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LITERARY CRITICISM AND THE CONCEPT OF IMITATION IN ANTIQUITY

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THE term "imitation" is not prominent in the vocabulary of criticism today. In such use as it still has, it serves to segregate the bad from the good in art rather more frequently than to set the boundaries of art. Yet as late as the eighteenth century imitation was the mark and differentia of the arts, or at least of some of them. To the critics of that century, literature and painting were imitative arts, and it was still important to debate whether or not music was an art of imitation.¹ The term had begun to slip into disrepute in writings on the philosophy of art even before critics of art found it cumbersome or inappropriate, and substitutes for it with more familiar philosophic justification have long since been found; if it does occa-

¹ Thus, James Harris, in the second of his *Three treatises* (first published in 1744) entitled "A discourse on music, painting, and poetry," treats poetry, painting, and music as three types of imitation differing in their media and modes of imitation (2d. ed. [1765], pp. 55 ff.), although he goes on to say that poetry disposes of the charm of "numbers" as well as imitation (p. 92) and music possesses, besides the power of imitation, the power of raising affections (p. 99), "whereas Painting has pretence to no Charm, except that of Imitation" (p. 92). Thomas Twining, on the other hand, in the dissertation "On poetry considered as an imitative art," which he prefaced to his translation of Aristotle's *Poetics* (first published in 1789), distinguishes four senses of imitation as applied to poetry: imitation by the sounds of the words, by description, by fiction, and by dramatic imitation; and he argues (2d ed. [1812], I, 35) that, since the last is the proper sense of imitation, it is incorrect to say that all poetry is imitation; only dramatic poetry is properly imitative. Moreover, in the second dissertation prefaced to his translation, "On the different senses of the word, imitative, as applied to music by the ancients, and by the moderns," Twining concludes his argument by quoting with approbation from James Beattie's treatise *On poetry and music* the statement that music should be stricken off the list of the imitative arts (p. 91) and by maintaining further that painting, sculpture, and the arts of design in general are "the only arts that are obviously and essentially imitative" (p. 92).

sionally return to use, with the proper protection of a warning that it does not mean literal representation of its object, it is seldom extended to include music or literature.²

The defense, such as it is, of "imitation" as a term applicable to poetry or suited to apply to all of the arts, has in our times fallen largely into the hands of historians of aesthetics and criticism; and although the fortune varies in the debate, the discredit which the term has suffered in modern criticism tends to be found earlier and earlier. "That the 'Imitation' doctrine of the *Poetics* is in some respects disputable need not be denied," according to Saintsbury,³ "and that it lent itself rather easily to serious misconstruction is certain. But let us remember also that it is an attempt—perhaps the first attempt, and one that has not been much bettered in all the improvements upon it—to adjust those proportions of nature and art which actually do exist in poetry." "It is natural," Bosanquet says,⁴ "that the earliest formula adopted by reflection should be strained to the breaking point before it is abandoned." "Aristotle, as his manner was," according to Butcher,⁵ "accepted the current phrase and interpreted it anew. True, he may sometimes have been misled by its guidance, and not infrequently his meaning is obscured by his adherence to the outworn formula." Atkins writes:⁶

Moreover the statement [i.e., Plato's statement of the relation of the arts to each other and to the universe in *Laws* 889B–D] helps to explain why "imitation" (and not "creation" or "expression") had been adopted as the process common to all the arts. To the Greeks before Plato, devoid of a mystical sense of an invisible order of realities, the plain and obvious fact was that the artist did not produce the objects of real life, but their appearances only; and it was therefore inevitable that the impression produced on their minds was rather that of imitative representation than of creation, interpretation, or the like.

The practice of historians of literary criticism would be conclusive, even if their evidence from the writers of antiquity were not impres-

² Thus George Santayana, in *Reason in art*, Vol. IV of *The Life of Reason* (New York, 1917), pp. 144 ff., discusses sculpture, acting, and painting as modes of imitation. Music, poetry, prose, and architecture had, however, been treated in earlier chapters before the concept of imitation was introduced.

³ George Saintsbury, *A history of criticism and literary taste in Europe* (New York, 1900), I, 54.

⁴ Bernard Bosanquet, *A history of aesthetics* (4th ed.; London, 1917), p. 13.

⁵ S. H. Butcher, *Aristotle's theory of poetry and fine art* (4th ed.; London, 1923), p. 122.

⁶ J. W. H. Atkins, *Literary criticism in antiquity* (Cambridge, 1934), I, 52.

sive, in establishing the variety of the meanings which the term "imitation" has assumed in the course of its history. Yet that diversity of meaning is seldom the direct object of critical attention: the term is vague, inadequate, primitive, and its use involves a play on words when it does not lead to self-contradiction. But when one returns to the ancient writers on which these historical labors are employed, it is difficult to retain a sense of the limitations and deficiencies with which scholarship has enriched the term. Instead, constant vigilance is required to discover the ineptitudes which should result from the use of so inept a word. For all the attempts that have been made to define "imitation" and for all the care that has been exercised in examining the statement in which it occurs, the philosophical contexts in which the word "imitation" is used and methodological questions as they apply to its use have received little scrutiny. Yet the meaning of a word will alter with a change in either context or peculiarities of method, notwithstanding that the definition may be retained; and if these remain unchanged, it is possible for the doctrine of imitation to persist in all essentials, even when the term has disappeared. If the critical views in which the word "imitation" appeared, no less than methodological devices peculiar to the systems in which the term was used, have survived the discredit of the term itself, the attempt to distinguish among the critical approaches of antiquity may not be without relevance to the modern analogues that have replaced them.

The word "imitation," as Plato uses it, is at no time established in a literal meaning or delimited to a specific subject matter. It is sometimes used to differentiate some human activities from others or some part of them from another part or some aspect of a single act from another; it is sometimes used in a broader sense to include all human activities; it is sometimes applied even more broadly to all processes—human, natural, cosmic, and divine. Like most of the terms that figure prominently in the dialogues, "imitation" as a term is left universal in scope and indeterminate in application. The dialectical method is used to determine its meaning in particular contexts, sometimes bringing out a meaning according to which any given statement in which it may occur is true, sometimes with equal force the meanings in which

the statement is false; not infrequently both ends are accomplished in a single dialogue. Of existent objects, Plato says,⁷ there are three things necessary for knowledge: the name (*ὄνομα*), the reason (*λόγος*), and the image (*εἶδωλον*); knowledge and the object itself are apart from these. Whether or not Plato wrote the epistle in which those distinctions are made, his practice seems to conform to it. "For as yet," the Stranger says at the beginning of the *Sophist*,⁸ "we have in common concerning him only the name." He suggests that he and his interlocutor doubtless have the thing in mind as well; but they must come to an agreement concerning the thing by means of reason, not by the mere words without the reason. Somewhat later, in discussing angling, they arrive at agreement not only concerning the name but also concerning the reason or definition of the thing itself.⁹ But when the search for the Sophist grows into an inquiry into being and non-being, pursued by way of word and reason, the Stranger remarks that in the case of being, as in that of every single thing which is supposed to be one, we call the single thing by many names and treat it as many.¹⁰ Not infrequently the speakers in the Platonic dialogues have reason to complain of the opposite difficulty, that many things are found to have the same name. It is probable that no small part of Plato's distrust of the written word is caused by the margin of independence which obtains between words, things, and reasons but which can be controlled in conversation by a skilled dialectician.

In any case, to require Plato to conform to an Aristotelian conception of definitions or terms in which words are assigned univocal meanings would be to distort his inquiry and make nonsense of much of his dialectic. It is invalid criticism to point out that a term like "imitation" has many meanings in Plato, and for the same reason it is questionable defense of the Platonic position to resolve the many meanings into one.¹¹ The word might be said to be defined in the

⁷ *Epist.* vii. 342A-B.

⁸ *Sophist* 218C.

⁹ *Ibid.* 221B.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* 251A-B. Consequent on this relation of names to things, Socrates frequently reproaches his respondents for finding many things where one is sought (as in *Meno* 72A or 77A), or again he is reproached by them for changing the meanings of his terms (as in *Gorgias* 483A); and on the other hand, speakers are praised for reducing many or infinite things to one name and for finding appropriate names for each subdivision (as in *Theaetetus* 147C-148B).

¹¹ J. Tate thus finds two kinds of imitation in the *Republic*: imitation in the literal sense, the mere copying of sensible objects; and imitation in an analogical sense, such that poetry in which imitation of this sort occurred could be considered non-imitative ("Imi-

course of the dialogues, but it receives no fixed meaning. The discussion proceeds by applying things and reasons to the elucidation of words, and in that process "imitation" and all like words suffer extensions and limitations. Unless the list is made indefinitely long to include infinite possible meanings, it is hardly accurate to say that the word has "several senses." From one point of view, "imitation" has only one meaning in Plato; from another, it has infinite meanings.

The methodological considerations which are so prominent in the use of words, and which control their meanings in what Plato would call a strange and wonderful fashion, may be stated in a way that has excellent Platonic precedent by setting forth the things to which Plato applied the word "imitation" and the other words which Plato applied to the same things—the many words which are applied to one thing, and the many things to which one word is applied. Without such considerations, on the other hand, inasmuch as they underlie some of Plato's most esteemed devices for displaying the meanings of words, it is difficult to know how the Platonic doctrine of poetry (to mention only one application) can be stated, or how its relation to later theories can be estimated, or how the condemnations which Plato passed on poets can be judged. In one of its narrowest senses Plato used the word "imitation" to distinguish poetic styles into three kinds: pure narrative, in which the poet speaks in his own person without imitation, as in the dithyramb; narrative by means of imitation, in which the poet speaks in the person of his characters, as in comedy and tragedy; and mixed narrative, in which the poet speaks now in his own person and now by means of imitation.¹² In the *Repub-*

tation' in Plato's *Republic*," in the *Classical quarterly*, XXII [1928], 23). In a later article ("Plato and 'imitation,'" *ibid.*, XXVI [1932], 161-69), Mr. Tate refers to this as a distinction between a good and a bad sense of the term "imitation": poetry which is imitative in the bad sense is excluded from the ideal state, while poetry which is imitative in the good sense can be called non-imitative rather than imitative, depending on the sense in which the term "imitative" is used. In this second article Mr. Tate finds support in the remaining dialogues for his earlier interpretation of imitation in the *Republic*. W. C. Greene contrasts the "literal kind of imitation" implied in the tenth book of the *Republic* with the imitation in the second and third books of the *Republic* which involves an attenuated form of the doctrine of ideas and which is criticized on ethical grounds in a not-unfriendly spirit ("Plato's view of poetry," in *Harvard studies in classical philology*, XXIX [1918], 37-38). In Book x, according to Mr. Greene, Plato begs the question by assuming that the definition of imitation will cover the aim of poetry (p. 53). Imitation in its broadest sense was a metaphor to which Plato resorted, with evident dissatisfaction, to explain the relation of the world of sense to the world of ideas (p. 66).

¹² *Republic* III. 392D-394C.

lic the preference among poets is for the unmixed imitator of the good, since the guardians of an ideal state should be educated to imitate only what is appropriate to them.¹³ Even this discussion of style and the manner of imitation involves a distinction of objects of imitation into worthy and unworthy in terms of the scale of their perfection of being. Moreover, previous to the discussion of style, the examination of the tales themselves, limited to proper subjects among gods, heroes, and men, led to a distinction not between worthy and unworthy but between true and false. The truths of poetry are imitations of the good. Falsehoods in words are likewise imitations, but the objects of such imitations have no external existence. False tales are imitations (μίμημα) of a lie in the soul, an after-rising image (εἰδωλον) of it. Poetry, even false, is not an unmixed falsehood, but requires the antecedent lie for its explanation.¹⁴

The terms alternative to "imitation" (μίμησις) begin to make their appearance in the discussion of falsity. A lie occurs when one copies (εἰκάζειν) the true nature of gods and heroes badly; it is comparable to a portrait which bears no resemblance (ὁμοία) to the painter's model.¹⁵ The argument concerning imitation may, moreover, be applied to the form in which it is itself stated, for the lie of the poet is explained by the image and likeness of the painter. Even at this early stage "imitation" may be applied to poetry in several senses; according to one, dramatic poetry is imitative of the speech of the characters; according to another, false poetry is imitative of a lie in the soul; according to a third, true poetry is imitative of the good. The lawgiver will lay down laws and patterns (τύπος) to which the poet will be required to conform;¹⁶ and as soon as the philosopher is given his function in the perfect state, he too enters into the imitative process. He imitates the things which truly are and assimilates (ἀφομοιοῦσθαι) himself to them. He should, moreover, be compelled to mold (πλάττειν) human nature to his vision; no city is happy unless its lineaments have been traced by artists who used the heavenly model (παραδείγμα).¹⁷ Through these varying applications the term "imitation" indicates a constant relation between something

¹³ *Ibid.* III. 397D.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* II. 382B.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* II. 377E.

¹⁶ *Ibid.* II. 380C.

¹⁷ *Ibid.* VI. 500C-E.

which is and something made like it: the likeness itself may be good or bad, real or apparent. When, consequently, poetry is examined again in the tenth book of the *Republic* and is found to be imitative, it is incorrect to suppose that the word "imitation" has been unduly extended or that it has been given a new literal sense. The imitator (*μιμητής*) is defined as a maker of images (*εἰδωλον ποιητής*) and is contrasted to the maker of realities; unlike the latter he has no knowledge of being but only of appearances.¹⁸ Both varieties of maker, moreover, stand in contrast to an *eternal reality*. Like the painter who paints the picture of a couch, the imitator makes a product at three removes from nature, for he imitates not that which is but that which seems to be, not the truth but a phantasm.¹⁹ Poetry, therefore, at that removal from truth, attains only a small part of the object, and the part it attains is not the object itself but an image (*εἰδωλον*) capable of deceiving. If the poet were able to produce the things he imitates instead of making only images, if he had knowledge of the truth, he would abandon imitation.²⁰ Truth and falsity, knowledge and opinion, reality and appearance delimit at each step the scope of "imitation"; but as its application has varied, it has marked consistently a contrast between the work of imitation and something else which is, in comparison with it, real.

Even when limited to poetry and analogous activities, then, the concept of imitation may expand and contract. It may embrace a part of poetry, or all poetry, or even philosophy as well. But it also extends to other human activities. All the arts are imitative. The painter is comparable to the poet in his imitative character;²¹ a good picture is one which reproduces the colors and figures of its subject.²² Music is an imitation (*μίμησις*), a representation (*ἀπεικασία*), a copy (*εἰκαστική*); good music possesses a standard of rightness and is a likeness of the beautiful (*ὁμοιότης τοῦ καλοῦ*).²³ The entire art of dancing is the result of imitation of what is said in song or speech.²⁴ Since values are determined either by the adequacy of the representa-

¹⁸ *Ibid.* x. 601C.

¹⁹ *Ibid.* x. 597D-598B.

²⁰ *Ibid.* x. 599A.

²¹ *Ibid.* x. 596E; *Sophist* 234B.

²² *Cratylus* 431C.

²³ *Laws* ii. 668A-B; cf. vii. 798D-E; *Cratylus* 423D.

²⁴ *Laws* vii. 816A.

tion or the character of the object imitated, the standards in dance and song may be stated in moral terms: figures and melodies which are expressive of the virtues of body or soul, or of copies (εἰκῶν) of them, are good.²⁵ Or the term "imitation" may be expanded in another direction from poetry. All verbal accounts, including the dialogues themselves, are imitations. At the beginning of the dialogue which bears his name, Critias remarks that all discourse is imitation (μίμησις) and representation (ἀπεικασιά); and he complains that his task is more difficult than the one that Timaeus performed, inasmuch as image-making (εἰδωλοποιία) is subjected to closer criticism when it represents well-known human subjects than when it represents divine things in which we are content with a small degree of likeness.²⁶ But in the *Timaeus* Socrates finds a difficulty in discourse almost the contrary to that of which Critias complained. To bring out the competence of the speakers in the succeeding dialogues, Socrates had been developing the contrast, in terms of the degree of their knowledge and the nature of their discourse, of philosophers and statesmen to the imitative tribe of poets and the wandering Sophists; the defects of his own presentation in the *Republic*, comparable to a defect he finds exemplified by the poets, arise from the fact that familiar things are easy to imitate, but what is unfamiliar is difficult to imitate in action and even more difficult in words.²⁷ Moreover, the component parts of poems, discourses, and dialogues are imitations. Words imitate things in a fashion distinct from that of music or design,²⁸ and the letters of which words are composed are themselves means of imitation. From letters and syllables, the lawgiver forms a sign (σημείον) and a name (ὄνομα) for each thing; and from names he compounds all the rest by imitation.²⁹ When the nature of things is imitated by letters and syllables, the copy (εἰκῶν) is good if it gives all that is appropriate, bad if it omits a little.³⁰

Not only arts, philosophy, and discourse are imitation. Human institutions must be added to the list. All governments are imitations of the true government;³¹ and the laws themselves, source of the true

²⁵ *Ibid.* II. 655B ff.; cf. VII. 812C.

²⁶ *Critias* 107B-C.

²⁷ *Timaeus* 19D-20B.

³¹ *Statesman* 293E; cf. *ibid.* 297C. It is significant, once more, that the nature of that imitation of the true government is explained by recourse to an image or figure (εἰκῶν, σχῆμα) in which the king is represented (ἀπεικάζειν) as pilot and physician.

²⁸ *Cratylus* 423C-424B.

²⁹ *Ibid.* 426C-427C.

³⁰ *Ibid.* 431D.

government, are imitations of particulars of the truth which are written down, so far as that is possible, from the dictation of those who know.³² But the expansion of the word "imitation" passes beyond human products, actions, virtues, and institutions; it extends to things themselves. All things change, imitating and following what happens to the entire universe; and the imitation conforms to its model even in conception, generation, and nutrition.³³ It extends finally to the first principles of things. The universe is distinguishable into three fundamental forms: the model form (*παράδειγματος εἶδος*), the imitation of the model (*μίμημα παραδείγματος*), and the Space or Receptacle in which Becoming takes place. Figures enter and depart in the Receptacle, as in a lump of gold which is curiously manipulated, in imitation of eternal figures, stamped (*τυποῦν*) from them in a marvelous fashion.³⁴

In its expansion and contraction, the word "imitation" indicates the lesser term of the proportion of being to appearance: if God is, the universe is an imitation; if all things are, shadows and reflections are imitations; if the products of man's handicraft are, his representations of them are imitations. If imitation is to be avoided, it is because of the danger of imitating, through error, ignorance, or falsehood, that which is not or that which is less than it might be or is less than that which imitates it. As confined to the arts, therefore, imitation is not coextensive with the productive arts; rather, it is a part of them, for they are divided into those which produce things which are and those which produce images (*εἰδωλον*); the latter is the imitative art. Even when art is contrasted to nature and chance, the arts are divided into those arts which produce images (*εἰδωλον*), related to each other but bearing little relation to truth, like music and painting, and those arts which co-operate with nature, like medicine, husbandry, and gymnastic.³⁵ The divine art suffers a like division, for in addition to natural objects which are the result of God's art, there are visions (*φάντασμα*) seen in dreams and waking, shadows (*σκία*), and reflections seen in polished surfaces.³⁶

Man likewise makes things which are, and he makes images. His

³² *Ibid.* 300B-C.

³³ *Ibid.* 274A.

³⁴ *Timaeus* 48E-49B; 50A-C.

³⁵ *Laws* x. 889A-D.

³⁶ *Sophist* 266B.

imitative or image-making art (εἰδωλοποικὴ τέχνη) is divided into two parts, the copymaking art (εἰκαστική), which follows its original in length, breadth, depth, and color, and the fantastic art (φανταστική), in which truth is abandoned and the images are given, not their actual proportions, but such proportions as seem beautiful. The products of the second branch of the imitative art are appearances or phantasms (φάντασμα), and they are no longer even like things which are.³⁷ The proportion of being to appearance may be pursued to even greater refinements; that portion of that fantastic art in which the artist uses his own person as his instrument, making his figure and voice seem similar to another's, is called imitation (μίμησις);³⁸ and the return is complete to the sense of imitation by which dramatic poetry was distinguished from other kinds in the third book of the *Republic*. The proportion of truth to falsity, and the proportion of knowledge to opinion, as might be expected, play as constant a rôle in the discussion of imitation as the proportion of being to appearance. The art of midwifery which Socrates practices on Theaetetus to bring forth his ideas is employed to distinguish the image from the real offspring,³⁹ and it is unsuccessful when it produces mere lies and images (ψευδῆ καὶ εἰδωλα).⁴⁰ If statesmen had no knowledge of what they were doing, they would imitate the truth but would imitate it badly; if they had knowledge, the imitation would be the truth itself and no longer an imitation.⁴¹ If a man had genuine knowledge of the things he imitated, he would abandon the fashioning of images and devote himself to real things and actions rather than to imitating them.⁴² Yet, on the other hand, by imitation of the unvarying revolutions of the God, we may stabilize the variable revolutions within ourselves;⁴³ and there is intellectual delight in the imitation of the divine harmony manifested in mortal motions.⁴⁴

Even in a hasty adumbration of the infinite gradations of meaning and application which the term "imitation" undergoes in the

³⁷ *Ibid.* 235B-236C. Cf. *Republic* x. 598B, where painting is said to be an imitation, not of that which is as it is, but of appearance as it appears; it is an imitation of a phantasm, not of truth.

³⁸ *Ibid.* 267A.

³⁹ *Theaetetus* 150A.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.* 150E.

⁴¹ *Statesman* 300D-E.

⁴² *Republic* x. 599A.

⁴³ *Timaeus* 47C.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.* 80B.

Platonic dialogues, it is apparent that a great many similar terms undergo similar variations and approximate similar meanings in the succession of subjects on which imitation is brought to play. Several such terms have been necessary for the preceding exposition. Imitation is the making of images (εἰδωλον). The art of image-making may produce copies (εἰκόν) or phantasms (φάντασμα), the difference between the two being that a copy is like its object, a phantasm is not. Yet a copy, to be correct, must not reproduce all the qualities of that which it copies. The painter makes a copy when he represents (ἀπεικάζειν) the color and form of his subject.⁴⁵ The control of poetic copies was to be the specific object of the supervision of poets and other artisans in the third book of the *Republic*. They were to be compelled to embody in their work copies of the good and to be prohibited from setting forth copies of the evil.⁴⁶ Similarly, the competent critic in any of the arts must know, first, what the copy is; second, how correctly it has been presented; third, how well it has been executed in words, melodies, and rhythms.⁴⁷ Even philosophic arguments are copies, for the solution of the question, whether injustice is profitable to the completely unjust man, in the *Republic*, is arrived at by fashioning a copy of the soul in discourse⁴⁸ (εἰκόνα πλάσαντες τῆς ψυχῆς λόγῳ) in order to show the propounder of that view precisely what he is saying. There are copies (εἰκόν) and likenesses (ὁμοίωμα) of ideas in which few, unfortunately, can see the nature which they copy;⁴⁹ and finally the universe itself is a copy of the intelligible (εἰκόν τοῦ νοητοῦ).⁵⁰

As these fundamental terms are expanded, others are added to the list. An image (εἰδωλον) is defined as a thing made in the likeness (ἁφομοιοῦν) of the true thing, but only after a preliminary skirmish in which images in water and in mirrors are invoked to explain images.⁵¹ Reflection in mirrors and in water is a constant device by which Plato clarifies his use of images and copies: the images and phantasms of men and other things are seen in water preliminary to examining men and things in their true natures;⁵² one's eyes would be

⁴⁵ *Cratylus* 432B.

⁴⁶ *Republic* III. 401B.

⁴⁷ *Laws* II. 669A.

⁴⁸ *Republic* IX. 588B.

⁴⁹ *Phaedrus* 250B.

⁵⁰ *Timaeus* 92C; cf. *ibid.* 29B ff.

⁵¹ *Sophist* 239D-240A.

⁵² *Republic* 516A-B.

ruined if one looked at the sun directly instead of at its copy in water or in something else of that sort;⁵³ one should make one's thought clear by means of verbs and nouns, modeling (*έκτυποῦν*) opinion in the stream that flows through the lips as in a mirror or in water;⁵⁴ the versatility of the imitative artist which produces the appearance, though not the reality, of all things is explained by comparison to a mirror;⁵⁵ the liver is so fashioned that the power of thought, proceeding from the mind, moves in the liver as in a mirror which receives impressions (*τύπος*) and provides images (*εἶδωλον*), and the spleen is like a wiper for the mirror.⁵⁶

Images and copies, however, as the metaphor would suggest, provide no satisfactory substitute for reality, though they are a necessary stage in the approach to reality. To understand the image we must know the reality; but to know the reality we must dispose of images. If there are copies (*εἰκῶν*) of letters in water or in mirrors, we shall never know them until we know the originals, and we shall never be true musicians until we know the forms of temperance, courage, liberality, and the rest.⁵⁷ He who studies things that are in arguments and reasons (*λόγος*) is as distinct from him who looks at them in copies (*εἰκῶν*) as he is from him who considers them in their operations and works (*ἔργον*).⁵⁸ There are many variants to the figure. The mirror may even appear in a text in which the mind is like a block of wax,⁵⁹ on which perceptions and thoughts are impressed (*ἀποτυπῶσθαι*) like the imprint of signet rings (*δακτυλίων σημεία*);⁶⁰ they persist as memorial imprints in the soul (*μνημεῖον ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ*), impressions (*τύπος*), seals (*σφάγισ*),⁶¹ imprints or signs (*σημεῖον*),⁶² and even footprints (*ἵχνος*);⁶³ and we remember as long as the image (*εἶδωλον*) lasts.⁶⁴ The soul is likewise a book in which memory, perception, and feelings inscribe copies (*εἰκῶν*).⁶⁵ Analogies might be multiplied or the list of terms further extended; but in that development, even in an attenuated form, the discussion turns, as is inevitable if the thesis

⁵³ *Phaedo* 99D.

⁵⁴ *Theaetetus* 206D.

⁵⁵ *Republic* x. 596D-E.

⁵⁶ *Timaeus* 71B; 72C.

⁵⁷ *Republic* iii. 402B-C.

⁵⁸ *Phaedo* 100A.

⁵⁹ *Theaetetus* 193C.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.* 191D.

⁶¹ *Ibid.* 192A.

⁶² *Ibid.* 192B.

⁶³ *Ibid.* 193C.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.* 191D.

⁶⁵ *Philebus* 38E-39B.

is correct, from the specific doctrine of imitation to embrace the entire philosophy of Plato and from the process of imitation to the devices of dialectic. Even the figure of the divided line is in terms familiar to the doctrine of imitation, although the movement is from copies to reality rather than from reality to copies: all things are divided into the visible and the intelligible, and each of these parts in turn is divided into two classes. The first of the two classes of visible things is the class of copies (εἰκόν), which includes shadows (σκία) and reflections of phantasms in water (τὰ ἐν τοῖς ὕδασι φαντάσματα).⁶⁶ The second class of visible things is that of which the previous is a likeness or copy, that is, natural things, and the proportion between the likeness (ὁμοιωθέν) and that of which it is a likeness is the proportion between the objects of opinion and the objects of knowledge. But the soul, when it comes to investigate the first portion of the intelligible part of the line, must treat as copies the things which were imitated in the first part of the line; it is for that reason that the geometer draws squares and diagonals.⁶⁷ Once the discussion pursues this direction, it is only a step from "imitation" to the terms which guard the loftiest reaches of the Platonic dialectic, to recollection (ἀνάμνησις),⁶⁸ to presence in (παρουσία),⁶⁹ and participation (μέθεξις, κοινωνία).⁷⁰

To elaborate the full significance of the term "imitation," consequently, more is required than the simple enumeration of the list of other words equivalent to it or used in its explication. Each of the terms of that lengthy list varies with the variation of "imitation." The set of significances employed in the dialogues may indeed be conceived as a huge matrix composed of all the words of a language, each possessed of an indefinite number of shades of meaning, the particular meaning of a word at any given time being determined by the meanings of other words drawn from that matrix in conjunction with which it is used. It is inevitable that the doctrine of imitation invade the philosophic enterprise and the dialectical method. All discourse is an imitation, and the interlocutors of the dialogues are constantly using,

⁶⁶ *Republic* vi. 509E-510A.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.* 510B-511A.

⁶⁸ *Phaedo* 72E, 92D; *Phaedrus* 249C; *Laws* v. 732B.

⁶⁹ *Gorgias* 497E; *Phaedo* 100D.

⁷⁰ *Sophist* 256A, 259A; *Parmenides* 132D.

discussing, and complaining of images, likenesses, metaphors, and copies. " 'Your question,' I said, 'requires an answer expressed in an image [εἰκών].' 'And you,' he said, 'of course, are not accustomed to speak in images.' ”⁷¹ The image is frequently successful, frequently bad.⁷² Even more important, the proportion of being to appearance, of truth to probability, obtains in discourse as in other things. It is proper to conceive all things as imitations; yet imitation should be avoided. All discourse deals in likenesses; yet one must be on one's guard against likenesses (δμοιότης).⁷³ Used with knowledge, however, there is no danger in imitation, whether the imitation be of lesser things or of greater; and so, too, dialectic may move in either direction, it may clarify the lesser by the greater, or the greater by the less.⁷⁴

The criteria of good, true, and beautiful derive from the same proportion of being to appearance which operated throughout the doctrine of imitation. If the artificer of any object uses the uniform and eternal as his model, the object so executed must of necessity be beautiful; but if his model is a created object, his work so executed is not beautiful.⁷⁵ Discourse concerning the abiding and unshakeable should be, as far as possible, irrefutable and invincible; but accounts of that which is copied after the likeness of the model are themselves copies and possess only likelihood, for as Being is to Becoming, Truth is to Belief.⁷⁶ In like manner and for like reason the Good gives truth to the objects of knowledge and the power of knowing, and is itself more beautiful even than they.⁷⁷ The pursuit of beauty does not follow a different path from that which leads to truth and goodness. It is no accidental consequence, therefore, and it is no evidence of an inexplicable insensitivity to poetry in a great writer, that poetry should fall so low in Plato's analysis or that the poet should have no place in the perfect state. Criteria of truth and morality are ap-

⁷¹ *Republic* vi. 487E. Cf. *Laws* 644C; *Gorgias* 517D; *Symposium* 215A, and *passim*.

⁷² *Phaedo* 99E.

⁷³ *Sophist* 231A.

⁷⁴ Thus, in the *Republic* ii. 369A, Socrates proposes first to treat of the state and then to seek the likeness (δμοιότης) of the greater in the lesser, whereas in the *Sophist* 218D the lesser is used as the model (παράδειγμα) for the greater. Cf. *ibid.* 221C, 226B.

⁷⁵ *Timaeus* 28A-B.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.* 29C.

⁷⁷ *Republic* vi. 508E.

plied as a natural course to the poet's work. He is permitted even in the ideal state to tell his tales, properly censored, as an incident of education and as a means of inculcating virtue. He may tell tales concerning the gods, to teach men "to honor the gods and their fathers and mothers, and not to hold their friendship with one another in light esteem";⁷⁸ he may tell tales concerning heroes to inspire the virtues of courage and self-control or temperance; but the discussion of the one remaining subject of his tales, men, is interrupted because justice would properly be inculcated by such tales, and, since the nature and value of justice has not yet been determined in the dialogue, instructions concerning the limitations of his poems are not yet ready for the poet.⁷⁹ Before that is possible the one remaining virtue, wisdom, which is left for expression to the scientist and the dialectician, since the poet can make no contribution to it, must be examined. If then one seeks tales about men, that is, tales by which men may learn justice, the *Republic* itself is such a tale, one long dialectical poem written for the elucidation of justice. In the *Laws*, where the concern is no longer with an ideal state but with one which is second best,⁸⁰ the function of the poet and the musician, still rigorously censored, is enlarged. In the *Republic* he found himself in competition with the dialectician, sadly handicapped by his lack of knowledge; in the *Laws* he is in competition with the Lawgiver, for the whole state is an imitation of the best and noblest life, which is the very truth of poetry.⁸¹ It is not its imitative character but its lack of truth and knowledge which brings poetry to its low estate. Homer and all the poetic tribe are imitators of images of virtue (*μιμηταὶ εἰδώλων ἀρετῆς*) and of other things, but they do not lay hold on truth.⁸² Poetry is a kind of madness comparable to the art of divination or prophecy, or to the art of purification by mysteries, or to that higher madness which seizes the soul when it contemplates in true knowledge, like that of the gods, essence, formless, colorless, intangible. But we are told that when the soul falls from such contemplation it passes first

⁷⁸ *Ibid.* iii. 386A.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.* iii. 392A-C.

⁸⁰ *Laws* v. 739A; vii. 807B.

⁸¹ *Ibid.* vii. 817B. "You are poets and we are poets in the same things, your rivals as artists and actors in the fairest drama, which true law and that alone can carry out, as our hope is."

⁸² *Republic* x. 600E.

into a philosopher or a lover; second, into a king or warrior; third, into a householder or money-maker; fourth, into a gymnast; fifth, into a prophet or mystic; sixth, into a poet or imitator; and there are but nine stages in this progressive degradation of the soul.⁸³ The poet, like the interpreter of the poet, may be inspired by a divine gift;⁸⁴ but like the statesman, who is similarly inspired, he possesses at best only right opinion which is short of knowledge,⁸⁵ and like Ion, his interpreter, he is repeatedly given the rhapsode's final choice between inspiration and injustice.⁸⁶

In Aristotle's usage, not only does the term "imitation" have a different definition than it had for Plato but, much more important, Aristotle's method of defining terms and his manner of using them have nothing in common with the devices of the dialogues. There is a double consequence of these differences. Whereas for Plato the term "imitation" may undergo an infinite series of gradations of meaning, developed in a series of analogies, for Aristotle the term is restricted definitely to a single literal meaning. In the second place and as a consequence of the first difference, whereas for Plato an exposition of the word "imitation" involves an excursion through all the reaches of his philosophy, "imitation" for Aristotle is relevant only to one restricted portion of the domain of philosophy and never extends beyond it. For Plato dialectic is a device by which words, normally opaque, may be made translucent so that a truth and a beauty which are beyond words may shine through them. Though it is a device formulated in terms of words and conceived for the manipulation of words, it is the thing which is held constant; and it is the thing to which the attention of the mind is directed, while the word, on the other hand, varies and is to be discarded once it has served its function as a stage in the progress to truth. Things can be learned, Socrates says,⁸⁷ either through names or through themselves; but although one may learn from the name, which is a copy (*εἰκὼν*), both whether it is a good copy and the truth of which it is a copy, it

⁸³ *Phaedrus* 244A-245A; 248C-E.

⁸⁴ *Ion* 533D-E.

⁸⁵ *Meno* 99A-E.

⁸⁶ *Ion* 542A.

⁸⁷ *Cratylus* 439A-B.

is better to learn from the truth both the truth itself and whether the copy is properly made. The end of the dialectical process may in a sense be said to be the definition of words, but any word may have many definitions. For Aristotle, on the contrary, the definition of terms and the establishment of principles are the beginnings of the scientific enterprise. Words may have many meanings, and Aristotle frequently enumerates divergent senses of a given word. But in science they must be terms and must therefore be univocal. A term is a word plus a meaning. Consequently, although the Aristotelian sciences are distinguished according to their subject matters, it is the term which is held constant; and a given object, under different aspects isolated by different terms, may move from science to science. As mind, man would be a subject for psychology; as animal, a subject for biology; as natural thing, a subject for physics; as moral agent, a subject for ethics; as tragic actor, a subject for poetics. There results from these two differences a third difference in the fashion in which Plato and Aristotle use words, among others the word "imitation." Plato may ask concerning a given thing in different contexts whether or not it is an imitation, and may arrive in two places, without inconsistency, at two answers, that it is an imitation and that it is not an imitation; for Aristotle, if a given thing is an imitation, it cannot *not* be an imitation.

The method of Aristotle, then, proceeds by the literal definition of terms and by the division of the domain of knowledge into a number of sciences: the theoretical sciences—metaphysics, mathematics, and physics; the practical sciences or the sciences of action—ethics and politics; the "poetic" sciences or the sciences of making; each with its proper principles and, in the case of subordinate sciences, principles derived from superior sciences. Imitation functions in that system as the differentia by which the arts, useful and fine, are distinguished from nature. Art imitates nature, Aristotle was fond of repeating,⁸⁸ and, at least in the case of the useful arts, the deficiencies of nature are supplemented in the process of that imitation by art following the same methods as nature would have employed. "Generally, art partly completes what nature cannot bring to a finish, and

⁸⁸ *Physics* ii. 2. 194^a21; *Meteor.* iv. 3. 381^b6.

partly imitates her."⁸⁹ Thus, if a house were a natural product, it would pass through the same stages that it in fact passes through when it is produced by art; and if natural products could also be produced by art, they would move along the same lines that the natural process actually takes. The fine arts differ from the useful in their means of imitation, and consequently in the end of their imitation, for they have no end beyond the perfection of their product as determined by their object and the means they employ. Apart from such differences they are imitations of nature in the same sense as the useful arts. The term, therefore, does not have the scope of application which it possesses in Plato; and such accidental coincidences of verbal expression as occur are in a limited region of philosophy, particularly in the discussion of poetry and most striking in the discussion of dramatic poetry. For Aristotle imitation is not, at one extreme, the imitation of ideas, such as philosophers and the Demiurge indulge in according to Plato; nor is it, at the other extreme, the imitation of appearances themselves imitations, such as satisfies the Platonic poet. Imitation, being peculiar to the processes of art, is not found in the processes of nature or of knowledge. For the natural is that which has an internal principle of motion, whereas the change which is effected in artificial objects is from an external principle. Moreover, for Aristotle imitation is not an imitation of an idea in the mind of the artist; such a statement would be meaningless in the context of the Aristotelian system, though one might properly point out that the forms of the things which proceed from art are in the mind of the artist.⁹⁰ Rather, imitation is of particular things; the object of imitation, according to the statement of the *Poetics*⁹¹ which seems to be intended to apply to all the fine arts, is the actions of men.

Aristotle says relatively little concerning the process of imitation, and that little has been subject to great differences of interpretation; yet what he says of natural objects and their production and of artificial objects and their making affords sound basis for reconstruction of his theory of imitation. The natural object, composite of form and matter, acts according to the natural principle of its being; in imi-

⁸⁹ *Physics* II. 8. 199^a15.

⁹⁰ *Metaphysics* VII. 7. 1032^a32-34.

⁹¹ *Poetics* 2. 1448^a1.

tation the artist separates some form from the matter with which it is joined in nature—not, however, the “substantial” form, but some form perceptible by sensation—and joins it anew to the matter of his art, the medium which he uses. The action which he imitates may be “natural” to the agent, but the artist must attempt to convey not that natural appropriateness and rightness, but rather a “necessity or probability” suitably conveyed by the materials of his art. It is for this reason that “a likely impossibility is always preferable to an unconvincing possibility.”⁹² The analysis might be illustrated from the various arts. The man who sits for his portrait assumes a posture which is determined by the laws of gravitation, by the anatomy of the human body, and the peculiarities of his habits; the painter must justify the line he chooses not in terms of physics or anatomy, but in terms of the composition which appears in the colors and lines on his canvas. A man performs an action as a consequence of his character, his heritage, his fate, or his past actions; the poet represents that action as necessary in his medium, which is words, by developing the man’s character, by expressing his thoughts and those of men about him, by narrating incidents. For Aristotle, consequently, imitation may be said to be, in the fine arts, the presentation of an aspect of things in a matter other than its natural matter, rendered inevitable by reasons other than its natural reasons; in the useful arts it is the realization of a function in another matter or under other circumstances than those which are natural. It is no contradiction, consequently, that the artist should imitate natural things, and that he should none the less imitate them “either as they were or are, or as they are said or thought to be or to have been, or as they ought to be.”⁹³ Art imitates nature; the form joined to matter in the physical world is the same form that is expressed in the matter of the art. Art does not abstract universal forms as science does, but imitates the forms of individual things. Yet, just as the form of man differs from man to man, so the actions of the historical Orestes differ from the actions presented as probable or necessary for Orestes in the plot of a play; and if Orestes had no historical counterpart, the play would still, in this sense of imitation, be an imitation of the actions of men.

⁹² *Ibid.* 24. 1460-26.

⁹³ *Ibid.* 25. 1460-10-13.

Whereas the word "imitation" and related words appear in almost every dialogue of Plato, the incidence of the term "imitation" in Aristotle is limited, with the exception of one passage in the *Politics*, almost entirely to the *Poetics*. It is the imitative element in his work that makes the poet a poet.⁹⁴ The various arts and the various kinds of poetry may be distinguished as modes of imitation; and therefore, approaching the problem in his accustomed scientific orderliness, Aristotle considers the arts according to the differences in the means, the objects, and the manners of their imitations. In the *Poetics* he has occasion to treat only of the arts which use rhythm, language, and harmony as their means of imitation, though color and form are mentioned as other means.⁹⁵ Flute-playing and lyre-playing use a combination of harmony and rhythm. The dance, with only rhythms and attitudes, can represent men's characters as well as what they do and suffer. The mime and the dialogue imitate by language alone without harmony. Other arts, including the dithyramb, the nome, tragedy, and comedy, combine all three means—rhythm, melody, and verse—differing from each other, however, in their manner of employment of these means. The object of imitation is the actions of men. With the differences of agents, the actions themselves are differentiated; and painters, musicians, and dancers can be distinguished and described according to the characters they represent. In this respect tragedy differs from comedy in that it makes its characters better rather than worse than the run of men. Given the same means and object of imitation, finally, two poems may differ in manner of imitation. One poet may speak at one moment in his own person, at another in the person of his characters, as Homer did; another poet may speak in a single person without change throughout; or in the third place the imitators may represent the whole story dramatically, as though they were actually doing the things described.⁹⁶ The familiar classification of the kinds of poetry thus recurs much as it appeared in Plato, and on this most concrete of the levels of Plato's dialectic Aristotle seems to come closest to the statement of his master. Yet, important distinctions must be made between the two statements. For Plato it is

⁹⁴ *Ibid.* 9. 1451^b28; 1. 1447^b15.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.* 1. 1447^a18 ff.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.* 3. 1148^a19.

a classification of three kinds of poetry: that which is effected by pure narrative, that which is effected by imitation, and the mixed kind which is effected by both. The preference is for the "unmixed imitator of the good."⁹⁷ Aristotle's distinction is among the manners of imitation in poems whose object and means of imitation are the same; to the other aspects of poetic imitation one further imitative characteristic is added. The question of preference among the various types is reserved for a later place,⁹⁸ and takes the form of the question whether the epic or the tragic is the higher form of imitation, the unmixed form not being considered. Moreover, the choice is made, not on moral but on literary grounds, because tragedy attains the poetic effect better than the epic. Aristotle is engaged in making literal distinctions, within the field of imitative art, of imitative devices and characteristics; dramatic imitation is one further imitative device to be added to other aspects of poetic imitation; his terms do not change their meanings, and his criteria are derived from a restricted field of discussion without reference beyond. Plato, on the other hand, applies the word "imitation" by means of the proportion of the real to appearance: relative to the narrative, drama is imitation; relative to the good, narrative too is imitation. No restricted field of literature with criteria peculiar to itself is indicated; rather, the proportions mark off at each application portions of the whole of things, real and apparent, and the criteria, envisaging the perfection of being which man might attain in that whole, are moral.

These primary distinctions serve a function in Aristotle's analysis comparable to that of the first principles of a science, although poetics is not a theoretic science and, like ethics and politics, it has no first principles in the precise sense in which Aristotle uses that term. These, however, are fundamental distinctions derived from the subject matter with which the inquiry is concerned, and they supply the apparatus about which the analysis of poetry is organized. There are six "parts" of tragedy: three—plot, character, and thought—determined by the object of imitation; two—diction and melody—determined by the means of imitation; one—spectacle—determined by the manner of imitation. For Aristotle, as for Plato, the object of

⁹⁷ *Republic* III. 387D.

⁹⁸ *Poetics* 26. 1461^b26 ff.

imitation is of primary importance; but that statement has a different significance in the context of Aristotle's analysis. In the dialogues it directed our attention from earthly things to eternal objects of imitation; in the *Poetics* it focuses discussion on the plot as an imitation of the actions of men. The plot is "the first essential, the life and soul, so to speak, of Tragedy."⁹⁹ The poet must be more the poet of his plots than of his verses, for he is a poet by virtue of the imitative element in his work, and it is actions that he imitates.¹⁰⁰ Character and thought follow in importance in the order named, and of the remaining three parts of the tragedy only diction is given extended discussion. The conditions of art, therefore, by which its representations are rendered necessary or probable are derived primarily from the object of imitation, and the discussion of tragedy in the *Poetics* is concerned largely with plot and character. Even the unity so essential to the work of art is not unrelated to its object of imitation, since "one imitation is always of one thing."¹⁰¹ Some of the conditions of art, as derived from the actions of men, pertain to the nature of art in general; some, derived from actions of a given kind, are specific to the art forms that are devoted to that kind; some conditions derived from the means of imitation, similarly, are generic to several kinds of art, as the devices of rhythm are used in poetry, music, and the dance; some are specific to particular arts, tone to music, words to poetry, color to painting.

In Plato it proved to be impossible to consider art without regard to its moral and political effects. Aristotle is no less aware of those effects and their implications; but in virtue of his method, whatever pertains to the subject of a particular science is reserved for treatment in that science. Tragedy may be used as a political instrumentality in the state or it may reflect political doctrines or motivations in its speeches: in either case, it does not function as a work of art but is properly treated among the problems of politics and rhetoric. Art in the state and thought in the drama are subjects which Aristotle apparently does not consider parts of the subject matter of the *Poetics*, for the first would need to be referred to the principles of political

⁹⁹ *Ibid.* 6. 1450^a38.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.* 9. 1451^b27-29.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.* 8. 1451^a31.

science, and the second, since thought is "the power of saying whatever is appropriate to the occasion,"¹⁰² falls within the scope of rhetoric and is referred to the Art of Rhetoric for treatment. Aristotle adds dryly that the older poets make their characters discourse like statesmen, and the moderns like rhetoricians. In the *Politics*¹⁰³ he treats the arts as instruments for teaching virtue and forming character. His attention centers almost entirely on music in the portion of the discussion of education which survives in that book. Rhythm and melody supply likenesses (*ὁμοίωμα*) of anger, gentleness, courage, temperance, and other qualities of character as well as their contraries; and the feelings of pleasure and pain at mere representations are not far removed from the same feelings about realities. The objects of senses like taste or touch furnish no likenesses to the virtues. There are figures in visible objects which do have that characteristic, but only to a small degree; and all people do not share in the feeling they occasion, for they are signs (*σημεῖον*) rather than likenesses of moral habits, indications which the body gives of states of feeling. The connection of painting or sculpture with morals is therefore slight. But even in simple melodies there are imitations (*μίμημα*) of moral habits, and the same is true of rhythms. It is primarily music among the arts which has the power of forming character; and Aristotle urges, therefore, that it be introduced into the education of the young.

If analogies are to be drawn between Plato's views on imitation and those of Aristotle and if the latter is to be assimilated to his master, as having effected either a distortion and retrogression or an advance and specification of the doctrines he learned in the Academy, the most fertile grounds for such comparison are found in the brief section in the *Politics*, for art is there discussed as a political force and politics is an architectonic science, limited by its practical character to the use of the analogical method. But even in the *Politics* the word and the method of its use falls short of the scope which it has in Plato's dialectic. Art, moreover, is there considered not as art but as a political device. To cite what is said concerning art in the *Politics* in refutation or in expansion of what is said on the same subject in the *Poetics*, without recognizing that the one is a political utterance, the

¹⁰² *Ibid.* 6. 1450^b6; cf. 19. 1456^a33.

¹⁰³ *Politics* viii. 5. 1339^a42-1340^b13.

other an aesthetic utterance, would be an error comparable to looking for evolution or refutation between the statements of the *Republic* and the *Laws*, without recognizing that the one has reference to a perfect state, the other to a state possible to men as they are. In the Aristotelian approach the aspects of things are distinguished from each other and treated independently; the major branches of the sciences are separated, and within each branch the major subdivisions; and since imitation is the differentia of art, and since the fine arts are further differentiated from the useful arts by their ends and their means, and since finally the fine arts are distinguished from each other by their respective means and the objects appropriate to those means, it follows not only that there is a branch of knowledge whose subject matter is the products of the arts, but also that each of the arts may be the subject properly for like investigation. The *Poetics* is such an examination of poetry in itself, not in its relation to education, morals, statesmanship, nature, or being. In Plato's analysis, on the other hand, art cannot be considered in isolation; it is one of the numerous strands of man's life and takes its importance and meaning from those strands; it bears analogies to all the other arts, to the phenomena of nature and the actions of the gods; distinctions in art parallel those of education, of science, of moral, social, and political life; in the dialectical examination of all these activities the same contraries are employed, the one and the many, being and becoming, the true and the false, knowledge and belief, the fair and the foul, and all of them involve imitation. Art is, therefore, never dissociated in the Platonic approach from the full context of life; and it is always subject to moral, political, educational, and scientific criticism, for there can be no other, no purely aesthetic, criticism of art.

The Platonic and the Aristotelian approaches to the consideration of art differ, therefore, not in the manner of two doctrines which contradict each other, but rather in the manner of two approaches to a subject which are mutually incommensurable. Even more, the differences of the two approaches and the peculiarities of the two methods indicate no superiority of the one over the other, nor are problems soluble by the one which are impervious to the analysis of the other. Although there is no place for distinct sciences, independent of each other, in Plato, there are none the less abundant devices by which to

make distinctions; and likewise, although all problems are assigned to their proper scientific context in Aristotle and although each science has its proper domain, its proper scope, and frequently methodological devices peculiar to itself, knowledge is not hopelessly atomized, for there are devices by which to consider phenomena in the context of all the varieties of problems. There are complementary dangers, moreover, in cross-references from one work of either of these philosophers to another. Plato never employs one dialectical strand alone: in the *Republic* and the *Laws* poetry is treated by means of analogies drawn successively from the numerous strands of political life; in the *Phaedrus* the analogies bind it to the other arts, particularly to the art of rhetoric; in the *Ion* it appears in connection with the divine gift of inspiration. Moreover, even between the *Republic* and the *Laws* the analogies have shifted—as indeed they shift from book to book within each of those works—for the context of one is the idea of a perfect state, the other the construction of a state short of perfection with specific social, economic, and political characteristics.

What is said about poetry in one of these contexts cannot be taken to be literally the same or literally contradictory to what is said of poetry in any of the other contexts. Just as the meaning in each dialogue is brought out by a dialectical development, so the translation from dialogue to dialogue requires similar dialectical modification. The doctrine of Plato concerning poetry cannot be built up by collecting quotations in which the word "poetry" appears throughout his works; the result of such an enterprise indeed is no doctrine whatever but, as the history of criticism has abundantly illustrated, a collection of inconsistent statements. Contrariwise, whereas in Plato's treatment the concepts of art and imitation are generalized or particularized to various dialectical contexts, in Aristotle the treatment of art and imitation, considered in their own right and in their proper science, may be supplemented by a consideration of them as they impinge on the problems of other sciences, on grammar, rhetoric, logic, ethics, politics, physics, psychology, or metaphysics. But to collect from the works concerned with the various sciences quotations in which the words "imitation" or "poetry" or "art" appear, with the intention to place them one after the other and so find in them a

coherent doctrine, results in an assemblage of statements as confused as the corresponding collections from the dialogues of Plato. As the statements of Plato require dialectical approximation to each other, the statements of Aristotle require the intrusion of proper principles from the appropriate sciences to permit transition from one to the other.

In Aristotle the term "imitation" is given a literal meaning and is limited in application to works of human art; in Plato the meaning is developed and contracted in analogies so that the word cannot be said to have determined application but is sometimes more general, sometimes more restricted, than any use in Aristotle. The word was used in still other senses by other writers in antiquity, but considerations of method are not so important in the fashions of their usage, and the systematic implications are not subtle. None of the writers on literature employed the dialectical method of Plato in any but a highly attenuated and faltering manner. Their definitions are literal like those of Aristotle, but in their writings the term "imitation" does not appear in a context of subject matters distributed in various scientific disciplines. Rather, the meanings in which they use the term are derived for the most part from one of the meanings which it assumed in Plato's dialogues, usually degraded and rendered static or, what amounts to the same thing, in a meaning which "imitation" might have had if Aristotle had used it in some other work than the *Poetics*, as, for example, the *Rhetoric*.

A third variant to the meanings of Plato and Aristotle may therefore be said to derive from the tradition of writers on rhetoric. In age, this view is at least contemporary with the other two, and it has perhaps an even longer and certainly less distorted history since the age of Plato. "For the rest" Isocrates says,¹⁰⁴ "he [the teacher] must in himself set such an example (*παράδειγμα*), that the students who are molded (*ἐκτυποῦν*) by him and are able to imitate (*μιμήσασθαι*) him will, from the outset, show in their speaking a degree of grace and charm greater than that of others." Though Aristotle wrote a *Rhetoric* (and, if Cicero and Quintilian are correct, justified himself in teaching rhetoric by turning a scathing epigram against Isocrates),

¹⁰⁴ *Against the Sophists* 18.

he confines his attention to the analysis of the means of persuasion available to the orator and finds no place for aphorisms concerning the imitation of past orators. He does say that man is the most imitative of animals and learns at first by imitation;¹⁰⁵ he distinguishes repeatedly in his works between sciences, which are acquired by learning; virtues, which are acquired by habituation; and arts, which are acquired by practice (*ἄσκησις*). It would be easier to find analogies in Plato for Isocrates' use of the term; but for Plato it would have that meaning only as applied to early education, for in maturity one would imitate, not the poet but him who knows. Strictly even then imitation is of the virtues and the truth, not of the wise man. Yet imitation in this rhetorical sense, imitation of other artists, continued to be used in the writings of rhetoricians and orators. Cicero frequently recommends the imitation of good models, and Dionysius of Halicarnassus composed a treatise *On imitation*, preserved unfortunately only in fragments, which he tells us consisted of three parts, the first on imitation in general, the second on the choice of writers for imitation (including poets, philosophers, historians, and orators), the third on the proper methods of imitation. The last subject, which was never completed by Dionysius, is one to which Quintilian returns,¹⁰⁶ for to his mind there are three essentials in the formation of the ideal orator—power of speech, imitation, and diligence of writing.¹⁰⁷ Imitation alone, to be sure, is not enough,¹⁰⁸ for invention must precede imitation, and the greatest qualities of the orator, including invention, are beyond imitation.¹⁰⁹ One should consider, Quintilian says, first whom to imitate, second what to imitate in the authors chosen.¹¹⁰ Imitation, he reminds us, should not be confined merely to words; one should consider also the appropriateness with which orators handle circumstances and persons, their

¹⁰⁵ *Poetica* 4. 1443⁹⁸.

¹⁰⁶ *Institutio oratoria* x. 2. 1–28.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.* x. 1. 3. Cf. *Rhetorica ad Herennium* i. 2. 3 (ed. Marx), in which three aids to proficiency in oratory are enumerated: art, imitation, and exercise. "Art" is preception which gives a certain way and reason of speaking. "Imitation" is that by which we are impelled with diligent reason to be similar to some model in speaking. "Exercise" is assiduous use and custom in speaking. Cf. Cicero, *De oratore* ii. 22–23.

¹⁰⁸ *Institutio oratoria* x. 2. 4.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.* x. 2. 12.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.* x. 2. 14, 27.

judgment and their powers of arrangement, their concentration of all parts of the speech to the end of victory. Yet his own treatment of imitation is confined almost wholly to the question of style. According to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, imitation is "a copying of models with the help of certain principles," but it involves a kind of psychological elevation as well: it is an "activity of the soul inspired by the spectacle of the seemingly beautiful."¹¹¹ Longinus regards zealous imitation of the great historians and poets of the past as one of the roads which leads to sublimity.¹¹²

We, too, then, when we are working at some passage which demands sublimity of thought and expression, should do well to form in our hearts the question, "How perchance would Homer have said this, how would Plato or Demosthenes have made it sublime, or Thucydides in his history?" Emulation will bring those great characters before our eyes, and like pillars of fire they will lead our thoughts to the ideal standards of perfection. Still more will this be so, if we give our minds the further hint, "How would Homer or Demosthenes, had either been present, have listened to this passage of mine? How would it have affected them?"¹¹³

Imitation of past authors, however, though it may be useful as a device for training orators or as a touchstone for sublime passages of prose and poetry, will not supply an object of imitation or a subject matter for poetry. To be sure, as an English poet was later to suggest, to imitate Homer was to imitate nature, but nature has become too generalized to supply the function exercised in the object of imitation as conceived in Plato or Aristotle. In the Platonic usage, the object of imitation is consistently that which is, or being, through all the variations of the meaning of the word. For Aristotle the object of imitation in poetry is the actions of men, though some of the arts may imitate character and passion as well. According to Aristotle the plot, the soul of the tragedy, gives unity to the work. Plot is seldom discussed by the later writers; but instead character, thought, or even natural things become the chief object of imitation. According to Dionysius, poets and prose writers must keep their eye on each object and frame words to picture them or borrow from other writers words which imitate things. Nature, however, is the great originator

¹¹¹ *On imitation* A. III (28).

¹¹² *On the sublime* 13.

¹¹³ *Ibid.* 14.

and teacher in these matters and prompts us in the imitation of things by words, as when we speak of the bellowing of bulls,¹¹⁴ or in the arrangement of words, as when Homer reflects the effort of Sisyphus rolling his rock uphill in the verses in which he describes it.¹¹⁵ Plutarch marks this transition to the imitation of natural objects most explicitly. Imitation, he says, is of actions or works (*ἔργον*) or things (*πράγμα*),¹¹⁶ and apparently these terms are equivalent in his usage. One of the problems to concern him most is that imitations of ugly or even disgusting objects should be pleasing, a subject on which Aristotle touched for an opposite purpose in treating the origin of poetry, for he argued that imitation is natural to man since he finds even the imitation of disgusting objects pleasing.¹¹⁷ The young should be taught to praise the genius and the art which imitates such subjects, according to Plutarch, but to censure the subjects and actions themselves, for the excellence of a thing and the excellence of its imitation are not the same. For him, as for Dionysius, the grunting of a hog, the noise of pulleys, the whistling of the wind, and the roaring of seas are the instances from which a discussion of imitation takes its natural beginning. But while poetry is based on imitation, in this sense, and employs embellishment and richness of diction suited to the actions and characters, Plutarch adds the warning, somewhat Aristotelian in language but Platonic in the development he gives it, that it does not give up the likeness of truth, since the charm of imitation is probability.¹¹⁸ Imitation has the same significance for Longinus when he is not using the term to recommend the imitation of great writers: just as people who are really angry or frightened or worried or carried away by jealousy or some other feeling speak incoherently, "so, too, the best prose writers by use of inversions imitate nature and achieve the same effect. For art is only perfect when it looks like nature and nature succeeds only by concealing art about her person."¹¹⁹ Demetrius cautions against crude imitation of the poets.¹²⁰

¹¹⁴ *On literary composition* 16.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.* 22.

¹¹⁶ *Essay on poetry* 3.

¹¹⁷ *How a young man should study poetry* 3.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.* 7.

¹¹⁹ *On the sublime* 22.

¹²⁰ *On style* ii. 112.

The dictum of Aristotle, that art imitates nature, has suffered a like degradation with the transformation of the word "imitation."

Although nature still supplies the object of imitation, imitation is no longer the central concept, either in the sense of Plato or in that of Aristotle, about which the analysis of poetry is organized. Occasionally, one of the later writers, like Plutarch, will take up the question of the truth of poetry and puzzle over the intentional and unintentional falsifications of the poets; but although the men who followed Plato learned from him to worry concerning lies about the gods, the Platonic proportions of truth to falsity, of being to appearance, do not play upon poetry again in antiquity. Truth, if it is discussed, is usually measured in these later times by asking whether or not the event took place, and whether the object was such as it is represented. On the other hand, what later writers learned from Aristotle applicable to literature, they derived from the *Rhetoric* rather than from the *Poetics*, as indeed might be surmised, since it was a period which held rhetoric in high esteem and most of the writers in the tradition were professed rhetoricians. Yet that change marks them as significantly different from Aristotle, since to confuse rhetoric and poetics would in his system be a Platonizing error. He, himself, distinguished the two disciplines sharply: only two of the six "parts" of tragedy—thought and diction—are properly treated in rhetoric; and only one of them—thought—receives the same treatment in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and *Poetics*. Aristotle's concern with action therefore and the emphasis he puts on plot, the soul of the composition, with its beginning, middle, and end, are not repeated in later writers.¹²¹ With the gradual disappearance of plot, the Aristotelian scheme of the parts of the poem breaks down and the most prominent of his critical principles become irrelevant. Principles and criteria must be supplied from the tradition of rhetoric, and imitation moves to a place of comparative unimportance in the analysis of poetry. Rhetoric, according to Aristotle, is the faculty by which in any subject we are able to win belief in the hearer. That belief is produced by means of invention, disposing of three means: the character and behavior of

¹²¹ Horace's brief treatment of plot, which includes the enjoinder that the middle harmonize with beginning and end, is typical of the few remnants of the treatment of that aspect of the poem. See *Art of poetry*, ll. 119-52.

the speaker, the character and passions of the hearer, and the proofs which are alleged in the words of the speaker. If some other effect in the hearer is substituted for belief, as Longinus substituted ecstasy, such an analysis might be suited to any branch of literature. The time might even come when invention might take the place of imitation, as indeed Quintilian had recognized its greater importance while protesting it was not a subject of art. The "parts" with which the analysis deals gravitate about thought and diction, or some variant of the elements of rhetoric. According to Dionysius, two things require attention in all forms of composition: ideas and words, subject matter and expression.¹²² According to Longinus, there are five sources of the sublime: power of thought and emotion, which proceed from natural genius; and figures, diction, and arrangement, which proceed from art.¹²³ According to Demetrius, each of the four kinds of style consists of thought, diction, and arrangement.¹²⁴

The consequences of these changes for the analysis of literature would be too long to enumerate. Whereas Plato considered poetry in the context of the total activity of man or in the context of the eternal ideas, poetry came to be considered more and more in isolation. On the other hand, the Aristotelian mode of analysis was not followed, for the work of art was not considered, in itself, objectively. Rather, it was the poets who were the subject of consideration in an environment of other poets whom they imitated and of audiences whom they pleased. The Hellenistic and Roman literary critic was sometimes a Platonist whose universe was limited to the literary world, sometimes an Aristotelian engaged in the rhetoric of poetry and prose. Since the plot had lost the central importance it had for Aristotle, imitation is of persons, actions, and things. Where Plato could be led by his dialectic to moral indignation at the imitation of the roll of thunder, the squeak of pulleys, the bleat of sheep,¹²⁵ or Aristotle could limit imitation to the actions of men and invoke aesthetic principles for the comparative judgment of kinds of poetry differentiated by the characters of the men imitated, later critics found occasion only to insist on the

¹²² *On literary composition* 1.

¹²³ *On the sublime* 8. 1.

¹²⁴ *On style* II. 38, etc.

¹²⁵ *Republic* III. 397A-B.

difference between the imitation and the object imitated and to separate admiration of the technique by which the one was produced from approbation of the other. Moreover, as criticism ceases to turn largely on action and the plot, the work of art as a whole passes out of the purview of the critic and attention is concentrated on analyzing the characteristics and determining the effectiveness of individual passages.

The kinds of poetry, moreover, which Aristotle was careful to distinguish in terms of the means and object of imitation, are treated without distinction; and citations are drawn not only from poets of different kinds but from historians, orators, and philosophers as well. But most important of such differences, containing them as consequences, is the fact that after Plato and Aristotle, who judged literature primarily by reference to its object of imitation, there grew up a generation of critics, of numerous and long-lived progeny, who judged literature by considering its effect on the audience. Not that Plato or Aristotle was averse to considering the pleasure afforded by an object of art, but they subordinated such consideration to that of the object of imitation; and while the good work of art will be pleasurable to the mind prepared to understand it, pleasure as such, without consideration of person and object, would furnish no criterion for art. But the natural center of gravity in rhetoric is the audience, and the fourth variation of the meaning of imitation is marked by the disappearance of the term from its central place in criticism. For while a poet may imitate that which is, or the actions of men, or other poets, he pleases rather than imitates audiences. "It is not enough for poems to have beauty," Horace says,¹²⁶ "they must also be pleasing and lead the listener's soul whither they will. . . . If the speaker's words are inconsistent with his fortunes, a Roman audience, high and low will roar with laughter." The nature and origin of poetry is to please the mind.¹²⁷ "Poets desire either to improve or to please, or to unite the agreeable with the profitable. . . . The centuries of the elders reject plays without a moral; the haughty knights dislike dull poems."¹²⁸

¹²⁶ *Art of poetry*, II. 99-112.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, I. 377.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.* 333-43. Cf. Plutarch, *How a young man should study poetry* 1, 2, 3, 7, and 14 for another view in which pleasure and improvement vie; but for a contrasting view of the place of audience and pleasure in the judgment of art see Plato's *Laws* II. 658A-659C and 668A-669B, or *Gorgias* 501D-502D.

Horace's criticism is directed in the main to instruct the poet how to keep his audience in their seats until the end, how to induce cheers and applause, how to please a Roman audience, and, by the same token, how to please all audiences and win immortality. But although imitation does not supply or illuminate these ends, it does help further them. The well-informed imitator is advised to take his models from life and custom and to derive from them a language faithful to life.¹²⁹ He should also study the Greek models;¹³⁰ the Socratic dialogues will supply matter, and words will follow quickly once the matter is seen;¹³¹ but the imitator is cautioned not to translate too literally lest his own style suffer.¹³² Imitation has been reduced to the imitation of other artists or to reflecting actual conditions or customs.

A fifth meaning for the term "imitation" of the same quixotic sort, that is to say, a meaning which, like the proportion of poet to audience, made the term unnecessary or impossible, remains to be indicated. Words may imitate thoughts, as Horace suggests; and if the analysis of poetry in terms of pleasure is an outgrowth of the rhetorical tradition, the analysis of poetry in terms of thought and diction is in a sense the lessened form which the Aristotelian poetic analysis took for later ages. Writers like Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Demetrius, when they limit themselves to relevant questions of words and their arrangements in relation to the thoughts they express, have in common with Aristotle the ideal of discussing the work of art in its own terms without reference to the universe, to authors, or to audience. But the object of imitation has been cut down to thought, and the subtlety of analysis is expended almost entirely on diction. Moreover, literature is considered in short passages, rather than whole works, and prose and poetry are treated together more or less indiscriminately. The problem of literature turns on propriety and the need to find distinguished thoughts and distinguished expressions

¹²⁹ *Art of poetry* II. 317-18.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.* II. 268-69.

¹³¹ *Ibid.* 310-11.

¹³² *Ibid.* 133-35.; cf. his disdain for the servile herd of imitators and his statement of the fashion in which he followed Archilochus, *numeros animosque secutus Archilochi, non res et agentia verba Lycamben*, and tempered the versification of Archilochus with Sappho and Alcaeus; the imitation was limited to measures and structure of verse, and did not extend to subjects or arrangement (*Ep.* I. 19. 19-29).

and to clothe thoughts in appropriate words. These are problems which the term "imitation" was apparently not suited to embrace, and the writers in that tradition continued to speak only of the imitation of poets by poets and of things by words.¹³³

Notwithstanding our changed attitude toward imitation, it requires no great alteration of terminology to recognize the tendencies of modern criticism in some of these five ancient attitudes, and there is much that is perhaps clearer in their example which might be considered with profit in the discussion of the nature of literature or the canons, tenets, or principles of criticism. Literature may be considered as a part of the social structure, and we have critics who engage in such social criticism today. It may be considered in terms purely of style, or in terms of the great writers and great works of the past, or in terms of the character and demands of audiences of the present and of posterity. It seems apparent that each of these approaches and each of their variants is distinct from the others. If its full intention is stated clearly, it is difficult to understand how one of them could be constituted the contradiction of the other, except in the sense that a given critic might prefer one to all the rest. Much that passes for differences of taste in literature consists in reality of differences of taste in criticism, of differences in the preferred approach to literature. A critic is seldom satisfied to make his own approach without having shut off all other roads. Such jealousy of one's own truth is not difficult to explain, for what I say, when I consider it my critical function to tell my experiences before works of art, may be expressed in words related to those you will use when you tell of art's social function; and those words will probably be used as in contradiction. What is needed is more than a definition of terms, for the terms used in definitions also vary in the context of the larger method and system in which criticism functions; ultimately contradictions and confusions are resolved by the exploration of the full philosophic implications of the attitude which the critic finds himself justified in assuming. It is not, perhaps, excessive to remark that the

¹³³ Cf. nn. 111, 114, 115, 120 above. Demetrius returns frequently to the problem of onomatopoeia and the imitation of actions by words. Cf. *On style* II. 72. 94; III. 176; IV. 221. Sometimes, however, he uses imitation in the sense of dramatic imitation in connection with the style of dialogues (*ibid.* IV. 226, 298).

philosophic sweep in recent criticism has not been broad, nor has the interplay of implication been subtle. There have been few writers in the whole history of thought able to manipulate the Platonic dialectic; and of them, few have turned their attention to literature. There are few studies of literature in terms of its medium, of the forms which are suited for expression in that medium, and the manner of such expression. It is hardly profitable or pertinent to regret that there have been few Platos and few Aristotles; but it is appropriate to remark on the misfortune, since there are so few, that we should neglect so signally to profit by their examples of method, but should be content in our studies and histories to find imperfections which they seem to possess only when their sentences are read without the logical and dialectical devices they supply to guide interpretation.

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ENGLISH IN MANORIAL DOCUMENTS OF THE THIRTEENTH AND FOURTEENTH CENTURIES

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A FEW years ago, through the generosity of the late Martin A. Ryerson, the University of Chicago acquired part of the manorial documents which since the sixteenth century have been in the possession of the descendants of Sir Nicholas Bacon, Keeper of the Great Seal under Elizabeth and father of Francis Bacon. At the dissolution of the monasteries, Sir Nicholas Bacon received from the royal governments grants of many manors which had belonged to Bury St. Edmonds, and to these he and his descendants later added others. With them came the records which had been kept from the thirteenth century; these were continued in some cases well into the eighteenth century. According to the count made by the booksellers (Bernard Quaritch, Catalogue No. 380, December, 1923), the University of Chicago's collection consists of 741 rolls. These comprise approximately two-thirds of the total body of manuscripts, the remaining third being now in the British Museum. Some twenty manors are represented—most, if not all of them, in East Anglia. Since for certain manors there are but a few rolls (5, 7, 9 and so on up to 38) and these of comparatively late date, the accounts of only five manors have been fruitful for this study. Redgrave offers perhaps the most complete series, the court and compotus rolls numbering 195. But the most valuable series for the present purpose is that of Hinderclay, consisting of 147 rolls. In the records of this period Hinderclay is always called Hilderele, the name by which I shall refer to it. These manors and Brandon (39) and Burgate (48) are in Suffolk; Thornage (68), spelled Thornegge in the records and consequently in this paper, is in Norfolk.

While looking over the University's collection for the purpose of giving directions for their cataloguing, Miss Rickert and Mr. Manly noticed in the early documents occasional English words imbedded in the Latin and called my attention to them. Of course this incidental use of English is not peculiar to the records of these manors, nor has

it been unobserved. Nathaniel J. Hone, in his *Manor and manorial records* (1906), remarked: "They [the account rolls] are written in Latin, interspersed here and there with English where the accountant's stock of Latin failed him."¹ Editors of documents which are in print could not fail to notice the occasional English words, and the editors of the *Oxford dictionary* have used this source to some extent (almost, if not entirely, from published records). No one, however, has made any extended study of the English words in thirteenth- and fourteenth-century manorial documents, or even exhibited the range and character of them. I can offer merely a sketch of the latter sort, since I have access only to manuscripts at Chicago and to some of the records that are in print.

The merest rough survey of the matter indicates that in the main the English words in the manorial documents are of a homely character. Many of them would never be used in the kinds of literature that we have from medieval times, and hence the *Oxford dictionary* has been able to find no instances of them before the eighteenth or nineteenth century. Indeed, there are instances of words which, as far as I am able to discover,² are not recorded in the *Oxford dictionary* at all; e.g., 'barn-thatching.' The effect of seeing this body of words is to make one realize how slowly rural life changes in spite of social and economic revolutions. It is no news to anyone that English was used on the farms of medieval England; but sight of this body of plain words like 'barnyard' (*OED*, 1513), 'oat-land' (*ibid.*, 1706), 'pitcher' (of hay) (*ibid.*, 1722) brings to one a vivid realization of the unity of English rural life, the fact that medieval farmers performed the same tasks and used many of the same words for their tools, the parts of their farms, and their activities that are used still. In another way, by showing unfamiliar aspects of the medieval agricultural systems, the English in the documents makes medieval life vivid; in particular, the names of duties owed the lord of the manor, and of the manorial festivals suggest elements in the life on the manor that are strange to us.

¹ P. 203. Hone might have included the Court Rolls, for though English appears more commonly in the Compoti, it will be noticed that the Court Rolls do provide some interesting evidence.

² I should like at this point to enter a caveat: when I indicate that a word is not in the *OED*, I mean merely that I have not found it there. In some cases undoubtedly the word is recorded, but I have not had ingenuity enough to discover it.

It would be proper as well as interesting to list all of the English words that are found in such documents, if the sole purpose of this article were to show how they suggest the life of the manor. But the chief justification for publishing a study of this material in a philological journal must be to present the new lexicographical evidence which it affords. Hence words which the *Oxford dictionary* records for an earlier date or one approximately the same as these documents will be omitted. Since the passages in which the words occur generally have little value for defining the words, it would be a waste of space to quote them. So for the most part I shall give merely the word and a reference to the place where it occurs. When a word has more interest than the ordinary "lath-nail" or "park-ditch," however, and the context has any value for defining it, I shall quote the passage. It is hardly necessary to say that some words have baffled me. Since the entries have so little defining value, if the composition, etymology, or modern use of the word does not reveal its meaning, one can but surmise as to what it is. In some cases, moreover, a slip of the pen may have given the intended word an untrue form. Generally I have omitted such dubious words; but I include as specimens a group which seem for one reason or another (chiefly repeated appearance) to be actual words.

A word remains to be said about dates. An obvious advantage of the kind of evidence used here is that the date is fairly exact. But it is not absolutely exact: the words come from documents which record matters of a particular year; of course the writing is not earlier than that year, but it may be somewhat later. The process of composition of the account rolls ('compotus') consisted of two general sets of acts. First notes were made by the reeves and their inferior officers. These the reeves collected and kept until the clerks who wrote the accounts in final form came to the manors. Just when they arrived we have no means of knowing. At any rate their stipend occasionally is included on the rolls; and sometimes one or more of the notes which they used as a basis are appended. The dates used are, of course, regnal years. As neither they nor the fiscal year which a particular roll covers coincide with the calendar year, it seems best in the dating of a roll to refer to it by the last of the two regnal years mentioned.³ The presumption

³ The classification of the rolls in possession of the University of Chicago frequently dates them by the first regnal year; hence those numbers are often one year less than mine.

that the rolls were actually written by the end of the regnal year, or at latest a short time after the beginning of the next year, seems good, since with the rather crude system of notes in use and the necessary dependence to some extent at least on the reeves' memories, it would be difficult to balance the accounts if a longer time elapsed.⁴

For the presentation of this material, it seems best to arrange it in groups—not that the grouping has any essential significance or that there is any particular plan in the arrangement of the groups, but that presenting words for associated matters together emphasizes the interest and significance of this vocabulary. Finally, as indicated before, the lists include only words which are either not included in the *Oxford dictionary* (marked with an asterisk) or not recorded until considerably later than the date of the present evidence. In every case I give only the earliest reference for a word, though often I have collected several quotations for it. When no date is cited, the reason is that the text from which quotation is made is undated. In most cases I give no discussion of etymology since the composition of the words is obvious. Finally, I have added a few fifteenth-century words.

PLACES ON THE MANOR

*barngarth (Durham, 1357–58)⁵

*barngate (Brandon Compotus, 25–26 Edward III)

barnyard 'In j muro facto circa le berneyerd' (Hilderle Compotus, 28 Edward III). 'De herbagio del Berneyerd nihil hoc annō quia depascebatur pro vitulis manerii' (Brandon Compotus, 40 Edward III). *OED*, 1473 (Scottish, 1683 U.S.)

*boureyerd (De Bray, 1300)⁶

*calfpasture (Denbigh, 1334)⁷

*calfyard (Hilderle Compotus, 26 Edward III)

coupasture (Denbigh, 1334).⁸ *OED*, 1523

*drapersrowe '1 shoppe in fore de Botoln[esdale] in le Draperesrowe' (Redgrave Court Roll, 4 Richard II)

⁴ It may be possible eventually, when someone has studied all extant manorial records, to obtain from the English words in them evidence as to the dialect of the places where the rolls were written. If in general the scribes who wrote them, however, were not residents of the manors, the value of this evidence would be limited. In any event, the data which I have been able to collect are not sufficient to be of value for that purpose.

⁵ *Durham account rolls* ("Surtees society"), I, 124.

⁶ *The estate book of Henry de Bray*, ed. Dorothy Willis (3d ser., "Camden Society"), XXVII, 50.

⁷ *Survey of the Honour of Denbigh*, ed. Vinogradoff and Morgan, p. 5.

⁸ *Ibid.*, n. 7.

- drapery 'Item tenuit iij schoppe *ibidem* in le Draparye' (Redgrave Court Roll, 11 Richard II). *OED*, 1483
- *dustlond 'Et praeterea herciabit . . . unam acram que dicitur Dustlond' (Crondal, 1325?)⁹
- farmland ('fermelond,' Hildercle Court Roll, 31 Edward III). *OED*, 1859; Suppl., 1638
- fieldgate ('ffeldgate,' Redgrave Compotus, 24 Edward III). *OED*, 1891
- *flaxlondhyl (Hildercle Compotus, 26 Edward I)
- guest-chamber ('Gestchaumbyr,' Thornegge compotus, 5 Edward IV). *OED*, 1526
- *hogfeld (Baslow, Derbyshire)¹⁰
- *horse-pasture (Ilketshall Compotus, 15 Edward IV)
- *horse-pool ('horspol,' Thornegge Compotus, 1 Richard II)
- *kitchenwong ('kychenewong,' Hildercle Compotus, 26 Edward I)
- *kitchenyard ('kecheneyard,' Forncett 1376-77)¹¹
- *marketway (Redgrave Court Roll, 48 Edward III)
- *millecote (Hildercle Compotus, 50 Edward III)
- *millhill ('melnehyl,' Hildercle Compotus, 26 Edward I)
- oatland 'Walterus Edward reddit in manus domini vnam acram terre de hotelond' (Hildercle Court Roll, 12 Edward III). *OED*, 1706
- parkgate (Hildercle Compotus, 41 Edward III). *OED*, 1400
- *parkditch ('parckdich,' Hildercle Compotus, 15 Edward II)
- *parkyard (Hildercle Compotus, 14 Edward II)
- *pindingfold (De Bray, 1322?)¹²
- pondyard ('pondyerd,' Redgrave Compotus, 14 Edward III). *OED*, 1485
- sawingpit (Norwich, 1390-91).¹³ *OED*, 1560
- stue 'In quodam stue mundando et subleuando' (Hildercle Compotus, 7 Edward III). *OED*, ca. 1386
- *swimmingdich (Redgrave Court Roll, 22 Richard II)
- *swynfold (Redgrave Court Roll, 46 Edward III)
- *thwertpath (Redgrave Court Roll, 22 Richard II)

BUILDINGS

- calfhous (Brandon Compotus, 40 Edward III). *OED*, 1807
- cartehous (Crowland, 1259).¹⁴ *OED*, 1483
- *chafecote 'contra gabulam novae grangiae' (De Bray, 1305)¹⁵
- cheesehatch ('chushache,' St. Swithun's, 1345).^{15a} *OED*, 'cheesehecke,' 1611

⁹ Crondal records, ed. W. T. Baigent, p. 87.

¹⁰ Journal of the Derby arch. nat. asso., XXII, 57.

¹¹ F. G. Davenport, *Economic development of a Norfolk manor* (Cambridge, 1906), appendix, p. 1.

¹² Estate book, p. 122.

¹³ *Leet jurisdiction in Norwich*, ed. W. Hudson ("Selden society"), V (1892), 76.

¹⁴ F. M. Page, *The estates of Crowland Abbey* (Cambridge, 1934), p. 216.

¹⁵ *The estate book of Henry de Bray*, p. 50.

^{15a} *Obedientary rolls of St. Swithun's* (Winchester) ("Hampshire Record Society") (London, 1892), p. 148.

- *drencheous (Worcester Compotus, 1376-77)¹⁶
 *faldecote ('ffaldecote,' Hilderele Compotus, 6 Edward I)
 *millecote (Hilderele Compotus, 50 Edward III)
 motehalle (De Lacy, 33 Edward I).¹⁷ *OED*, 1380
 *susterenespitele 'hospitale sororum ecclesie S. Swithuni Wynton, vocatum
 susterenespitele' (St. Swithun's, 1382)¹⁸
 tile-kiln ('tylkylne,' Redgrave Compotus, 2 Henry VI). *OED*, 1531
 toll-house (Redgrave Court Roll, 14 Edward III). *OED*, ca. 1440

LABORERS, INCLUDING CHOSEN OFFICERS

- akerman (Ramsey, 1251).¹⁹ *OED*, 1000 and 1389, gives these meanings:
 'cultivator of ground,' 'husbandman,' 'ploughman.' In the thirteenth cen-
 tury apparently the meaning is limited to *ploughman* (see Neilson, *op.*
cit. [s.v. *hydemanlond* below], p. 69; Vinogradoff, *Villainage in England*,
 p. 259)
 *calfherd (Hilderele Compotus, 31 Edward I)
 *cartereve (Forncett, 1272-73)²⁰
 cooper ('euperii,' Forncett, 1272-73).²¹ *OED*, 1415
 fenreve ('ffenreue,' Redgrave Court Roll, 12 Richard II). *OED*, 1865
 fishman ('fyssman,' 'fischeman,' Durham, 1389).²² *OED*, 1540
 *horn and key Usually called 'cornugerend' and 'claviger'; here 'Tota curia
 elegit Robertum Smyth ad officium de Horn et elegit dominium ad officium
 de keyes pro tenemento quondam Swyftes (Hilderele Court Roll, 15 Ed-
 ward II). Sometimes these offices were held by one person: 'per officium
 vocatum horn et keytheys' (5 Edward III). Apparently the holdings were
 "elected" in rotation; those elected had to pay a sum to the lord.
 *hinhewe (Hilderele Compotus, 3 Edward III). This is spelled *inhewe* in
 Hilderele Compotus, 47 Edward III. See Bosworth-Toller, s.v. '*inhiwan*.'
 See quotation below under *scotcarte*.
 *inhyne 'In liberatione, j Inhyne extrahenti fimos, claudenti sepes, hercian-
 ti, etc.' (Manydown, 1338)²³
 overman (Redgrave Court Roll, 49 Edward III). *OED*, 1708 (meaning 3)
 pitcher 'In stipendio j pychere in autumpno et post autumpnum euntis ad
 tertiam carucam' (Hilderele Compotus, 4 Edward II). *OED*, 1722
 repreve (Hilderele Compotus, 2 Edward I). *OED*, 1393
¹⁶ *Compotus rolls of the Priory of Worcester, XIVth and XVth centuries*, ed. S. G. Hamil-
 ton (Oxford, 1910), p. 19.
¹⁷ *De Lacy Compoti* ("Chetham Society"), p. 106.
¹⁸ *ib.* 153.
¹⁹ *Ramsey cart.*, I, 318.
²⁰ Davenport, p. xi.
²¹ *Ibid.*, p. xxxvi.
²² *ib.*, 49, 50.
²³ *The manor of Manydown*, ed. G. W. Kitchin ("Hampshire Record Society" (London,
 1895)), p. 149.

sadeler (Hilderele Compotus, 28 Edward I). *OED*, 1389
 sawer ('sawerys,' Hilderele Compotus, 51 Henry III). *OED*, 1379
 thatcher (Hilderele Court Roll, 5 Edward II). *OED*, 1440
 woodfeller (Redgrave Court Roll, 19 Richard II). *OED*, 14. . . . Ordinarily the office was called 'wodeward'; here, however, 'eligunt Willelmum perle ad officium Wodefeller.'

LEGAL CLASSES OF MEN

- *anlepiman (Forncett, 1272-73).²⁴ For meaning see *OED*, 'onlepy'
 *anelepwymman²⁵
 *landsettus (also 'landsettagium') meaning 'an occupier, a man sitting on land'²⁶
 *niet, neat, net, neth (from OE *geneat*), 'villanus,' 'nativus'²⁷
 undersitter 'De lxxvi precariis autumpni pertinentibus de omnibus tenentibus domini ibidem et handlepymen et vndersetters' (Brandon Compotus, 7 Richard II). *OED*, 1580
 *wokebenemen (Redgrave Compotus, 11 Edward III)
 *yerdlings, halfyerdlings (Battle)²⁸ 'holders of a virgate of land'

KINDS OF HOLDING

- *cotsedel (Hilderele Court Roll, 8 Edward I).²⁹ Elsewhere 'cotsettele,' 'cotsetlo'; here 'Robertus Walnote reddit in manus domini l cotsedel.' *OED* cites the word from 1000 but only in the meaning of 'a villen who occupied a cot.'
 *hydemanlond (Wistowe Compotus, 1298)³⁰
 soknelond (Hilderele Court Roll, 4 Edward II). *OED*, 1888, has *soke-land*
 *werkklond (Hilderele Court Roll, 20 Edward III). Used in contrast to 'mol-land'

REQUIRED WORK

This class of words is difficult particularly because the requirements differed in kind and amount at different places and hence the vocabulary differed. From the length of the following list, derived from but a few manors, it is apparent that the vocabulary over all England was extensive.³¹ Three elements which appear commonly in them are:

²⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. xxx; also Vinogradoff, *Villainage in England*, p. 213.

²⁵ Before 1327; see Maitland, *The Court Baron* ("Selden Society" [1891]), p. 146; also Vinogradoff, *ibid.*

²⁶ Vinogradoff, pp. 146, 147 n.

²⁷ Vinogradoff, pp. 144-45.

²⁸ Vinogradoff, p. 148.

²⁹ See *Manydown*, p. 146.

³⁰ N. Neilson, *Economic condition of the manors of Ramsey Abbey* (Philadelphia, 1898), Appendix, p. 17.

³¹ In fact, a great many more of these terms may be found in another study by Miss Neilson: *Customary rents* ("Oxford studies in social and legal history," Vol. II [Oxford, 1910]), but unfortunately the dates of their occurrence are not given.

OE (*ge*)*bed*; OE *bēn*; OE *bōn*, all meaning 'prayer,' 'request.' Just what were the requirements named by these words is by no means clear from the evidence thus far available, but Miss Neilson's monograph, cited below, offers many suggestions concerning them.

**auererthe* Vinogradoff quotes: 'De qualibet caruca arant unam acram de averherde,' and 'Ipsi idem arant pro auererthe in purificatione de unoquoque sullung unam acram et 150 acris 3 virgatas.'³²

**barnthatching* 'Praeterea metet in autumnno per unum diem cum duobus hominibus pro opere quod vocatur Bernethachinge.' 'Metent una die autumnno pro cornbote, et una alia die pro coopertimento grangiae.' (Ramsey Cartulary)^{33, 34}

**bedesolewes* 'aruras quæ dicuntur bedesolewes' (Ramsey Cartulary, 1251)³⁵
bedrip Evidently this word was also used to refer to the men who did the work: 'ccxxxvij bedrepes ad cibum' (Hidercle Compotus, 18 Edward III) (Winchester, 1208-9).³⁶ *OED*, 1226

**bene* 'tertia die falcabit dimidiam acram quæ dicitur bene.' *OED* has no mention of this meaning. Hidercle Compotus, 25 Edward I, has 'Benas' as plural of this word. (Ramsey, 1252)³⁷

beneday 'Faciunt in autumnno tres benedayes ad cibum domini.' *OED* cites the word (1499) but gives only the queried meaning 'rogation-day.' (Ramsey)³⁸

**beneerthe* 'Quælibet caruca arabit ad cibum proprium unum sellionum. Et vocabitur beneerthe.' (Ramsey, 1255)³⁹

**beneryp* 'Metet etiam duas rodas frumenti, quod dicitur beneryp' (Ramsey, 1252).⁴⁰ *OED* cites the word without example.

cornbone 'In secunda septimana tria faciet opera . . . in qua metet tres rodas frumenti, et carriabit, quod appellatur cornbone' (Ramsey, 1255)⁴¹

**cornbote* 'metet cum uno homine per unum diem pro cornbote'⁴² (Ramsey, 1294)⁴³

**cuntrewerk* 'consuetudine Manerii reddendo inde Chircheset ut solebat et omnia alia opera vocata Cuntrewerk' (Bromham, 3 Henry IV).⁴⁴ *OED*, ca. 1607, 'country-work,' which probably has not this specific meaning.

**daywene* 'metet et ligat j acram dimidiam frumenti . . . pro uno daywene' (Redgrave Compotus, 11 Edward III). In Redgrave Compotus, 26 Edward III, the spelling is 'daywynes.'

³² Pp. 281, 248 n. 1.

³³ II, 39.

³⁴ II, 45.

³⁵ I, 318.

³⁶ *Bishopric of Winchester Pipe Roll*, p. 45.

³⁷ I, 299.

³⁸ I, 402.

³⁹ I, 475.

⁴⁰ I, 358.

⁴¹ I, 463.

⁴² *Select pleas in manorial and other seigniorial courts*, ed. F. W. Maitland ("Selden Society" [1888]), I, 82.

⁴³ II, 40.

⁴⁴ Johnson and Jenkinson, *Court-hand*, I, 214.

eadacre⁴⁵ Apparently the same as *radaker*, since it occurs in the same context.

*fastningseed 'Item per idem tempus arabit dimidiam acram pro fastningse sede sine cibo et opere si habeat carucam integram.'⁴⁶

*filstnerthe or filsingerþe 'Item iste cum quanto iungit arabit de filstnerthe eodem tempore per unum diem.'⁴⁷

*godlesebene 'arare 18 acras ad frumentum de godlesebene.'⁴⁸

*landegginge 'et faciet unam hersuram que vocature landegginge et valet 1 den.'⁴⁹

*lentenerth 'Pretereā item arabit de Lentenerþe dimidiam acram.'⁵⁰

*louebene 'et in pane furnito ad opus cxcvij precariorum autumpni, metencium quasi per 1 diem, v quarteria cum xxxij de Louebene . . . qui predicti xxxij de le Louebene non capunt panes pro cena' (Hilderele Court Roll, 1 Edward I)

*lovebone 'metet ipse sellionem de consuetudine quod dicitur lovebone' (Ramsey, 1255)⁵¹

*lovefoþer 'Carriabit etiam ad diem proprium unam carrectatam bladi, quæ vocatur lovefoþer' (Ramsey)⁵²

*mederipe 'Idem faciet cum uno homine beripam [*sic*] sine cibo domini et vocatur medripe.'⁵³

*nidrip 'Metent v acras de nidrip' (Crondal, 1325?)⁵⁴

plouben ('plotbene,' 'pluben,' Hilderele Compotus, 49 Henry III ff.) This was apparently one of the required services in connection with which the lord supplied food, as all the entries have to do with grain furnished for it. *OED*, *plogbone*, 1483

*radaker (Dimidius Virgarius)⁵⁵ 'debet unam arruram que vocatur radaker, scil. arare unam acram ad semen yemale, et triturare semen ad eandem acram'

*rytnesse (Ely) 'arabit unam rodam de Rytnesse.'⁵⁶

*Saint Edmundislode (Hilderele Compotus, 6 Edward I.) The following: 'De Roberto Capellano qui fecit defaltum de arrura que vocatur Saint Edmundislode', from Hilderele Compotus, 2 Edward II, indicates its meaning.

⁴⁵ Vinogradoff, p. 282.

⁴⁶ Vinogradoff, p. 282 n.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 282. Vinogradoff says that it is the same as 'beneerthe.'

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 280.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 282.

⁵¹ I, 464.

⁵² I, 387.

⁵³ Vinogradoff, p. 284, n. 1.

⁵⁴ *Crondal records*, ed. W. T. Baigent ("Hampshire Record Society" [London, 1891]), p. 91. See also pp. 97, 99 (the last adds 'in autumpno').

⁵⁵ Vinogradoff, p. 282.

- *seedbene 'faciet lovebones quolibet tempore anni sicut cæteri, secundum quantitatem tenementi sui, præter wodebene et sedbene' (Ramsey, 1251)⁶⁶
- *unlawenherþe (Gloucester) Vinogradoff says that this is the same as *be-neerthe*⁶⁷
- waterfurwyng (Redgrave, Court Roll, 22 Richard II). See *OED*, s.v. 'waterfurrow' (where waterfurrowing is cited for 1662)
- *wodebene (Ramsey, 1251).⁶⁸ Perhaps the same as the following word.
- wodebone See *seedbene* above. 'Præterea ipse arabit unum sellionem loco sibi assignato, et herciabit de consuetudine, quæ consuetudo appellatur wodebone' (Ramsey, 1251).⁶⁹ *OED*, 1524

FOOD AT REQUIRED WORK

- benebred 'Siligo: item furnitam ad Benebred 1 quartarius, et dimidius' (Hilderele Compotus, 28 Edward I). This may be *bean-bred*, *OED*, s.v. 'bean,' II. 7; but I take it to mean bread furnished at a bene. Compare 'Ordeum furnitum super Benas carucarum(?) iij quartarii et dimidius' (Hilderele Compotus, 25 Edward I)

PAYMENTS TO THE LORD OF THE MANOR

- *benesed 'Dat ad natale unam gallinam, et unum bussellum frumenti, quod appellatur benesed' (Ramsey, 1251)⁶⁰
- *beolaw or bodelsilver (Payment to the lord of two shillings or one sheep)⁶¹
- *bonepenny (Baslowe, Derby, 1319-20)⁶²
- *brewynsilver⁶³
- *burgabul 'et de xvd. de burgabulo in Grastrete' (Winchester, 1207-8)⁶⁴
- *copesilver 'Homagium dat domino ex quadam consuetudine vocata cope-silver' (Hilderele Court Roll, 24 Edward III). See *OED*, *cope-money*, s.v. *cope* sb.³, 1815
- *corn-hole 'a best sheaf levied at harvest time'⁶⁵
- *coupeny 'De coupenys hoc anno ad Pentecostam xxd' (Brandon Compotus, 18 Edward III)
- *fishfee 'fise' (Worcester, 20-21 Edward I)⁶⁶
- *fish-penny (Tempus Edward I)⁶⁷

⁶⁶ Ramsey cart., I, 317.⁶⁹ *Op. cit.*, I, 461.⁶⁷ Vinogradoff, p. 282.⁶⁸ I, 287.⁶³ Ramsey cart., I, 310.⁶¹ Quoted from Jeayes, *Lyttelton Charters*, p. 51, in *Halesowen court rolls*, ed. J. Amphlett and S. G. Hamilton (Worcester Historical Society [Oxford, 1910-12], p. 419).⁶² *Jour. Derby Arch. Nat. Hist. Assoc.*, XXII, 57.⁶³ Ramsey cart., I, 369.⁶⁴ *Pipe Roll of Bishopric of Winchester*, p. 77.⁶⁵ Vinogradoff, p. 289.⁶⁶ *Early Compotus rolls of the priory of Worcester*, ed. J. M. Wilson and C. Gordon (Worcester Historical Society, 1908), p. 9.⁶⁷ Seebohm, *English village community* (London, 1896), p. 44.

- *fishsilver 'phisshesilver, haringsilver.' 'Perhaps commutation for fish once given to the abbot' in Lent⁶⁸ (Crowland, 1259)⁶⁹
- foddercorn (Ramsey, 1225).⁷⁰ *OED*, 1655
- *forwardsilver (Fornett Compotus, 1376-78)⁷¹
- *fritfen (Crowland, 1259)⁷²
- fulstyingpound 'Tota villata, præter liberos, dat in festo Sancti Andreae viginti solidos, qui vocatur filstinpound; et per hoc quieti debent de omnibus misericordiis, ante iudicium pro sex denariis, et post iudicium pro duodecim denariis, nisi pro effusione sanguinis, vel pro excisione quercus pro furto'⁷³ (Ramsey, 1255)⁷⁴
- *gadercorn 'et de gadercorn reddunt de quolibet swlinge 4 coppas de puro ordeo et de presenti gallum et gallinam de quolibet domo'⁷⁵
- *gavelsed 'singule virgate debent per annum . . . de gavelsed 3 mensuras'⁷⁶
- *hangerlondsilver 'a small payment made in years in which certain land called hangerlond, meadow land, was sown' (Wistowe, 1307)⁷⁷
- *haringsilver (Ramsey, 1252).⁷⁸ See *fishsilver* above
- *havedsot⁷⁹ OE *heafod* + *scot*(?)
- heusyre (Ramsey, 1251).⁸⁰ *OED*, 1325 (see Neilson, pp. 52 f.)
- hevedsilver (Wistowe, 1252).⁸¹ *OED*, 1467
- *hocselver 'Pro hocselver regis' (Worcester, 21-22 Edward I)⁸²
- *horsgabul (Bromham, 3 Henry IV)⁸³
- *huntenesilver (Crowland, 1259)
- *maltsilver Neilson: 'Maltsilver may have been a commutation on some manors of the malt delivered by the villein at Ramsey' (Wistowe Compotus, 1307)⁸⁴
- *menipeny (*Var.*: menyngpeny, Crowland, 1259)⁸⁵

⁶⁸ Neilson, p. 55.

⁶⁹ Page, p. 174.

⁷⁰ I, 464.

⁷¹ Davenport, p. xliii.

⁷² Page, p. 219.

⁷³ II, 22.

⁷⁴ I, 468.

⁷⁵ Vinogradoff, p. 289, n. 2.

⁷⁶ Vinogradoff, p. 288, n. 3.

⁷⁷ Neilson, appendix, p. 20.

⁷⁸ I, 298.

⁷⁹ Vinogradoff, p. 292, n. 5.

⁸⁰ Ramsey *Cart.*, I, 285.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 357.

⁸² *Early Compotus rolls*, p. 22.

⁸³ Johnson and Jenkinson, Part I, p. 214.

⁸⁴ Neilson, p. 55; appendix, p. 19.

⁸⁵ Page, p. 174; see also p. 92.

- *nutgeld(?) 'reddit compotum de lviii. li. et x s. et iijd. numero de firma de Westmerilland cum noutgeldo' (Lancashire, 1189-90).⁸⁶ Is this the same as *nut-silver*?
- nutsilver 'notesilver,' explained as payment in commutation of a service of gathering nuts for the lord (Neilson) (Wistowe, 1311).⁸⁷ *OED*, 1569
- *pondpenny (Cronal, 1325?)⁸⁸
- *potfald *Glossary*: 'The custom of enfolding cattle in the lord's fold or making payment in default' (Winchester, 1208-9)⁸⁹
- *rentsilver (Brandon Compotus, 29 Edward III)
- *sackfee 'de redditu qui vocatur Sakefe' (De Lacy, 24 Edward I)⁹⁰
- *saltpeny 'de redditu ad Gulam Augusti qui dicitur saltpeny' (Fornett, 1272-73)⁹¹
- *scythepenny 'Debent eciam denarium pro falce quod anglice dicunt sithpeni'⁹²
- *shiphyre (Crowland, 1259)⁹³
- *spotgabulum *Glossary*: 'a payment, perhaps for pasturage' (Winchester, 1207-8)⁹⁴
- *waterlet 'In consuetudine waterletæ iijjd' (Winchester, 1207-8)⁹⁵
- wethersilver (Wistowe, 1297).⁹⁶ *OED*, 1557
- *wilesilver 'Item Mabilia ad Aquam . . . quieta est de heusire, fodurecorne, nuttes, wilesilver' (Ramsey)⁹⁷
- *wodefare 'In acquietancia redditus messoris de Wodefare pro anno vjd' (Brandon Compotus, 18 Edward III)
- *wodegong 'et duas gallinas pro wodegonge' (Wicherton)⁹⁸
- wodehae (Broughton, 1252)⁹⁹ Is this wood-hag *OED* 1569?

PERQUISITES OF THE REVE AND MESSOR

- *reve's meat, reve's silver 'Johannes Basely et Willelmus Brasyer electi sunt ad coligendum reuysmete pro officio prepositi' (Hildercle Court Roll, 1, 11 Henry IV)
- *sedlep 'Siligo. Item messori de consuetudine pro suo sedlep, j bussellus' (Brandon Compotus, 30 Edward III)

⁸⁶ *Lancashire Pipe rolls*, ed. W. Farrer, p. 74.

⁸⁷ Neilson, p. 71, and appendix, p. 33.

⁸⁸ *Cronal records*, p. 85.

⁸⁹ *Pipe roll*, p. 5.

⁹⁰ *Comp. H. de Lacy*, p. 10.

⁹¹ Davenport, p. xxx.

⁹² Vinogradoff, p. 291, n. 3.

⁹³ Page, p. 174.

⁹⁴ *Pipe roll*, p. 83.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

⁹⁶ Neilson, appendix, p. 2.

⁹⁷ *Ramsey Cart. I*, 489.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 56.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 333.

PERQUISITES OF LABORERS

- *bosingsilver 'De bosingsilver 1 denarium ad festum Sti Martini si habeat equum et carectam' (Ely).¹⁰⁰ Is this boozing-silver?
- *cowrod 'Pro firma unius vacce pro eis conducte pro lacte inde habendo vestura j rode frumenti et j rode avene hoc anno et vocantur cowrods' (Anstey)¹⁰¹
- *lammesseferþing (Hilderle Compotus, 49 Henry III). See *lamessilver*
- *lamessilver 'Dat famulis die Ad Vinculam ad lamessilver qui habent de consuetudine, iij d' (Fornecett, 1272-3)¹⁰²
- *markynglomb 'Item liberatus Bercario pro suo Markynglomb j agnus' (Brandon Compotus, 18 Edward III; see also Brandon Compotus, 40 Edward III)
- *meneschef men's sheaf 'Et habebit quotiens cariaverit 1 garbam vocatam meneschef' (Borley, 1 Edward III).¹⁰³
- *sennelsilver 'Item in allocacione Ade(messoris) pro sennelsilver . . . pro septimana j d' (Redgrave Compotus, 24 Edward III). Semel-silver(?); sinmel-silver(?)
- *shepecorn 'pro familiis manerii qui capunt shepecorn' (Redgrave Compotus, 11 Edward III; see also Redgrave Compotus, 26 Edward III)
- soulsilver 'In allocacione eiusdem (i.e., messoris) pro Soulsuer intra festam Sancti Michaelis et Gulam Augusti iijis vij d obolus pro septimana j d.' (Redgrave Compotus, 14 Edward III; see also Redgrave Compotus, 50 Edward III, 'soulseluer'). Clearly the *OED* statement that this is the same as *soulscot*, 'a due paid on behalf of a deceased person to the church,' is not correct for the usage indicated in Redgrave Compotus.
- *veewrod As the context is the same as for *cowrod*, the word apparently is a synonym for *cowrod* (the first element presumably from OE *feoh*) (Anstey)¹⁰⁴

PAYMENT TO CHURCH

- *ploughscot 'Item ecclesie de Hilderle pro Plokscot' (Hilderle Compotus, 7 Edward I; see also Hilderle Compotus, 7 Edward III). Other spellings are *plousot*, *ploushot*, *plouscot*, *ploweshott*.

CELEBRATIONS

- *ale-bene 'Item dati custumariis ad le Alebene' (Hilderle Compotus 4 or 5 Henry VI)
- *fordlot 'In expensis eorum ad Nativitatem ad eorum fordlot' (Hilderle Compotus, 20 Edward I). Other spellings are *forlot* and *ffoorthlat* (Hilderle Compotus, 21 Edward I; 36 Edward III)

¹⁰⁰ Vinogradoff, p. 291, n. 3.

¹⁰¹ W. Cunningham, *The growth of English commerce and industry* (5th ed.), I, 604.

¹⁰² Davenport, p. xxxiv.

¹⁰³ Cunningham, I, 579.

¹⁰⁴ Cunningham, I, 604.

- *forthdrove Apparently this is the same as the preceding word. At any rate, *forthdryuing* in Hilderele Compotus, 35 Edward III, is said to be 'post Nativitatem,' and when *forthlot* is given alone, the amount is the same as that for *forthdrove*, three pence (*fordroue*, Hilderele Compotus, 6 Edward I)
- *forthdrovesilver 'Item eisdem pro forthdrovesilve ijs. ex consuetudine' (Wistowe).¹⁰⁵
- Miss Neilson suggests that it is connected with a Christmas plowing.
- *ladyesale 'In dono domini ad unum Ladyesale ij bussellos' (ordei) (Hilderele Compotus, 44 Edward III)
- *lammesale Under autumn expenses: 'in lammeshale iij d'. Other spellings *lammesseale*, *lamasschal* (Hilderele Compotus, 6 Edward I)
- *mathale Apparently *math*, mowing, plus *ale*, celebration (Baslow, Derbyshire, 1319-20)¹⁰⁶
- *ploughale (plochale, pluhal, plouhal) (Hilderele Compotus, 41 Henry III).
'In conuiuio ad Nativitatem beate Marie cum plochale'
ploufeste 'Item in expensis xxiiij hominum cum viij carucis ad precarium vocatum ploufeste ad semen frumenti sufficientem ad unum repastum' (Hilderele Compotus, 28 Edward III). *OED*, 1607
- *repegos Hilderele Compotus, 50 Edward III indicates that it was 'in fine autumpni.' Geese, other meats and beer were provided; e.g., Hilderele Compotus, 21 Edward I: 'In ceruisia empta ad opus familiarum(?) ad eorum repegos ld. In carne empta ad idem.' Cunningham says: 'This may have been the kern-supper when harvest was over'¹⁰⁷
- *sighale (scythe-ale? Crowland, 1259)¹⁰⁸

PRODUCTS OF THE MANOR

- *aveloves 'Unde fiunt de bussello xv panes et vocantur aveloves' (Anstey, Herts., 2-3 Henry IV)¹⁰⁹
- *binding-rod ('bydyngrod,' Redgrave Compotus, 7 Henry V)
- broches 'In subbosco amputando pro broches' (Hilderele Compotus, 10 Edward II). *OED*, s.v. 'broach,' sb. meaning 5; 1440
- corbels (Hilderele Compotus, 13 Edward II). *OED*, 1400
- erab 'Et quod idem Robertus colegit iij bussellos de Crabbe sine licentia in bosco domini et ea vendit apud Teford pro xvj d' (Hilderele Court Roll, 25 Edward III). *OED*, 1420
- cropping 'Et de xijd de croppinges vnus fossae . . . venditis' (Hilderele Compotus, 47 Edward III). *OED*, 1420
- *crossbend 'vi quercum prostratorum in Hesco pro Crossebendes ad molendinos de Brokes (Hilderele Compotus, 13 Edward II)

¹⁰⁵ Neilson, appendix, p. 58; text, p. 84.

¹⁰⁶ *Journal of the Derby archaeological and natural history association*, XXII, 83.

¹⁰⁷ I, 600.

¹⁰⁸ Page, p. 197.

¹⁰⁹ Cunningham, p. 602.

- *deersleather 'Quere totum processum in libro de dereslethir, in folio' etc.¹¹⁰ (Ramsey, 1316-42)
- *doorbows In a list of repairs to the carthouse—'nouos(?) dorbowes' (Hilderle Compotus, 10 Edward II)
- *dorstal 'Et de ixd de Croppes i quereus prostratis in Hescoc pro Dorstalles et baces ad dictam bercariam' (Hilderle Compotus, 10 Edward II)
- *dunnemiche 'Unus panis vocatur dunnemiche et alter gestelof.' A note states that *dunnemiche* means brown-loaf, presumably *dun miche* (Halesowen, 1295).¹¹¹ See *OED*, 'miche,' sb. 1
- eavesboard (*euesbord*, Hilderle Compotus, 42 Edward III). *OED*, 1399
- *estrych (Hilderle Compotus, 42 Edward III). *OED* has only *estricheboard*, 1350
- eueslath (Brandon Compotus, 14 Richard II). *OED*, 1875
- *faldsaule In the section 'custos faldae'(?), 'in ferro pro j faldsaule empto xij d' (Hilderle Compotus, 36 Edward III)
- fattimber See *rastwode*
- *fenthak (=fen-thatch, Redgrave Compotus, 6 Henry VI)
- firewood (*fferwode*, Redgrave Court Roll, 51 Edward III). *OED*, 1496
- *fodderbin (*ffoddirbynne*, Redgrave Compotus, 30 Edward III)
- *gatestaple Wood for *gatsstapels* (Hilderle Compotus, 19 Edward II)
- *gatetres (Hilderle Compotus, 4 Edward II)
- *gestelof See *dunnemiche* (1295)
- groundsel (*gruncell*, Brandon Compotus, 4 Richard II). *OED*, 1406-7
- horstree (Thornegge Compotus, Richard II—year uncertain). *OED*, 1787
- mancorn (Winchester, 1208-9).¹¹² *OED*, s.v. 'mong-corn,' 1263
- *meatcorn The term is used of grain assigned to the servants for food and appears under *exitus siligonis*, *exitus orde*, and *custos molendini* (*metecoren*, Hilderle Compotus, 49 Henry III).
- *mengrell 'iiii quartarii 1 bussellus mengrell venditi' (Hilderle Compotus, 7 Edward I)
- *milnecorn 'bladi vocati milnecorn' (Hilderle Court Roll, 18 Edward III)
- molplow (Redgrave Compotus, 36 Edward III). *OED*, 1798
- *mydsty 'vi ring (sc. frumenti) per opera uno mydsty jacenti contra hostium maioris grangiae' (Wistowe Compotus, 1298)¹¹³
- outshot 'In j carpentario conducto pro vj dies emendando et imponendo xi sparres et outshotys in longo stabulo' (Thornegge Compotus, 2 Richard II). *OED*, 'out-shoot,' 1613; 'outshot,' 1626
- *pot-meal (Ilkeshall Compotus, 10 Henry VI: 'In factura ij bussellorum auene pro potmele.')

¹¹⁰ Ramsey Cart., II, 244.

¹¹¹ Halesowen court rolls, p. 336.

¹¹² Pipe roll, p. 1.

¹¹³ Neilson, appendix, p. 17.

- *rastwode 'et de ij s. vi d. de excaetis remnantum v quereuum prostratorum pro rastwode et flattetimber' (Hilderele Compotus, 14 Edward II). See *OED*, *wrest* sb.² 1653; fat(a), II. 4. d. 1697.
- robeyl (rubble, Worcester Compotus, 1376-77).¹¹⁴ *OED*, ante 1400
- rooftree (*roftre*, Hilderele Compotus, 14 Edward II). *OED*, ca. 1440
- sail-yard 'j Seylyerde ad molendinum' (Hilderele Compotus, 14 Edward II). *OED*, 1351-52
- *settling 'et quod Johannes cristemesse amputavit ij setlyngges de popelis et ij setlyngges de Wilwys' (Hilderele Court Roll, 46 Edward III).
- schredynges 'schredynges quereuum' (Hilderele Compotus, 13 Edward II). *OED*, 1398
- shaek s.v. 'mixtur,' 'j quartarius et dimidijs de schak diuersorum bladorum' (Hilderele Compotus, 12 Edward II). *OED*, 1536
- *shacorn (Redgrave Compotus, 14 Edward III) (*shakcorn*, Hilderele Compotus, 29 Edward III)
- *sinktree 'In v bordis de popel emptis pro sinktres in dicta loga faciendis' (Brandon Compotus, 7 Richard II).
- *spurbendes (Hilderele Compotus, 13 Edward II)
- *stagetimber (Hilderele Court Roll, 26 Edward III)
- *stalling 'Johannes Metewynd fecit transgressionem in bosco domini amputando stallyngges' (Hilderele Court Roll, 49 Edward III).
- standard 'Henricus Hare amputavit infra boscum domini ij standard' (Hilderele Court Roll, 43 Edward III). *OED*, *stander*, 1548; *standard*, 1473; *standel*, 1543
- *staytre 'i staytre pro molendine de Broke' (Hilderele Compotus, 13 Edward II)
- *stepfat 'In ij circulis ligni emptis pro le stepfat.' (Thornegge Compotus, 2 Richard II). Is this our *steep* plus *vat*?
- *toplatth (Brandon Compotus, 14 Richard II)
- tub 'In j cunatore conducto pro iiij dies pro . . . j tubba erigenda' (Hilderele Compotus, 4 Edward II). *OED*, 1392-93
- tungetre 'Et de xiiij d. receptis de excaetis j quercus prostrati in Stanbergh ad j Tungetre.' In the same account for 13 Edward II a 'toungetre pro molendino' is mentioned (Hilderele Compotus, 7 Edward I). *OED*, *tongue-tree* of an oxcart, 1829
- waterbord (Thornegge Compotus, 45 Edward III). *OED*, 1417
- *werklof 'et habebit quilibet unum panem frumenti . . . quantitatis unius wklof de Rameseia' (Ramsay)¹¹⁵
- *windspelt 'in C(clavis) . . . emptis pro le waterbord et 1 wyndspelt ejusdem domus clavandis' (Forncett, 1376-78)¹¹⁶
- *windwon 'In xij bordes de estrych pro le wyndwon molendini faciendū emptis. (wind-vane?) (Brandon Compotus, 37 Edward III)

¹¹⁴ *Compotus rolls of the priory . . . XIVth and XVth centuries*, p. 20.

¹¹⁵ *Ramsay cart.*, I, 367.

¹¹⁶ *Davenport*, p. lvi.

*windyard 'De herbagio dil Ercheyerd Wyndyerd et wurteyerd nihil' (Thornegge Compotus, 1 Richard II). Perhaps the first element of this word is *wind*² (*OED*) from stem of *wind* v.³, 'to winnow.'

ARTICLES BOUGHT

- *axeltreclutes (Hilderele Compotus, 18 Edward I)
 bacrope (Hilderele Compotus, 42 Edward III). *OED*, 1711
 basket (*bascat*, Winchester, 1207-8).¹¹⁷ *OED*, 1300
 beyle 'In ij circulis ferri et le beyle dil stoppe fontis emendendo' (Thornegge Compotus, 1 Richard II). Probably this is *OED bail*, sb.² 1447
 *bindwithes 'In spetis et byndwitthes emptis ad idem' (sc. a house) (Brandon Compotus, 7 Richard II). *OED* has a different *bindwith*
 *bodytray 'In j pare de Boditrayes emptis xd' (belonging to a cart) (Redgrave Compotus, 26 Edward III)
 *brestbult (Brandon Compotus, 30 Edward III), s.v. 'custos carucarum'
 bridlebit (Durham, 1438-39).¹¹⁸ *OED*, ca. 1500
 bucket 'In j boketto et fune ad aquam extrahendam de puteo emptis' (Winchester, 1207-8).¹¹⁹ *OED*, ante 1300. The quotation shows that the meaning is that of the English rather than the French word.
 *cappyingg 'In j kippelyne empto pro carecta et j corda pro cappyingg empta iij d' (Thornegge Compotus, 45 Edward III)
 carteband (Wistowe, 1311).¹²⁰ *OED*, 1483
 carteclute (Fornett, 1272-73).¹²¹ *OED*, 1446
 cartnailis (Worcester, 25-26 Edward III)¹²²
 carterop (Hilderele Compotus, 21 Edward III). *OED*, 1535
 chesecloth (Holywell, 1341).¹²³ *OED*, 1741
 eiver (Winchester, 1207-8).¹²⁴ *OED* (*kiver*), 1407
 *clampletute (Hilderele Compotus, 32 Edward I)
 clutnayl (Wistowe Compotus, 1351).¹²⁵ *OED*, 1463
 *cuttingsaw (*cuttingsagh*, Hilderele Compotus, 48 Edward III)
 dressingknyves (Durham Compotus, 1366).¹²⁶ *OED*, 1411
 dud 'In donis eisdem pro eorum duddis' ('clothes,' 'duds') (St. Swithun, 1334-35).¹²⁷ *OED*, 14 . .

¹¹⁷ Pipe roll, Winchester, p. 60.

¹¹⁸ Durham account rolls (Surtees Society), I, 71.

¹¹⁹ Pipe Roll, Winchester, p. 82.

¹²⁰ Neilson, appendix, p. 34.

¹²¹ P. xxxiii.

¹²² Early Compotus rolls, p. 51.

¹²³ J. E. T. Rogers, *History of agriculture and prices*, II, 665.

¹²⁴ Pipe roll, p. 60.

¹²⁵ Neilson, p. 62.

¹²⁶ Durham account rolls (Surtees Society), I, 45.

¹²⁷ Obedientary rolls (see n. 15a above), p. 238.

- fetterlock (*feterlok*, Hilderele Compotus, 35 Edward III). *OED* (first quotation in this meaning), ca. 1440
- *flornayles (St. Swithun, 1334-35)¹²⁸
- forlyne (Hilderele Compotus, 21 Edward III). *OED*, 1626
- frettes (Hilderele Compotus, 4 Edward II). *OED* (sb^s), 1688
- groppis (Manydown Compotus, 1378).¹²⁹ Probably this is *OED*, sb², 1411
- *groundstrake (Brandon Compotus, 10 Edward II). *OED*, s.v. 'ground,' 18, says that this means 'garboard strake,' but as the latter has to do with ships, the present word must be different.
- *halpenyclout 'In j plate ferre vocata helpenyclout cum clavis ad idem cum broddis ad dictam axem' (Brandon Compotus, 14 Richard II)
- *henghokes (1367-68)¹³⁰
- *heuedclute Over *clapclute* in the passage quoted under that word is written 'heuedclute' (Hilderele Compotus, 32 Edward I)
- *heuedyren 'heuedyren ad dictam molendinam' (Hilderele Compotus, 26 Edward I)
- heuedstal (Hilderele Compotus, 5 Edward III). *OED*, 1480
- *heuedstrake 'ad terciam carucam' (Redgrave Compotus, 11 Edward III)
- horseshoe ('horsehous', Durham, 1316).¹³¹ *OED*, 1387
- *horseskeppe 'j horssekepp virgarum' (Brandon Compotus, 37 Edward III)
- *hurthirnes (Fornett Compotus, 1272-73),¹³² *hurtirnes* (Hilderele Compotus, 32 Edward I)
- *hyngulnayl (Worcester Compotus, 1388-89)¹³³
- kerche (Redgrave Court Roll, 47 Edward III). *OED*, ca. 1430
- *kyppeynes (Wistowe Compotus, 1311)¹³⁴
- *linecordis (Worcester Compotus, 25-26 Edward III)¹³⁵
- markyngiryn (Redgrave Compotus, 50 Edward III). *OED*, ca. 1420
- milcloc (Hilderele Compotus, 49 Henry III). *OED* (s.v. 'mill-clack'), 1638
- muckrake 'vno muckrake cum ij Tyndes ferre' (Brandon Compotus, 39 Edward III). *OED*, 1684
- *panneyren 'Custos molendini: In j panneyren ad axam molendini' (Brandon Compotus, 30 Edward III)
- pitcher 'In xxxv picheris et ollis emptis' (Winchester, 1208-9). *OED*, ca. 1290

¹²⁸ P. 230.

¹²⁹ *The manor of Manydown*, ed. G. W. Kitchin ("Hampshire Record Society" [London, 1895]), p. 146.

¹³⁰ *Proceedings of the Society of Antiquaries* (2d ser.), XV, 316.

¹³¹ *Durham account rolls*, I, 11.

¹³² Davenport, p. xxxlii.

¹³³ *Compotus rolls of the priory . . . XIVth and XVth centuries*, p. 20.

¹³⁴ Neilson, appendix, p. 34.

¹³⁵ *Early Compotus rolls*, p. 50.

¹³⁶ *Pipe roll*, p. 2.

- plouclout (Wistowe Compotus, 1307).¹³⁷ *OED*, 1376-77
- plowlyne (Brandon Compotus, 7 Richard II). *OED*, 1895; Suppl., 1797
- redyngg 'redyngg empto(?) *pro bidentibus consignandis*' (Brandon Compotus, 29 Richard III). *OED*, first example in this use, 1778
- *renpinnes (Hildercle Compotus, 26 Edward I)
- *ruggad (undated Hildercle Compotus, thirteenth century). Is this a compound of OE *hrycg* and *gād*?
- *rusteschon (Anstey, Herts., 2-3 Henry IV)¹³⁸
- *shaetrays (Hildercle Compotus, 42 Edward III)
- *shotnaye (Thornegge Compotus, 1 Richard II)
- selys (Thornegge Compotus, 45 Edward III). *OED* (sale sb.³), first quotation uncompounded, 1434-35
- *shildebred (Worcester, 25-26 Edward III)¹³⁹
- sydebordis Boards for repair of a mill (Thornegge Compotus, 13 Edward IV). *OED*, 1611
- *sykilirens (Redgrave Compotus, 30 Edward III). Part of the expenses of a mill
- *splentnail (Hildercle Compotus, 17 Edward I)
- *standard 'In j standard vnus lagenæ ferro ligato (?) empto ad familiares' (Hildercle Compotus, 4 Edward III)
- standard 'j bussellus secundum standard' (Hildercle Compotus, 1 Edward III). *OED*, 1622
- *stertwythes 'Custos carucarum: In sultwyth et stertwythes emptis' (Thornegge Compotus, 1 Richard II)
- *stirop 'In ij stiropis pro molendino' (Brandon Compotus, 18 Edward III)
- *stradeloutis (Amstey Compotus, 2-3 Henry IV)¹⁴⁰
- strake (Hildercle Compotus, 26 Edward I). *OED*, 1330-31
- straknaye (Wistowe Compotus, 1297).¹⁴¹ *OED*, 1334-35
- *stodyngnaye (Worcester Compotus, 1376-77)¹⁴²
- *sultwyth See 'stertwythes.'
- sursingle (Durham Compotus, 1307).¹⁴³ *OED*, 1390
- sweyes 'In ce sweyes emptis pro ij faldis wyscandis' (Brandon Compotus, 18 Richard II). *OED* (sway, sb.ii), 1545
- tankard 'In j tankard pro ceruisia' (Thornegge Compotus, 45 Edward III). *OED*, 1485
- thyllesels 'custos caretтарum: Thyllesels cum stroppes' (Brandon Compotus, 39 Edward III). Presumably *thill-saddle*, mentioned without example in *OED* (s.v. 'saddle,' sb. 3)

¹³⁷ Neilson, appendix, p. 28.¹³⁸ Cunningham, I, 597.¹³⁹ *Early Compotus rolls*, p. 50.¹⁴⁰ Cunningham, I, 597.¹⁴¹ Neilson, appendix, p. 6.¹⁴² *Compotus rolls of the priory . . . XIVth and XVth centuries*, p. 20.¹⁴³ *Durham account rolls* (Surtees Society), I, 5.

- *thylletrays 'j pare de Thylletrays cum pare de sels' (*ibid.*)
 *tun-iron ('tonyren,' Redgrave Compotus, 24 Edward III)
 *underlaths(?) 'custos carucarum: In iij hunderlathers emptis. . . . In vnderlayis ad easdem' (Hildercle Compotus, 12 Edward III)
 *uptie (Worcester, 25-26 Edward III)¹⁴⁴
 vinegar (Hildercle Compotus, 55 Henry III). *OED*, 1300
 *warpin 'In iij warpyns de ferro emptis pro carucis' (Brandon Compotus, 18 Edward III)
 wedingyrnis (i.e., weeding-irons, Norfolk 1400).¹⁴⁵ *OED*, 1562
 wyndingbondes (Hildercle Compotus, 2 Edward II). *OED*, 1582 (probably different in meaning). Mentioned in connection with carts.

ANIMALS

- *baghors (Durham Compotus, 1311-12)¹⁴⁶
 *fischehors (Durham Compotus, 1311-12)¹⁴⁶
 bellewether (Brandon Compotus, 18 Edward III). *OED*, ca. 1430
 clopsteres (Hildercle Compotus, 30 Edward I). *OED*, 'club-start,' 1877
 *colfysch (Durham Compotus, 1338)¹⁴⁷
 *fressingges (Wistowe Compotus, 1297).¹⁴⁸ Note in Neilson: 'probably young pigs'
 gogge 'vitulum qui vocatur Gogge'¹⁴⁹ (Norwich, 1287-88)¹⁵⁰
 *halpeniges 'In aucis emptis quarum xij de Rentges et halpeniges' (Durham Compotus, 1340)¹⁵¹
 stag 'viiij cignotei vocati stagges' (Brandon Compotus, 37 Edward III). *OED*, 1544

MEASURES OF LAND

- butt 'de uno vetere curtillagio cum iijor buttes terre jacentibus' (Halesowen Court Rolls, 1304).¹⁵² *OED* ('butt,' sb.^e), 1450
 *fering (Ramsey Cart., undated)¹⁵³
 ferlinga, furlingo *Glossary*: 'Probably equivalent to fourth part of a plough land' (Pipe Roll, Winchester, 1207-8). *OED* (ferling 3), 1695¹⁵⁴
 *ferlingsetl (Glastonbury, undated)¹⁵⁵

¹⁴⁴ *Early Compotus rolls*, p. 50.¹⁴⁵ *Victoria County history of Norfolk*, II, 323.¹⁴⁶ *Durham account rolls* (Surtees Society), I, 10.¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 34.¹⁴⁸ Neilson, appendix, p. 5.¹⁴⁹ *Leet jurisdiction in the city of Norwich*, ed. William Hudson (Selden Society), V, 5.¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 51.¹⁵¹ *Durham account rolls*, I, 36.¹⁵² *Halesowen court rolls*, p. 480.¹⁵³ *Ramsey cart.*, I, 415, 417.¹⁵⁴ *Pipe Roll*, pp. 63, 65.¹⁵⁵ Vinogradoff, p. 148.

*stafaker 'Item datur messori j acre ordeí. Item j stafaker ordeí' (Redgrave Compotus, 26 Edward III)

*toftland (Brandon Compotus, 48 Edward III)

KINDS OF WORK

*coukerre (Denbigh, 1334)¹⁵⁶

*horskerre (Denbigh, 1334)¹⁵⁶

*pikking 'In blestis frangendis et in pikking tempore seminationis ordeí' (Fornecett Compotus, 1272-73)¹⁵⁷

*weteckerre (Denbigh, 1334)¹⁵⁶

LEGAL TERMS

*benlaw The parties to a suit consented to a *benlaw* (Halesowen Court Rolls, 1301)¹⁵⁸

*bortrening This word in the form *Bortrenii* appears first in Hilderele Compotus, 53 Henry III. Usually abbreviated as *Bortrem*, it is written *bortrening* in Hilderele Compotus, 23 Edward I. It is a name for Court Leet (or view of Frankpledge) appearing in Hilderele Compoti through Edward I's reign, and in Redgrave Court Rolls of about the same time. If this is OE *borh + tremman*, presumably the forms in Hilderele Compotus, 23 Edward I, are slightly miswritten.

*fiftedai 'et de vi d. de Ricardo de Willa pro sursisa, quia non venit ad fiftedai cum secta hundredi' (Winchester, 1207-8).¹⁵⁹ *Glossary*: 'the fifth court day.' *OED* Suppl. has a 'fifth day' which is probably different.

MISCELLANEOUS

*axelinge 'et pro axelinge carecte cum axle(?) empto' (1367-68)¹⁶⁰

bannenotre (Worcester Compotus, 1387-88).¹⁶¹ *OED*, ca. 1450

bay 'Item j bay hakeney' (Holywell, 1341). *OED*, 1374

*billyng 'et herciabit pro dimidiam diem ante nonam et habebit j billyng' (Extent of manor of Brandon, 3 Richard II)

*cartplow (Redgrave Compotus, 26 Edward III)

chese-fat (Hilderele Compotus, 8 Edward I). *OED*, 1398

clothsack (1331).¹⁶² No example in *OED*

cogwhel (Brandon Compotus, 23 Richard II). *OED*, 1416

*cropnayl (Worcester Compotus, 1376-77)¹⁶⁴

*crabbethornes 'xv arbores, videlicet quercus mapelys et crabbethornes' (Redgrave Compotus, 36 Edward III)

¹⁵⁶ *Survey of the honour of Denbigh*, p. 6.

¹⁵⁷ Davenport, p. xxxix.

¹⁵⁸ P. 419.

¹⁵⁹ *Pipe roll*, p. 66.

¹⁶⁰ *Proceedings of the Society of Antiquaries* (2d ser., London), XV, 315.

¹⁶¹ *Compotus rolls of the priory . . . XIVth and XVth centuries*, p. 24.

¹⁶² Rogers, II, 665.

¹⁶³ Rogers, II, 642.

¹⁶⁴ *Compotus rolls of the priory . . . XIVth and XVth centuries*, p. 18.

- erabbetren (Redgrave Compotus, 14 Edward III). *OED*, 1425
- *custumpund (Fornecett Compotus, 1272-73)¹⁶⁵
- *dongecoppis 'iij Dongecoppis sine rotis' (Holywell, 1341)¹⁶⁶
- *doungerowe 'Idem reddit de iij. receptis pro cariacione j Doungerowe' (Hilderele Compotus, 12 Edward II)
- egylkes (Estate Book of Henry de Bray, before 1400).¹⁶⁷ *OED*, 1868
- *forchep 'Foranus non faciat forchep civi necque cum eo emat vel vendat in civitate nisi civis voluerit' (Customs of London, twelfth century)¹⁶⁸
- forge ('forgio,' De Lacy, 33 Edward I).¹⁶⁹ *OED*, 1386
- gap 'In stipendio unius hominis per j diem obstupantis gapes circa boscum' (from Redgrave Compotus, 26 Edward III) (Hilderele Compotus, 21 Edward III). *OED*, ca. 1380
- *hamerokes 'In walewrt et in hamerokes et dokkes abradicandis extra frumentum' (Fornecett Compotus, 1272-73)¹⁷⁰
- *leet-fee 'et ballius hundredi pro letefe iij. (Mellis Court Roll, 1 Edward IV)
- *pesewort (De Bray, before 1400)¹⁷¹
- *presentbred 'xjs. iij. de presentbred customariorum venditis ad festum' (Cuxham, 1316-17)¹⁷²
- rape W. de G. 'fecit Rape in domo Richardi Topat Mitild Coln' (Redgrave Court Roll, 20 Edward I). *OED*, sb.², meaning 3, 1481
- *rendbord (Worcester Compotus, 1376-77)¹⁷³
- ryngbone 'Pro vno equo cartae aridendo de quadam infirmitate vocata Ryngbone' (Redgrave Compotus, 35 Edward III). *OED*, 1594
- *schargg 'In ij hominibus conductis per xij dies pro quercubus scharggandis' (Hilderele Compotus, 4 Edward III)
- schredynges 'Schredynges quercuum in Stanberg pro furcis inde faciendis' (Hilderele Compotus, 13 Edward II). *OED* (2b), 1398
- schrowedand (Hilderele Compotus, 32 Edward III). Perhaps this is *OED*, shroud vb.², 1577-87
- *scotcarte 'In oblacione ij cartariorum(?) vi familiarum carucæ(?) j Inhewe euntum ad le scot carte et herciantum temporibus seminationis, etc.' (Redgrave Compotus, 30 Edward III)
- *serving-board 'et solutum Rogero Clement pro factura le dressores et le seruyngbordes in coquina' (Thornegge Compotus, 21 Edward IV)
- shokand 'In xj acris siliginis metendis, ligandis et shokandis' (Brandon Compotus, 18 Edward III; 37 Edward III). *OED*, ca. 1440

¹⁶⁵ Davenport, p. xxx.¹⁶⁶ Rogers, II, 665.¹⁶⁷ Ed. Dorothy Willis (3d ser., Camden Society), V, xxvii.¹⁶⁸ Cunningham, I, 617.¹⁶⁹ De Lacy Compotus, p. 101.¹⁷⁰ Davenport, p. xi.¹⁷¹ Willis, loc. cit.¹⁷² Rogers, II, 618.¹⁷³ Compotus rolls of the priory . . . XIVth and XVth centuries, p. 20.

soudyng 'In soundyng ij plumborum' (Redgrave Compotus, 14 Edward III). Cf. *OED*, *sold* v.², 1388

stoding 'Pro lathing et stoding' (1367-68).¹⁷⁴ *OED*, *studding*, 1588

velym (Worcester Compotus, 1388).¹⁷⁵ *OED*, *ca.* 1440

verious 'Item in iiij bussellis dimidio salis emptis tam pro potagio familiarum quam pro autumpno et pro verious' (Hilderle Compotus, 30 Edward III). Is this *various*, *OED*, 1552?

wassheledur (Worcester Compotus, 1388-89).¹⁷⁶ *OED*, 1426-27

*waterpayle 'Item in j clospe ferri pro le Waterpayle' (Hilderle Compotus, 35 Edward III)

wattle verb in the form *watiland* (Hilderle Compotus, 29 Edward III). *OED*, vb. 2, 1377

watlyng verbal noun (Thornegge Compotus, 45 Edward III). *OED*, 1573-80

*woolsack 'In ij wullesakkes emptis pro lanam domini cariandis versus melforde' (Redgrave Compotus, 35 Edward III)

DOUBTFUL WORDS

Probably it is unnecessary to state that, in the study of such documents as these records, a reader who is not an expert in paleography or in manorial history encounters many words which are unintelligible to him. In part this result is due to my incomplete knowledge of medieval Latin and French, in part to a lack of skill in deciphering the text and to an inability to understand the abbreviations, and in part to the carelessness of the scribes. Most such words I have disregarded. But a few which seem reasonably certain, though unintelligible to me, I present as examples of the kind of thing encountered.

*baces and ouerslayes 'de lxd. de Croppes j quercus prostrati in Heseoo pro Dorstalles et baces ad dictam bercariam' (Hilderle Compotus, 10 Edward II); 'de excaetis iij quereuum prostratorum in Stanberg pro Dorstall et Ouerslayes ad dictam grangiam' (Hilderle Compotus, 12 Edward II)

*bachauers (Hilderle Compotus, 6 Edward I). Apparently this word refers to tenants who were required to harvest peas and grain. Though the word occurs frequently in Hilderle and Redgrave documents, I am unable to decide whether the sixth letter is *u* or *n*. The word looks like a compound, the second element of which is *aver* (see *OED*, *aver-* and *average*, sb.) Hilderle Compotus, 2 Edward II, indicates the meaning: 'In pane furnito pro lxx hominibus qui vocantur Bacauers pro pisas colligendas et bladum ligandum.' In one case an abstract noun based on this word is

¹⁷⁴ *Proceedings of the Society of Antiquaries* (2d ser.), XV, 315.

¹⁷⁵ *Compotus rolls of the priory . . . XIVth and XVth centuries*, p. 43.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

- indicated: 'Et quod Johannes Boyby detinet unum Bacaueragium(?) et dimidium per annum pro v annos de tenemento chapman' (Hilderele Court Roll, 2 Edward III).
- *bidbred 'In x axibus pro carectis xij croxbond et bidbred (Hilderele Compotus, 2 Edward III)
- *blektruns 'Simon Faber tenet dimidiam virgatam, et facit pro ea feramenta carucarum curiae, et percepit duos blektruns ad carbonem' (Ramsey, no date)¹⁷⁷
- *cluppeles (Worcester, 25-26 Edward III). Purchased for a cart¹⁷⁸
- *erokelis 'Et de l.s. de l. crokelys venditis Roberto Clerk et de diuersis crokelis mapelys venditis diuersis emptoribus' (Hilderele Compotus, 42 Edward III)
- *dayesen 'Propter illam gallinam conquererunt habere de bosco domini regis unam summam bosci, quae vocatur dayesen' (Gloucester)¹⁷⁹
- *denykesmen 'De redditu iiii tenencium vocatorum Denykesmen' (1367-68)¹⁸⁰
- *dunelegges 'In reparacione carectae . . . eum dunelegges' (Hilderele Compotus, 11 Edward III); 'dulegh'; 'dulegiis' (Hilderele Compotus, 9 Edward III). Perhaps this is *OED*, *duledge*, with an older meaning; *dunelegges* may be *duuelegges*
- *goryng 'de ijs. vj d. de herbagio ij acrarum cum j goryng ibidem vendito Roberto Clerk' (Hilderele Compotus, 42 Edward III)
- *heyroun 'et de xxvjs. de heyrouns venditis(?) hoe anno' (among wood sold) (Hilderele Compotus, 42 Edward III)
- *hop 'Compotus . . . de ij hopis gruelli venditis' (Winchester, 1207-8); 'In prae'benda senescalli, iij quarters, iij hops' (*ibid.*, 1208-9)¹⁸¹
- *leupynn (Hilderele Compotus, 17 Edward I). Whether the third letter is *u* or *n* is uncertain.
- *powhaylles 'pro nouis powhaylles crostre et Baces in poste molendini ibidem factis et imponendis et eciam pro nouis sebeltres' (Brandon Compotus, 23 Richard II). See Godefroy, *s.v.* 'poaillier'
- *Redesquene 'In ^{xx}_{vj} xij agnis lauandis pro quadam infirmitate dil Redesquene' (Redgrave Compotus, 14 Edward III)
- *reswys 'In clauibus pro reswys et heuesbord emptis iiii d' (Hilderele Compotus, 9 Edward III). See Davenport, *op. cit.*, pp. xxxiii, xxxv: *resuis*, *resues*; p. lvi, *resues*
- *sebeltre See *powhaylles* above
- *sefore 'pro aueragios qui dicuntur sefore (Hilderele Compotus, 3 Edward III)
- *shamelys 'In ij paribus rotorum pro carucis emptis cum axibus et shamelys' (Thornegge Compotus, 45 Edward III)

¹⁷⁷ Ramsey cart., II, 20.¹⁷⁸ Early Compotus rolls, p. 50.¹⁷⁹ Vinogradoff, p. 290, n. 2.¹⁸⁰ Proc. Soc. of Ant. (2d ser., London), XV, 311.¹⁸¹ Pipe roll, p. 52.

*shegg *s.v.* 'pastura vendita: de ijs. vid. de vna pecia shegge vendita' (Hilderele Compotus, 29 Edward III)

*walses 'In camera militum recarpentanda fere de novo de netherwalses et impositione de stuthes et resues. . . . In plaustrura de le walses postea' (Fornett, 1272-73)¹⁸²

*waspail 'De quibus in porcis suibus et porcellis sustinendis ij bussellos dimidium Waspail (Hilderele Compotus, 2 Edward III); 'waspail'—not abbreviated (*idem*, 42 Edward III; 1 Richard II). See Du Cange, *s.v.* 'vaspale'

*whepe 'In stipendio Wilhelmi Joye carpentarii scalpantis meremium pro iiij postibus novis una cum impositione unius whepe unius overway ac eciam bordantis latera ex utralibet parte molendini' (Anstey, Hert., 2-3 Henry IV)¹⁸³

PROPER NAMES

One cannot end this sketch without mentioning the surnames and place-names found in these documents. Perhaps nothing but a glance at an index of a Patent Roll calendar could suggest the enormous extent of such names present in manorial records. But the names in the manorial rolls are more simple in their elements and less French and formal than those in government records. They emphasize anew the English speech habits of the folk, and, to some extent, display the use of compounds which later are recorded as common nouns, e.g., Irenmonger (Halesowen 1293, *OED*, 1343) and Heryngmongere (Wistowe 1316, *OED*, 1614). Sometimes a surname produces on a modern reader a puzzling or even a humorous effect, e.g., Wasschepayle (Brandon Compotus, 18 Richard II) and Swalwetayle (Redgrave, 23 Richard II). The following specimens of place-names will suggest something of their character: Swimmingdich (Redgrave Court Roll, 22 Richard II), Deadman's-cross (Redgrave Compotus, 8 Henry VI), Newegate, Fyueokis, Chercheweye, Lanesend, ffenfurlong, Cherchefeld, Calkepittis, Greneweye, Stonilondfeld, Middileroft, Litolwode, Puddyingistoft, Coldokwong, Mikilwodegrene, Brodelond (all from Redgrave, 23 Richard II). Needless to say it was customary to name places on the manor from tenant families, e.g., Morganeselos, Shirlokesyate (Morgans Compotus, 12 Richard II); Rowlynesyerd, Babbispictell (Ilketshall Compotus, 9 Edward IV).

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¹⁸² Davenport, p. xxxv.

¹⁸³ Cunningham, *op. cit.*, p. 595.

POEMS ATTRIBUTED TO VOLTAIRE

IRA WADE

EVERYONE is familiar with the great precaution exercised by Beuchot in editing the poems written by Voltaire and in rejecting those which he believed to have been written by others.¹ In spite of this, certain spurious poems, for instance, the *Epître à Samuel Bernard* (Beuchot, XIII, 29-31), have found their way into the Beuchot collection.² Bengesco has proceeded with similar care in the preparation of his *Bibliographie*, where he has discarded many other works attributed incorrectly.³ It would seem that the combined efforts of these two scholars should have resulted in giving to the public once and for all an accurate list of Voltaire's poems. But such is undoubtedly not the case, for both Beuchot and Bengesco took into consideration only the printed form of a work. They did not consider the manuscript copy which was passed from hand to hand and which eventually found its way into anonymously printed *Recueils de poésies fugitives* or into manuscript *Recueils de poésies*. These latter Bengesco entirely ignored:

Outre ces diverses pièces imprimées séparément, les *Poésies mêlées* publiées sous le nom de Voltaire, ou qui lui ont été faussement attribuées soit dans les feuilles périodiques, soit dans les *Correspondances* et les *Mémoires* du temps, soit enfin dans les divers recueils poétiques du XVIII^e siècle, sont en nombre si considérable qu'il est impossible d'en dresser, même approximativement, la liste complète et détaillée. Un tel travail n'offrirait d'ailleurs qu'un médiocre intérêt, la plupart de ces pièces étant insignifiantes, et n'ayant généralement aucune valeur poétique.⁴

It must be admitted that this attitude on the part of Bengesco is in part justifiable. There is now at the Bibliothèque Nationale (F. fr.

¹ Beuchot, XIV, 303-6.

² See Van Roosbroeck, *MLN*, XXXVII (1922), 440-42.

³ *Bibliographie des ouvrages de Voltaire*, IV, 278-310. Cf. Moland, XXXII, 429-40, and L, 590, "Ouvrages faussement attribués à Voltaire."

⁴ IV, 302.

12860, p. 3 and again p. 78) a short poem entitled "Couplet inédit de Voltaire lors de la chute du système de Law":

Accablé de malheur, menacé de la peste,
Grand Saint Roch, notre unique bien,
Ecoutez un peuple chrétien:
Venez nous secourir, soyez notre soutien,
Nous ne craignons rien de funeste.
Ah! détournez de nous la colère céleste!
Mais n'amenez pas votre chien,
Nous n'avons pas de pain de reste.

It will certainly be granted that little is to be gained by inquiring whether this particular poem is genuine or not. But others which throw an interesting light either upon the state of mind and early activities of the poet or upon the background in which he moved may be very important to students of the eighteenth century. Thus, it would seem, in spite of Beuchot's prudence and Bengesco's arbitrary elimination of poems which may have been after all written by the poet, that the time has arrived for a renewed investigation of Voltaire's writings between 1714 and 1732.

This investigation is all the more imperative since it has become more and more apparent to students of Voltaire that full justice has not been given the poet's output during these eighteen years. Anyone will admit that during this period he was attempting to acquire the reputation of being the greatest poet of France. He had definitely identified himself with the school of Chaulieu, La Fare, and Chapelle. We know that he was very precocious, and we have ample reason to suspect that he was also very prolific. However, the combined collection of epîtres, odes, epigrams, and stances for these eighteen years is much smaller than for other periods when he was interested primarily in other forms of writing, such as drama, history, or philosophy. Let us consider, for instance, the period from 1714 to 1719. It is undoubtedly true that he had by this time acquired considerable fame as a poet. That fame now rests upon two poems (*La Bastille* [1717]; *La police sous Louis XIV*), one ode (*La chambre de justice* [1715]), no "stances," three contes (*L'anti-gilon* [1714]; *Le cadenas* [1716]; *Le cocuage* [1716]), one satire (*Le boubier* [1714]), twelve *poésies mêlées* (the total of these twelve poems is 119 lines), and sixteen "épîtres."

In five years' time, 1714–19, his production in his chosen field, that of *poésies fugitives*, would seem to have been actually less than it was between 1732 and 1737, when he had transferred his attention to another field of literature.

There are other circumstances which lead us to the conclusion that many of Voltaire's lighter verses have not been included in his work. The *Correspondances* of the time refer time and again in a somewhat enigmatic manner, it is true, to some poem written by him. We have already had occasion to mention the letter of Villeroy to Danchet.⁵ The following letter of Rousseau is another example:

8 avril 1715

Je reçois, mon cher monsieur, avec la lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écire, la petite pièce de vers de M. Arouet que M. Mandat m'avait déjà fait voir, il y a quatre jours, en passant ici pour aller à Vienne. Il m'en a montré deux autres de la même main. ... J'ai vu même par les deux autres pièces, dont l'une est dédiée à la Duclos et l'autre roule sur les Jésuites et les Jansénistes, qu'il n'est pas assez en garde contre ce qui peut donner prise aux ennemis que son mérite pourra lui attirer dans la suite.⁶

The poem dedicated to La Duclos is probably the *Anti-gilon*. The second one mentioned concerning the Jesuits and the Jansenists apparently has not found its way into the collected works. Voltaire's own *Correspondance* as well as that of others suggests that his poetic production was considerably larger than is commonly supposed.⁷ In a letter of June, 1731, he confessed having a portfolio of what he called *pièces fugitives*, while Thiériot had another.⁸ But a still more striking evidence of possible lacunae in his poetry is furnished by a casual perusal of the *Recueils de poésies* in manuscript which circulated in the eighteenth century. As we all know, this method of collecting verses of famous poets was especially pleasing to the cognoscenti of the eighteenth century, and volume after volume can be found in the public libraries of France. These *Recueils* in manuscript often attribute poems to Voltaire. To be sure, the attributions are not wholly trustworthy, nor are all the poems ascribed to him unpublished. He himself complained of the frequent false attributions: "On

⁵ PMLA, XLVII, 1068.

⁶ RHL, 1902, pp. 550–51.

⁷ Cf. Beuchot, LI, 88, n. 1.

⁸ Beuchot, LI, 215 (1731).

fait mon inventaire quoique je ne sois pas encore mort, et chacun y glisse ses meubles pour les vendre."⁹ But there are instances where the works may not be wrongly ascribed to him. Hence the necessity arises of establishing a rigorous method of distinguishing those which are wrongly attributed from those which were really his.

The problem of the method to be employed is all the more acute since no one procedure is sufficient for adequately testing a work. In general, the only arguments offered for assigning a poem to Voltaire must come from the authority of the manuscript where it is found, from the internal evidence of the work itself, from the external evidence of *Correspondance*, *Mémoires*, etc., and from analogies drawn between the ideas of the poem under consideration and those of one known to be by Voltaire. Unfortunately we cannot have complete confidence in arguments so deduced. To be sure, the authority of the manuscript should be weighed, but it must be remembered that eighteenth-century *Recueils* are singularly untrustworthy. Internal evidence occurs but rarely. Indeed, it is rare that one finds even external evidence, such as *Correspondance*, *Mémoires*, which is not contradicted by some other bit of external evidence from another source. The argument that a poem "sounds like" Voltaire or that the style is reminiscent of him is not extremely convincing. In fact, any one of these tests involves almost insuperable difficulties. These difficulties can best be illustrated by an examination of certain poems which have been taken from manuscript *Recueils* and which in recent years have been attributed to him.

In a book entitled *Unpublished poems by Voltaire, Rousseau, Beaumarchais*, etc. (New York, 1933), Professor Van Roosbroeck attempts to establish that Voltaire is the author of two poems now found in a manuscript *Recueil* which formerly belonged to Villeneuve. The two poems, one an *Épître à Athénaïs*, the other entitled *Épître à Mademoiselle du ****, have not been included in the *Œuvres complètes* by Beuchot nor even mentioned by Bengesco in the "ouvrages faussement attribués à Voltaire."

Mr. Van Roosbroeck gives three reasons for assigning the *Épître à Athénaïs* to Voltaire. First of all, it is so ascribed in the Villeneuve manuscript. Second, there is external evidence which confirms the

⁹ Bengesco, IV, 302, quoted from Collini, *Mon séjour auprès de Voltaire*.

Villeneuve manuscript. In the *Voltariana ou éloges amphigouriques de Fr. Marie Arrouet* (Paris, 1748), Voltaire is represented as the author in four different places. Each time the *Athénaïs* is coupled with another work which is known to be his: *Épître à Uranie*, *Épître sur la calomnie*, *Le mondain*, *Lettres philosophiques*, *Zaïre*, and *Mahomet*. Mr. Van Roosbroeck concludes from this fact that it is highly improbable that those who were so well informed about the author's other works could be misinformed about the *Athénaïs*. Lastly, he affirms that the poem is written in a tone characteristic of the young Arouet. "Written in a form similar to that of the *Épître à Uranie*, it remains throughout Voltairean in manner and voices some of his favorite ideas."¹⁰

It is to be noted that Mr. Van Roosbroeck has used three of the four known procedures for testing the authenticity of a poem found in a manuscript *Recueil*: the manuscript authority, external evidence, general tone and style. His arguments deserve consideration but are not conclusive. For instance, the Villeneuve is the only known manuscript *Recueil* which contains the *Athénaïs*. This fact, to be sure, does not prove that Voltaire did not write the work. It merely makes confirmatory information more necessary. Unfortunately, such information as we have is not always corroborative, for when, in 1744, the poem was published in the *Recueil de pièces fugitives, en vers* (à Londres, chez Jean Pierre Schmidt), and again in the *Recueil de pièces fugitives* (Londres, 1757), it appeared anonymously. The unpublished Villeneuve *Recueil* is certainly no more authoritative than the published 1744 *Recueil de pièces fugitives*. The external evidence of the *Voltariana* is also unconvincing. In the first place, the *Voltariana* is a collection of pamphlets written against Voltaire, and it should be accordingly examined with care. Second, all the references to the *Athénaïs* in the *Voltariana* seem to have been written later than 1744 after the appearance of the *Recueil de pièces fugitives en vers*.¹¹ Since this small *Recueil* printed the *Épître à Uranie par A. de V* ... followed immediately by the *Épître à Athénaïs*, there is a presumption that the commentator concluded that the two poems were by Voltaire after he

¹⁰ *Unpublished poems*, p. 13.

¹¹ Not after 1733, as Professor Van Roosbroeck says. The poem on the *Temple du goût* which Professor Van Roosbroeck dates 1733 has a note which refers to Voltaire's letter of 1746 to the Abbé d'Olivet (i.e., De la Tour, according to Baston).

had read them together in the 1744 *Recueil*. This presumption becomes more certain when it is observed that in all four passages of Baston's work, the *Athénaïs* is constantly coupled with the *Épître à Uranie*. The argument concerning general tone and style is even less significant, since, according to Marchand,¹² some contemporaries considered that the poem did not sound like Voltaire: "Quelques personnes donnent aussi à Mr. de Voltaire *L'Épître à Athénaïs* mais beaucoup d'autres en doutent, la trouvant fort inférieure tant pour la versification que pour le tour." It must be concluded that there are as many reasons for rejecting as for accepting the *Athénaïs*.

The case of the second poem in question, *Épître à Mademoiselle du ****, is different in that there seems to be no contemporary mention of it other than that of the Villeneuve manuscript. Evidently proof of its authenticity depends upon the reliability of this manuscript. Professor Van Roosbroeck, having tested it in one instance and having found it reliable, concludes that it is also reliable with respect to the authorship of this particular *Épître*. In order further to advance his point, Professor Van Roosbroeck says that "since this poem does not exist in print, it is difficult to see why it should be spurious" (p. 20). And, lastly, he adduces the familiar argument that it sounds like Voltaire.

It takes but a moment's reflection to realize that only the argument from the reliability of the Villeneuve manuscript is valid. Unsubstantiated, however, by confirmation from other manuscript *Recueils* or by external or internal evidence, this test is not very conclusive. Any collector of verses may be right in one attribution and wrong in another. To be accepted as fully authoritative, the Villeneuve manuscript would have to be proved correct not in one point alone, but in all other points. As for the other reasons given for accepting the poem, they are of minor import. The fact that it was never published is certainly not evidence of its authenticity. It would be just as fair to assume that every unpublished poem attributed to Voltaire is really his. The fact that in general it sounds like him is no proof that it is genuine, since practically any contemporary who wrote verses and wished them to be successful might have endeavored to pattern them after those of Voltaire. It must be concluded that there are as yet no

¹² *Dictionnaire historique* (La Haye, 1758), II, 319a.

real grounds for accepting the attribution of the *Epître à Mademoiselle du ****. Since, however, unlike the *Epître à Athénaïs* there are no well-founded reasons for rejecting it, it should be classified for the moment as a decidedly "doubtful" poem.

A different situation exists in the case of *Jansénius*, published in 1906 by Professor Gazier in the *Revue des deux mondes* (XXXII [April, 1906], 639) as a possible poem of Voltaire. Professor Gazier found this *Jansénius* attributed to M. Aroüette de Voltaire in a manuscript *Recueil* belonging to Louis Adrien le Paige, *avocat au Parlement*. In support of his belief in the authenticity of the poem he notes, first of all, that some of the verses are well constructed. Then he brings to our attention the fact that Voltaire, whose brother was a devotee of the Jansenist cause, was at one time interested in Jansenism, even to the point of investigating one of the miracles of the group. Furthermore, Professor Gazier assumes that the line "Fais que l'exil injuste où je suis condamné" probably referred to the poet's exile in England.

The arguments of Professor Gazier can be further strengthened by certain facts not in his possession. The *Jansénius* occurs in at least seven other manuscript *Recueils* of the eighteenth century (Arsenal 3133, Lyon, Palais des Arts 54, Narbonne 210, Reims 646, Grenoble 2268, Aix 364, Archives 1377). Two of these (Arsenal 3133 and Grenoble 2268) attribute the poem to Voltaire. Obviously, when two or more unrelated *Recueils* make the same attribution, it becomes more plausible. Moreover, not only do we have the letter of Voltaire which Professor Gazier quotes to show the interest which the former took in Jansenist miracles; we have also the letter of Jean Baptiste Rousseau which states as early as 1715 that Voltaire had written a poem "qui roule sur les Jésuites et les Jansénistes." Finally, the content of the *Jansénius* seems to indicate Voltaire as its author. It is significant that while the work treats with reverence Jansen and the Bishop of Senes, it speaks rather lightly of Fleury, who, in a way, was not only persecuting the Jansenists, but (and this was more important) Voltaire. In that light, the line "Fais que l'exil injuste où je suis condamné" would not refer to the exile to England. Taken in connection with the preceding line:

Dans un antre je suis, comme lui [David] confiné
Fais que l'exil injuste où je suis condamné,

the reference would be to the poet's enforced stay at St. Germain after his return from England. Thus there is both internal and external evidence supporting the theory that Professor Gazier has correctly ascribed the *Jansénius*.

There remains for consideration only one objection to the acceptance of the poem in the *Œuvres complètes*. When we remember the inherent scorn which Voltaire displayed for the Jansenists in general and for his *Janséniste de frère* in particular, we find it hard to accept as his a work in praise of Cornelius Jansen and the Bishop of Senes. Curiously enough, this situation is just the reverse of that of Mr. Van Roosbroeck's *Épître à Mademoiselle du ****. In this case, both internal and external evidence point to Voltaire as the author, but the objection arises that the poem does not "sound like" him. However, there is a grave danger in judging a work by our preconceived and somewhat arbitrary notion of what "sounds like" him. It is as unwise to reject a work unlike Voltaire's authentic poems, in content, as it is to accept one similar to them in ideas and expression. If, for instance, the poet saw a momentary advantage in defending the Bishop of Senes at the expense of the Cardinal Fleury, it is reasonable to assume that he would seize the opportunity, even though he may have had but a lukewarm interest in Jansenism.

As a matter of fact, the *Jansénius* is more interesting for the very reason that it does not contain the usual expression of Voltaire's ideas. Once accepted, it presents the picture of a Voltaire who is developing not only along certain prescribed lines, but also in interest in the affairs of the moment. This, to be sure, is not unreasonable. He was not born a deist, any more than he was born a Jesuit. He became both through circumstances. There is absolutely no reason why the circumstances at one moment should not have inclined him to Jansenism. One can only conclude that the *Jansénius* is by Voltaire and as such is significant.

The case of the *Ode sacrée* which Professor Gazier also published in the *Revue des deux mondes*¹³ is somewhat, although not altogether, similar to that of the *Jansénius*. Its content also concerns the Council

¹³ XXXII (April, 1906), 639 ff. Professor Gazier found two copies of the poem attributed to "Voltaire poète auteur de cet [sic] ode" in the same manuscript which contained the *Jansénius*.

of Embrun and the Bishop of Senez. It is, however, unlike the *Jansénius* in that no internal evidence indicates Voltaire as its author. Professor Gazier is inclined to follow much the same reasoning in accepting both poems. It seems to us that additional proof that the *Ode sacrée* is genuine is present in the now existing manuscript *Recueils*. The poem can now be found in B. N. F. fr. 10476 (fols. 173-75), Arsenal 3133 (fols. 101-6), F. fr. 12799 (fols. 161 ff.), Reims 646 (pp. 239-44), and Troyes 2593 (fol. 4). The title varies: "Ode de Mr. de Voltaire sur le Concile d'Embrun, où Mr. l'Evêque de Senez fut condamné en 1727" (Arsenal 3133), "Ode de Mr. de Voltaire ou l'ode sacrée" (F. fr. 12799), "Ode de Mr. Volterre sur les affaires présentes de l'Eglise, composée peu après le fameux Concile d'Embrun" (Reims 646), "Ode au sujet du Concile d'Ambrun par Arouet" (Troyes 2593), and "Ode Sacrée de M. de Voltaire 1732" (F. fr. 10476). There are variations in the text, as well as in the titles, which at least indicate that all the copies were not made from one master copy. The attribution to Voltaire is certainly not the guess of one contemporary. He was believed the author by at least six unrelated collectors, counting the Le Paige manuscript. Moreover, every collector who copied the poem stated explicitly in the title that it was written by Voltaire. It would seem that no doubt existed in the minds of his contemporaries concerning the authorship of the *Ode sacrée*.

A difficulty in regard to the date arises in ascribing the *Ode* to Voltaire. If the poem was written in 1727 or 1728, he was in England and was presumably little interested in French religious controversy. If the date 1732 found in B.N.F. fr. 10476 can be accepted, he seems to be giving more importance to it than was due, since he waited five years after the event had transpired. In spite of this difficulty, it would seem that the evidence of Reims 646 should be accepted: "composé peu après le fameux Concile d'Embrun." In all probability, both the *Ode* and the *Jansénius* were composed at St. Germain. In that event, the 1732 of F. fr. 10476 would refer to the date of its release or its circulation. Evidently, it came from one of the portfolios of *pièces fugitives*.¹⁴

In view of all the evidence presented, it is difficult not to accept the *Jansénius* and the *Ode sacrée* as by Voltaire. Since they were both

¹⁴ Beuchot LI, 215.

written after 1727 and before 1732, they offer a curious portrait of an author supposed to have already written one of the strongest deistic pronouncements which he ever made (the *Epître à Uranie*) suddenly extolling the virtues of one of the cause's staunchest supporters.¹⁵

A final example will disclose the grave danger of accepting any poem which is stated to be by Voltaire without the closest examination. There is in Arsenal 3130 (p. 219) an *Ode athée de M. de Volterre*. It seems that Arsenal 3130 is the only collected *Recueil* which contains it. Nevertheless, a manuscript note at the beginning of the *Recueil* states: "Toutes ces pièces ont fait du bruit dans leur temps et méritaient d'en faire." The *Recueil* formed "le premier may, 1750," belonged to D'Hémery, the inspector of police, who should have known the authors of the separate items. It contains poems which are now known to be rightly attributed: *Les Philippiques* to Lagrange-Chancel, the *Epître sur la calomnie* to Voltaire, the *Ode à Priape* to Piron. However, one observation is disquieting: on page 159 of the *Recueil* can be found *Les j'ai vu de Voltaire*. As for the ode itself, there seems to be no external and no internal evidence, save the untrustworthy argument of tone, which would warrant placing it among the works of the poet. One might be inclined to conclude from the authority of the manuscript and the general tone of the poem that the *Ode athée* belongs in the same category as the *Epître à Mademoiselle du ****. Such a decision, however, would be entirely unwarranted, for the *Ode athée* is none other than a poem by Dehénault: "Imitation du Chœur de l'acte second de *La Troade* de Sénèque." It was published in the *Œuvres diverses* of Dehénault in 1670.¹⁶

From this survey we can venture to draw certain preliminary conclusions. In the first place, it is imperative, in spite of Bengesco's assertion to the contrary, that a careful study be made of Voltaire's poetic output, especially in the period between the publication of the *Œdipe* and the appearance of the *Lettres philosophiques*. The survey would undoubtedly bring to light a rather large number of poems in manuscript *Recueils* attributed to the poet. Some service could be rendered by collecting and making a list of these poems with indica-

¹⁵ There is no confirmation in the later works of Voltaire of his attitude toward Jansen. He did, however, refer to the activities of the Council of Embrun (see Moland, XIV, 87; XV, 60).

¹⁶ See Lachèvre, *Les œuvres de Jean Dehénault* (Paris, 1922), p. 6.

tions of where they may be found. An even greater service could be rendered by carefully studying the attributions and cautiously examining the poems to determine which ones are genuine. For it must constantly be kept in mind that not all those assigned to Voltaire were written by him. Of the six which we have considered in this preliminary survey—*Couplets inédits*, *Epître à Athénaïs*, *Epître à Mademoiselle du ****, *Jansénius*, *Ode sacrée*, *Ode athée*—only two (*Jansénius* and *Ode sacrée*) can now be safely incorporated in his works. Three others (*Epître à Mademoiselle du ****, *Epître à Athénaïs*, *Couplets inédits*) must be reserved as doubtful. One (*Ode athée*) may be rejected. In the second group, which promises to be by far the largest of the three, will be found poems relatively unimportant as, for example, the *Couplets*; others, such as the *Epître à Mademoiselle du ****, of considerable importance, but impossible to accept because of our meager knowledge; still others, such as the *Athénaïs*, where the reasons for accepting them are no more cogent than the reasons for rejecting them. Second, the method to be employed must be all the more rigorous since we are dealing in the main with unknown quantities. To be sure some injustice may be done, but it is better to decide negatively rather than affirmatively, when the evidence is either contradictory or insufficient. Lastly, we can be assured that through these investigations a fuller picture of Voltaire and his early activities will be secured. Already with the entrance of the *Jansénius* and the *Ode sacrée* a different Voltaire from the poet of the *Epître à Uranie* appears. With the completion of the survey it is reasonable to expect a more definite portrait of the young Voltaire about whom we now know so little.

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

BOOK REVIEWS

Deor. Edited by KEMP MALONE. Pp. x+38. *Waldere*. Edited by F. NORMAN. Pp. viii+56. *The dream of the rood*. Edited by BRUCE DICKENS and ALAN S. C. ROSS. Pp. xii+50. *The Parker chronicle* (832-900). Edited by A. H. SMITH. Pp. viii+72. *Beowulf and the seventh century*. By RITCHIE GIRVAN. Pp. viii+86. All in Methuen's Old English Library. London: Methuen & Co., 1933-35.

The four editions of texts listed above maintain the high standard of the first volume in this series (mentioned in this journal sometime ago); all give detailed information as to the reading of the manuscripts, concise introductions surveying the scholarship on the texts, notes, and glossaries; all are extremely conservative in accepting emendations. Professor Malone's *Deor* is notable for a new and probably correct explanation of *be wurman*. His interpretation of *seonobende* is probably right, and that of *monge* and *Theodric* shows his customary acumen and may be correct. In line 13 Malone reads *Mæðhilde* without attempting to identify the lady. This, of course, is conservative and justifiable. But surely his remark "Thorpe's reading *Mæðhilde* is nowadays generally accepted" goes too far. Schücking and Wyatt in their readers print *maeð hilde*, and so does Klaeber in his *Beowulf*. Lawrence's interpretation of the whole passage based on this reading is surely worth summarizing, not because it is demonstrably right but because, since we know nothing about a story concerning *Mæðhilde* and *Geat*, even a possibility that gives meaning to the passage should be before us. Mr. Norman compresses into an introduction of thirty-four pages a definite and comprehensive summary of all the significant information and theories on *Waldere* and the narratives related to it. He may be amused to know that one student who had never troubled to look up the bibliography of the poem has always interpreted II, 1-10 as part of *Waldere*'s speech. Professor Dickens and Mr. Ross print the Vercelli text of the *Dream* and the verses on the Ruthwell cross, both newly studied from the original sources. They are inclined to think that the Vercelli is an extension of the original from which Ruthwell quotes. Their survey of the problems connected with the poem is comprehensive and judicious, but it seems strange that, after concluding that the language of Ruthwell is somewhat later than that of *Cædmon*'s hymn, they assign to the *Dream* practically the same date. It should be remembered that archaeological study of the Cross itself supplies only a date *a quo*, since the lines of the poem may have been added later. Dr. Smith's introduction to the selections from the *Chronicle* is a brief but valuable study of the processes by which the *Chronicle* was compiled, its chronological irregularities, etc.

It is questionable whether *Beowulf and the seventh century*, which consists of three lectures delivered at University College, London, should have been published without expansion. Such expansion would have given the author space to criticize other views or to show how his data confirm and fit in with other theories so that he might have convinced readers of the truth of his judgments. In the first lecture Mr. Girvan argues plausibly that the language of *Beowulf* is not exclusively poetic but the diction of everyday literary use; then he points out that the dialect differences in Old English do not antedate the invasion of the Germanic tribes (not a new conclusion); finally he takes up some of the linguistic evidences which Morsbach and his followers used to establish the date of the poem. Most of the data which he cites there point to a relatively late date; yet on evidence which he himself says "is not impressive," Mr. Girvan decides on 680-700. Why he selects a date earlier than Morsbach's or how he would meet Schücking's arguments for a later date is not made clear. In his second lecture ("The background") Mr. Girvan thinks it necessary to argue that—aside from the representation of such customs as ship-burial and use of historical figures such as Hrothgar and Hygelac—the poet presents life as he knew it in England. Surely no one will quarrel with this assertion, but it does not suffice to prove that the author wrote in the seventh century. To accomplish that result it would be necessary for Mr. Girvan to show that conditions in the eighth or ninth century did not agree with the poet's representation of life and manners. In the final lecture ("Folk tale and history") Mr. Girvan argues from inconsistencies in references to Hrothgar's age that "in Danish affairs at least we are not in an authentic historical atmosphere," but a not dissimilar inconsistency in the treatment of Hygelac's age does not prevent him from concluding that "the Geat material is more purely historical." Since aside from Hygelac's raid he cannot check the Geat material with history, the distinction is hazardous. Finally, the author argues that the hero, Beowulf, must have been historical because "it is not readily credible that the poet could have introduced into a series of events known to the last detail [i.e., Geatish history] an entirely alien figure, provided him with a carefully defined relationship to the ruling house," etc. Whether such a procedure is incredible depends on the mental make-up of the poet's audience. If they expected in a poem what they regarded as literal fact, it is incredible. But perhaps they could find as much delight in an imaginary hero represented as having changed the fates of nations as we do in D'Artagnan and his profound influence on the history of France and England. There is not space here to summarize Mr. Girvan's further development. As is general throughout the book, his views are reasonable but not proved. Very rarely does he misrepresent facts as in the sentence: "We find beside him [Hrothulf] the evil counsellor Unferth." The text never associates these two persons, and we do not know that Unferth gave evil counsel. To be sure, Mr. Girvan utters many dubious *obiter dicta*; e.g., "It may be taken for granted that the knowledge [of sixth century history] was transmitted to later times in heroic lays"; *Beo-*

wulf "was one of many, and its preservation is a sort of accident. Among the Anglo-Saxons there was no school of professional reciters, and if there had been, it is not *Beowulf* that they would have preserved. The *scop* did not memorize the work of predecessors, he made the material anew." Such statements need proof quite as much as do those which the writer argues at length. Yet in general Mr. Girvan plays the game squarely; given more time and space he may be able to present his ideas more convincingly.

JAMES R. HULBERT

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La pensée allemande de Luther à Nietzsche. By J. E. SPENLÉ. Paris: Armand Colin, 1934. Pp. 197.

This little book analyzes in chronological order the thought of German intellectual leaders from Luther to the present day as a means of understanding the character of the German mind. The ideas of men in diverse fields—Luther, Kant, Goethe, Feuerbach, Marx, Wagner, to mention a few—are used, and some of the conclusions which the author offers are in brief as follows: "German nationalism is secularized Lutheranism" (p. 25); "The German is not omniscient, but he prides himself on possessing a priori categories, universal rules, infallible methods" (p. 38); "Much of German thinking is equivocal" (pp. 45-46); "The German idea [as enunciated in Fichte's *Addresses*] has fanaticised an entire people" (p. 86); "If one considers that which constitutes the German superiority, one will perceive that it is not some unique quality . . . , but that it is the methodical education, the disciplined development, the rational intensification of faculties which are also found among other peoples of high civilization, but which have never received among them such intensive development, such impersonal discipline" (pp. 109-10); Nihilism "at the same time terroristic and ecstatic" is "a profound and permanent trait of German character" (p. 169). So the author finds German thought pessimistic, suspicious of the power of reason, inclined toward an organic, functional conception of liberty, toward Messianic acts and toward regeneration out of its own depths. It is a nation "eternally unfinished, an unsatisfied people."

This thesis seems, on the basis of our present knowledge of German character, to contain some truths, some half-truths. The reviewer would hesitate to distinguish between them. The author usually follows the best German guides. But in the fervent defense of his thesis he is frequently one-sided; on Luther he accepts Lucien Febvre's ideas—a sufficient condemnation for any book; he misrepresents Hegel; he seems to know nothing of German liberalism; and he very questionably identifies German thought and character with the thought and character of a few leaders. Even though interesting and in part acceptable, the book is dangerous to read because it oversimplifies the subject.

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Shakespeare's imagery, and what it tells us. By CAROLINE F. E. SPURGEON. Cambridge: University Press; New York: Macmillan Co., 1935. Pp. xvi+408. With 2 plates and 7 charts.

Miss Spurgeon's ample volume arrives doubly recommended. It completes the first part of a project already announced in two widely noticed preliminary essays of five years ago, and thus finds expectation well prepared.¹ It also brings to something of a climax the revisionist study of Shakespeare's texts which has now been in progress for over a decade, and thus permits an appraisal, hitherto less convenient, of a method and its value to the immediate future. This study doubtless has its greatest tests still ahead of it, but it already defines a phase of Shakespearean criticism as distinct from the bibliographical labors of Pollard and Greg, and as sharply complementary to the historical motives of Stoll, Lawrence, Adams, and Wilson, as their work has been corrective of the nineteenth-century tradition of romantic interpretation that extended from Coleridge and Hazlitt to Swinburne and Bradley, through a long line of lesser conjurors of "character problems," soul struggles, and (more recently) case histories under a dozen psychological tenets. As a means of restoring active critical interest in Shakespeare's work and of rescuing it from two centuries of suffocating annotation, the validity of this purpose can no longer be questioned, whatever abuse of license it may already have invited. Its defense must rely not merely on the hope of safeguarding the plays (as one exponent has announced) from "the disintegration of misguided scholarship," but on the more positive effort to rescue them from theory, tradition, and irrelevance by insisting on their real existence as poems. The means of effecting this restoration (that is, by isolating what Shakespeare wrote, at whatever cost of historical apparatus and with the aid only of those products of scholarship that redeem exact and specific meaning) is drastic, but hardly more so than the circumstances of modern literary study require. It will inevitably err both on the side of boldness or leniency (as in Wyndham Lewis, Middleton Murry, Lytton Strachey) and on that of such exhaustive technical classification as Miss Spurgeon encourages. But it will find its justification in a recovery of the poetic substance in the plays, and in a corresponding critical responsibility toward it that may correct both the apathy of readers and the prodigies of inconsequence which have vitiated the greater part of Shakespearean commentary during the past two generations.

Miss Spurgeon's labors have coincided with those of several other enthusiasts,² to some of whom she pays recognition, but she has not risked their ex-

¹ *Leading motives in the imagery of Shakespeare's tragedies* (London: Shakespeare Association, 1930), and *Shakespeare's iterative imagery* (i) *as undersong*, (ii) *as touchstone*, in his work (annual Shakespeare lecture of the British Academy; London, 1931).

² Chief among these are four studies by G. Wilson Knight, *The wheel of fire: essays in interpretation of Shakespeare's sombre tragedies* (Oxford, 1930), *The imperial theme: further interpretations of Shakespeare's tragedies, including the Roman plays* (Oxford, 1931), *The Shakespearean Tempest* (Oxford, 1932), and *The Christian Renaissance* (London, 1933). Of slighter character is Frederick Charles Kolbe's *Shakespeare's way, a psychological study*

posure to charges of facility or of having expanded their texts, imaginatively and subjectively, with as great a recklessness as their romantic predecessors. Not only has she "listed and classified and card-indexed and counted every image in every play thrice over"; she has set up an elaborate system of cross-references within the plays; "assembled, classified, and compared with Shakespeare" the images in fifty plays by twelve contemporaries as well as in four major works of Bacon; made extensive researches into sixteenth-century gardening, bell-ringing, hunting, domestic life, war, and kindred phenomena; traced the martlet nests of Macbeth's castle to the walls of Berkeley Castle in Gloucestershire (in spite of initial discouragements offered by "the present Lord Berkeley's private secretary, Mr. O'Flynn"), and likewise (with the more agile sympathy of Captain William Jaggard of Stratford) the river eddy of *The rape of Lucrece* (ll. 1667-73) to an identical eddy in the Avon, under the eighteenth arch of the old Clopton Bridge, which has somehow survived the changing impulses of that stream and the erosion of its banks; and finally she has reduced this staggering quantity of statistics to a series of seven charts as varicolored, and as scrupulously computed to the minutest segment of graph paper, as anything to be found among stock-market diagrams or a government survey of the rainfall. The result is a documentation of "Shakespeare's senses, tastes, interests, thought, and association of ideas" that surpasses anything achieved, in the matter of sheer annotation alone, since Robertson's verse tests or the palmy days of the *Shakespeare Jahrbuch*. The running page-heads of Part I ("The revelation of the man," pp. 3-213) reveal the unsparing inspiration of Miss Spurgeon's delvings. What formerly passed under the loose title of Shakespeare's "knowledge of life" or "capacity for experience" here becomes, among several score of named proclivities, "his dislike of noise," "love of sunrise," "knowledge of deer-hunting," "sensitiveness to food," "interest in medicine," "his sensitive palate," "sympathy with horses," and "sympathy for snails." This inventory finally arrives at a climax in a chapter on "Shakespeare the man."

Part II extends this documentation (we reserve the word "analysis") to another phase of Miss Spurgeon's project, one defined in the earlier of her two preliminary essays: "The function of the imagery as background and undertone in Shakespeare's art." Here the "leading motives" in the histories, come-

(London, 1930), although it defines the same method. Among other volumes examining Shakespeare's style are Elizabeth Holmes's *Aspects of Elizabethan imagery* (Oxford, 1929) and Wilhelm Michels' *Barockstil bei Shakespeare und Calderón* (Paris: *Revue hispanique*, 1929), while the more general interest in verbal and stylistic investigation has appeared in such works as George H. Rylands' *Words and poetry* (London, 1928), to which Miss Spurgeon refers along with Knight's studies, and William Empson's *Seven types of ambiguity* (London, 1930), behind which lie semantic projects like C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards' *The meaning of meaning* (London, 1925). One may mention here the earlier efforts in this direction by Vernon Lee in *The handling of words* (London, 1923) and by Logan Pearsall Smith in *Words and idioms* (London and Boston, 1925), and for a general summary of these tendencies, L. C. Knights's *How many children had Lady Macbeth? An essay in the theory and practice of Shakespeare criticism* (Cambridge, 1933).

dies, romances, and tragedies are outlined—"the iterative imagery which runs, not only through a passage, but all through a play"; "the recurrent images," as Miss Spurgeon elsewhere says, that "play a part in raising, developing, sustaining, and repeating emotion . . . which is somewhat analogous to the action of a recurrent theme or *motif* in a musical fugue or sonata, or in one of Wagner's operas." She shows the dominance of symbols of light in *Romeo and Juliet*; of rottenness, disease, corruption, and the "muddled" in *Hamlet*; of food and appetite in *Antony and Cleopatra* ("the disgust at woman's wantonness seems to express itself instinctively to Shakespeare in terms of physical appetite and food"); of false friends and flatterers in *Timon of Athens*, as expressed by "dogs, fawning and eating and lapping . . . licking the sweets and melting the sugar."

No reservations can be declared concerning Miss Spurgeon's completeness. The whole verbal content of the plays is laid forth, and whatever is omitted by force of page limitations is warranted to be on file in her card catalogue or in the dazing minutiae of her graphs. Furthermore, we are invited to abide the fulfilment of her undertaking. She promises two further books: the first, "chiefly concerned with questions of authorship considered in the light of this freshly collected evidence," is somewhat anticipated in chapters ii and iii, and will be of chief interest to editors and historians; the second, "dealing with the background of Shakespeare's mind and the origins of his imagery," will more closely supplement the present volume, about whose final value we are accordingly held in some suspense. But Miss Spurgeon has revealed enough of her procedure, results, and particular genius in these tasks to invite an opinion on her contribution to the new orientation of Shakespeare studies, as well as a comparison with those related writers to whose methods she, of all living persons, is qualified to impute the influence of "the impression rather than the fact." Such opinion cannot presume to touch the quantitative aspects of her achievement. What it may illuminate is the profit to be realized from such investigation ("what it tells us," as her subtitle emphasizes), and the extent to which she herself has won it.

Imagery in poetry or poetic drama is obviously a component of an entire aesthetic entity, of that complete verbal and expressive medium which is, in a technical sense unemployed by Miss Spurgeon, the analogy of the author's initial and abstract concept. The establishment of this correspondence may be inevitable and simultaneous in the writer, or it may be arbitrary and gradual. It is impossible, and perhaps unnecessary, to know; but the only sense in which such a correspondence has been arrived at, from the viewpoint of the reader, will be in terms of a structure that includes imagery, but imagery in its relation to the other components of the work in question—its verbal devices, its rhythmic and tonal qualities, its liberty or conformity in matters of form; in other words, of the entire context of usage and meaning which conditions, and may justify, the particular quality in the images. To define imagery and its operation in a poem, therefore, demands more than a loose and wholly un-

technical notion of what an image is. Its integrity and even its meaning to the whole poem, its peculiar force, its realism or its ambiguity, cannot be otherwise defined; and where the poem is also a drama, involving complicated motives and characters (often quite impersonal to the author) this task becomes far more complex. Miss Spurgeon, however, opens her study by declaring that to arrive "at a definition of an image, elaborating, safeguarding, and illustrating it . . . calls for an abler pen than mine." She prefers to "use the term 'image' here as the only available word to cover every kind of simile, as well as every kind of what is really compressed simile—metaphor"; confesses that she is "at present primarily concerned with the content rather than the form of images"; and gives some inkling of her grasp of the formal problem when she tops off several broad remarks from Burke, Coleridge, Shelley, and Middleton Murry by saying that for herself "analogy—likeness between dissimilar things—which is the fact underlying the possibility and reality of metaphor, holds within itself the very secret of the universe."

The defect ensuing from this introductory reservation is everywhere apparent in her book: in its exhaustive itemizations and in the failure of the items to focus in basic conceptual values or in anything more central than Shakespeare's tastes and personality; in a system of "association of ideas" that has no visible limits or principle beyond those which testify as often to Shakespeare's conventionality of thought as to his genius; in a purely numerical confusion rising from the counting of unidentified matter, which Miss Spurgeon describes in Appendix I; and in a fatiguing insistence on the observed and experienced reality of everything in the plays. This ends by assuming an enormous connection between Shakespeare's own experience and whatever is ascribed to his characters.

But if Miss Spurgeon's innocence in defining imagery is a bad start for her task, it is a good preparation for the climax toward which her inventory tends—a chapter on "Shakespeare the man." One may be forewarned by her opening admissions: "I believe it to be profoundly true that the real revelation of the writer's personality, temperament, and quality of mind is to be found in his works, whether he be dramatist or novelist, describing other people's thoughts or putting down his own directly," and "In the case of a poet, I suggest it is chiefly through his images that he, to some extent unconsciously, 'gives himself away.'" But these are no comfort for what comes in chapter ix, where Miss Spurgeon's "bold attempt . . . to set down some of his characteristics as they strike me" results in a set of statements about Shakespeare's personality as appallingly vague and commonplace as anything guessed (and all of it was guessed) long before the day of statistical scholarship. "The figure of Shakespeare which emerges is of a compactly well-built man, probably on the slight side, extraordinarily well co-ordinated, lithe and nimble of body, quick and accurate of eye." "All his senses were abnormally acute, especially—probably—those of hearing and taste." "These, then, as I see them, are the five outstanding qualities of Shakespeare's nature—sensitiveness, poise, cour-

age, humor, and wholesomeness—balancing, complementing, and supporting each other." One would like to bring these examples to an arbitrary halt here, but since Miss Spurgeon insists on capping her climax, we may be indulged one more. "He is indeed himself in many ways in character what one can only describe as Christ-like; that is, gentle, kindly, honest, brave, and true, with deep understanding, and quick sympathy for all living things."

Another problem left unsolved is the part played by the images in the poetic structure of the plays, as opposed to their incidental descriptive purpose or the practical clues they furnish to the action and motives of the characters. Miss Spurgeon's treatment comes in Part II under the heading of "Leading Motives." It is her most substantial discussion, being in fact the only part of her work that relates to real aesthetic values and methods, and her short passages on individual plays (few go beyond three or four pages), reinforced by what we know of her detailed inventories, must act as a valuable spur to critics who have already enquired into the symbolic unity of Shakespeare's dramas. Her shortcomings—in imagination, in connecting imagery with other poetic factors, and in grasping the whole force and spirit of these "leading motives"—are revealed, however, when contrasted with the work of G. Wilson Knight. The risks of his studies were early recognized (and, in spite of that, later suffered) by Mr. Knight himself, but in at least two of his volumes he realized the interpretative problem in its entirety, and what that problem demands in defining the whole unity and integrity of a Shakespearean play. His errors at least arose from an excess of zeal in a right direction, not by confusing his aims with irrelevant biographical and historical impulses. "We should not look for perfect verisimilitude to life," said Mr. Knight, "but rather see each play as an expanded metaphor, by means of which the original vision has been projected into forms roughly correspondent with actuality, conforming thereto with greater or less exactitude according to the demands of its nature." He defined not only a proper approach to such studies but a sense of the relative success of Shakespeare's "projections" which his best chapters did much to elucidate, thus making their positive contribution to criticism. Miss Spurgeon's insistently factual, critically noncommittal treatment seems to lack this sense entirely. Part II of her study confirms a suspicion which her laxity in definition and the insensitive contours of her style have already prompted. One is compelled, even in the face of such phenomenal patience before so forbidding a task, to agree with a verdict that will do less harm to Miss Spurgeon than good to her readers: "Those who imagine that a card index is a substitute for sensibility need no encouraging."

If she does anything to vindicate the "new" or "pure" criticism of Shakespeare, it is chiefly by the vigorous way in which she demonstrates, by her shortcomings, the necessity of such criticism among Shakespeare scholars. Her labor will never be lost, but one may wonder if the best way of making it available would not have been by publishing a concordance of images, for the benefit of those who know how to use them. The particular task she has

achieved can hardly—nor humanly—be improved upon; and she may be praised for demonstrating how urgent an opportunity awaits the critics who are competent to take up the work at the point of which she stops short.

MORTON DAUWEN ZABEL

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John Ford. By M. JOAN SARGEAUNT. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1935. Pp. 232.

Students of John Ford have produced a rather large body of commentary on his works but have made little effort to learn anything about the man himself. Possibly they have felt that, since Ford was personally so obscure, biographical research would not bring any great return. Miss Sargeant, however, has undertaken the task which others have neglected, has searched painstakingly through public records and antiquarian volumes, and has made the first substantial additions to our knowledge of Ford's life and connections since Gifford wrote his introduction to Ford's *Works* in 1827.¹ Adding her discoveries to what was already known, she has presented, in the first two chapters of her book, an account of Ford's life and literary career which consists, to be sure, of mere scraps of information pieced out with surmise but which is probably as complete and accurate a biography of Ford as will ever be written.

The rest of her book deals with a diversity of subjects. She discusses Ford's collaboration with other dramatists. She comments on his use of his sources, his choice of settings, his blank verse. Her last chapter, "Ford's literary reputation," contains a statement of all that is known about the Carolinian performances of Ford's plays, a history of Ford revivals since the Restoration, and a survey of Ford criticism from Langbaine on down.

Miss Sargeant is guilty of certain oversights. Although she has apparently undertaken to examine all plays which have been ascribed to Ford on internal evidence, she says nothing of *The laws of Candy*, attributed to him by E. H. C. Oliphant.² In discussing the sources of *Perkin Warbeck*, she points out, as her own discovery, one of Ford's borrowings from Gainsford which Mildred C. Struble has already noted.³ Her list of Ford revivals does not include a recent performance of *'Tis pity she's a whore* in Paris.⁴ Such minor faults, however, do not seriously affect the value of her scholarly work. She has shown herself an able investigator, and though she is sometimes prolix in treating insignifi-

¹ Miss Sargeant published some of her findings in short articles before the appearance of her book. See the *Review of English studies*, VIII (1932), 69-71; IX (1933), 447-48; X (1934), 165-76.

² See *The plays of Beaumont and Fletcher* (New Haven, 1927), pp. 476-85.

³ See Miss Struble's "The indebtedness of Ford's 'Perkin Warbeck' to Gainsford," *Anglia*, XLIX (1925), 88-89; cf. pp. 113-16 of Miss Sargeant's book.

⁴ *Domage qu'elle soit une prostituée*, a translation by Georges Pillemont, was presented in April, 1934.

cant questions, she has presented the ascertainable facts about Ford and his work illuminatingly.

Miss Sargeant's book is offered to the public as "mainly a critical study." It is proper, then, to look closely at her attempts to interpret and evaluate, which, indeed, occupy a large part of the volume. Many of her critical opinions, I think, are just and penetrating. I applaud particularly her attack upon the widespread belief that Ford was a moral sophist, a rebel against the sex ethics of society, an apostle of a cult of love. This conception of Ford has been given considerable plausibility and currency by the writings of the late Stuart P. Sherman and has become almost a convention of Ford criticism. The commentators have been predisposed to accept it, I suspect, because the incest theme of *'Tis pity* has horrified them. But this play (which, incidentally, was written for an audience which demanded horrification) is no vindication of the sin of its principal characters. The obvious and reasonable interpretation is that they are victims of an irresistible passion which involves them in calamity. An impartial reading of Ford's other plays fails to discover any subversive ethical preachment. In *A line of life*, his moral treatise, he condemns emotional self-indulgence and sexual irregularity. As Miss Sargeant says, Ford, like his fellow-playwrights, assumes unquestioningly that "love is the only sound basis for marriage, and marriage is the only sound basis for love" (p. 140).

I agree with many of Miss Sargeant's critical observations. Yet I believe that her criticism has, in general, been weakened by her inattention to background, by her neglect of the intellectual medium in which Ford's drama grew. If she had studied the ethical doctrines generally known and approved among Ford's contemporaries, she would have been better equipped for discussion of Ford's moral tenets. A study of seventeenth-century principles of criticism would have been useful to her in determining Ford's dramatic purposes. It is especially hard to understand why she has slighted early Stuart ideas regarding psychology and psychopathology, for she is evidently conscious of their great influence on Ford. One has a right to expect, in her treatment of *The lover's melancholy*, a much more enlightening discussion of the old conception of melancholia than she offers. She dismisses Bassanes, the jealous old husband of *The broken heart*, with only a short quotation from Burton's *Anatomy of melancholy* to help us see the grotesque psychopathic tragedy which the Carolinian audience saw in his career. Her interpretation of *'Tis pity* is incomplete because it neglects the process of mental disease and moral degeneration which explains the hero's tragic sin. One could give other examples of this sort.

A recent monograph by Mary Edith Cochnower,⁵ which Miss Sargeant does not mention, makes some attempt to place Ford against his proper intellectual background, but we do not yet have a complete and satisfactory interpretation of his work by this method.

Miss Sargeant's book, however, is probably the most instructive study of

⁵ "John Ford," in *Seventeenth century studies*, ed. Robert Shafer (Princeton, 1933).

Ford thus far published. Even the most unsympathetic reader will see the value in her first two chapters, with their new biographical material and their review of the old, and in her last chapter, with its competent account of the fortunes which Ford's works have met since his death.

LAWRENCE BABB

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Samuel Pepys: the years of peril. By ARTHUR BRYANT. Cambridge, England: At the University Press; New York: Macmillan Co., 1935. Pp. xv+466.

For *The man in the making*, the first volume of Mr. Bryant's biography of Samuel Pepys, the *Diary* formed the principal source of information, though the author supplemented his skilful retelling of facts from Pepys's journal with new material drawn from manuscript sources. In writing *The years of peril*, however, he had no such consecutive document on which to rely; consequently this second volume reveals even more clearly than did the first his adroitness in extracting from a huge mass of unassorted manuscripts the complete account of Pepys's daily concerns during the fourteen years of his life covered by this book. Here Mr. Bryant has assembled hundreds of new facts, but the fundamental character of Pepys remains unchanged. Those who are familiar with the complete *Diary* will still recognize the same shrewd, hard-working, courageous man whose love of system and organization impelled him to begin his *Diary* on the first day of the year, to summarize his accounts at regular intervals, to exclaim over his pleasure at drawing straight lines on white paper, and, when forced to put a stop to his journal, to close it on the last day of a month. With Pepys this delight in the minutiae of method amounted to genius.

The chief interest of Pepys's life was the building-up and management of the Royal Navy, and to this task he applied himself without ceasing. The climax of his work came when he finally brought about the appropriation of money for the construction of thirty new warships. But in spite of his labors for the navy, he still had time to advise all the members of his family and of his wife's family in their personal affairs. Moreover, he was able to consider problems of education, and spent many hours urging the governors of Christ's Hospital to improve the discipline of the School and to introduce a curriculum more adapted to the practical requirements of the boys. He was also a devoted member of the Royal Society and, when his duties permitted, delighted to spend time in the company of the learned.

The most exciting chapters in *The years of peril* concern Pepys's alleged complicity in the Popish Plot. The villain in this story is a certain Colonel John Scott, known for his misdeeds on Long Island, in France, and in Holland. Scott was a tool of Shaftesbury, a member of the Green Ribbon Club, and the principal agent employed by the Whig group to persecute Pepys, who was a firm adherent of Charles and the Duke of York. By corresponding with men in England and abroad, by keeping meticulously detailed diaries, and by

securing affidavits as to the truth of all the evidence submitted, Pepys was able to assemble the facts of Scott's life item by item. From this material one learns of Scott's career of crime, and one realizes, also, that in tracking Scott through the New World and the Old, Pepys collected a great deal of information relevant to Shaftesbury and his associates.

But, in spite of their importance, until Mr. Bryant unearthed these papers they had been entirely neglected by modern historians. The most recent biographer of "Achitophel" does not so much as mention Scott's name or make a single reference to the Pepysian manuscripts in the Bodleian or in the Pepysian Library at Magdalene College, Cambridge.¹ The mere glimpses, however, which Mr. Bryant has given of the material which lies ready in these sources convince us that Pepys's beautifully arranged books must contain even more data which, although not relevant to Mr. Bryant's study, nevertheless will be of great assistance in writing a true account of the Popish plot and of Shaftesbury's part in it. Scott's villainies, indeed, have never been fully appreciated. In a footnote Mr. Bryant observes that Mr. John Pollock in *The Popish plot* "solemnly supports his thesis of the existence of a real Catholic Plot on the apparent honesty and disinterestedness of Scott as a witness" (p. 275 n.). As a matter of fact, Pollock actually goes so far as to state that Scott's "information may be accepted as genuine," and he concludes that "there was some truth in the discovery of a Roman Catholic conspiracy in the year 1678."² Yet anyone who reads over a few of the sworn statements so carefully brought together by Pepys will realize that Scott could be depended on neither for truth nor for lies. He was a complete moral bankrupt. Before long, therefore, the history of this crisis will have to be re-written, and those who undertake the task will find in the papers which Mr. Bryant has used an unworked mine of contemporary information which will add to our knowledge of this portion of English history and of the figures who acted the principal parts in the heroic tragedy of the "Popish Plot."

RUDOLF KIRK

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La pensée religieuse de Swift et ses antinomies. By C. LOOTEN. Lille: Facultés Catholiques; Paris: Desclée de Brouwer & Cie, 1935. Pp. 208.

This study is similar to a recent one, *Jonathan Swift: Gedanken und Schriften über Religion und Kirche*, by Hans Reimers (Hamburg, 1935), in its attempt to present a detailed consideration of Swift's religious thought. Like Reimers, M. Looten deprecates the assumption underlying numerous discussions of past commentators: that because *A tale of a tub* and *Gulliver's travels* are Swift's greatest works they embody all, or nearly all, that is significant for an understanding of his religious views. As a result of this assumption lesser works of importance bearing on this subject have received only the most superficial ex-

¹ Louise Fargo Brown, *The First Earl of Shaftesbury* (New York, 1933).

² *The Popish plot* (London, 1903), p. 64.

amination. Therefore we have the efforts of M. Looten to supply a better proportioned evaluation of Swift as a clergyman and religious thinker.

As the title implies, the book concerns itself with the antinomies of Swift's religious thought. M. Looten prepares the ground for the contradictions in thought by showing that the very essence of Swift's character was paradox, that all his life Swift exhibited a dualism not yet satisfactorily explained. That Swift, a person so lacking in spirituality, so wholly without "le sentiment intérieur de Dieu," should have become a clergyman at all is merely one of a number of obvious paradoxes. Of Swift's fitness for his profession, M. Looten has much to say. His conclusions are that Swift's faulty academic training, his superficial knowledge of philosophical and theological literature, and his intellectual tastes, so distinctly lay rather than clerical, indicate a positive lack of fitness for clerical functions. M. Looten is not impressed by what has been conceived of as Swift's learning and wide reading. They are merely the appearance of such, at times hardly more than a listing of names, as in Swift's cataloguing of patristic writers with whom he had only the barest acquaintance. M. Looten cites, too, against Swift the theologian the evidence of a disproportionate library: only one-sixth of it consisting of theological books. Thus he is hardly surprised to discover that Swift, his intellectual tastes being what they were, was amenable to the influence of such writers as Lucretius, Montaigne, La Rochefoucauld, Samuel Butler, and even Joseph Glanvill, despite Swift's characterization of the latter's *Scepsis scientifica* as "a fustian piece of abominable curious virtuoso stuff."

The main object of the study is to set in relief the contradiction between Swift the pyrrhonist and pessimist and Swift the defender of the Anglican church, a contradiction that M. Looten evolves from a variety of Swift's writings, with some support from biographical details. In the first capacity Swift is pictured as undermining all positive religion; in the second, as an intransigent doctrinaire without professional preparation who took refuge in dogma to anathematize his opponents. *A tale of a tub* carries the greatest burden of the indictment. In 1705, William Wotton referred to the *Tale* as "one of the Prophane Banter upon the Religion of *Jesus Christ*, as such, that ever yet appeared." M. Looten would not dissent from this characterization. The important point is that he thinks Wotton's reaction to the *Tale*—that its irreverence and impieties constitute a menace to religion as a whole, not merely, as Swift contended, to a sect—was typical of contemporary reactions. I doubt this. M. Looten is not alone among students of Swift in being misled by the clamorous and articulate opposition to Swift. But the majority of the reading public, familiar with the constant violent attacks on dissenters and papists, must have viewed the *Tale* as merely another such, though more brilliantly presented. It is necessary to keep in mind that Swift was anything but unique in his calloused handling of sacred matters; and even though he was attacked frequently on religious grounds, these attacks were not necessarily sincere. Take, for example, Wharton, Nottingham, and Abel Boyer,

three of Swift's enemies to whom M. Looten gives credence. Though they use religion as a convenient handle for excoriating Swift, their opposition to him was, for very good reasons, political.

A parade of Swift's enemies is, of course, impressive; and M. Looten makes excellent use of them to build up the case against Swift. He demonstrates, too, how easy it is to make Swift testify against himself. Swift writes to Stella that he is not attending church because of his vertigo, yet he is found at the table of the Vanhomrighs. He makes a damaging statement, for a theologian, with reference to Christmas: "I never once thought of it." Of his sermons he writes that they are "the idlest trifling stuff ever writ." No apologist can fully extenuate these matters. Still it is one of the disturbing features of M. Looten's study that he is so readily inclined to believe the worst of Swift. He does not doubt that the excesses of *A tale of a tub* represent Swift's abiding convictions, but when Swift rises to the level of moderation and orthodoxy, as he does in *A project for the advancement of religion* and *The sentiments of a Church of England man*, M. Looten discovers that these works are motivated by self-interest and the desire for justification. His final judgment of Swift as a defender of Anglicanism is that Swift was a violent, dogmatic controversialist, primarily Erastian in sentiment, moved mainly by a desire to defend his post, and in the last analysis a liability to the church. Though one cannot dissent wholly, surely there are some necessary qualifications.

If M. Looten errs on the side of decisiveness, if he is rather too rigid in his devotion to a thesis, he is at least always lively and provocative; and no one is more acutely aware than he of Swift's elusiveness as a personality and as a thinker. In addition to its positive values, this study is important for indicating that certain aspects of Swift's life and thought need more searching examination. What, for example, of the relation between ethics and religion in Swift's works? What, too, of the vexed problem of Swift's promotion in the church? M. Looten takes for granted the old view that *A tale of a tub* was mainly responsible for Swift's failure to get desired appointments; but Sir Charles Firth has successfully attacked this thesis (*Review of English studies*, II [1926], 1-17). Swift failed to get the see of Waterford because the Earl of Pembroke wanted it for his chaplain, not because of the impieties of *A tale of a tub*. And so with other vacancies. Firth suggests, logically enough, that what prevented the Whigs from elevating Swift was their recognition that he was not Whiggish enough, as indicated in part by his opposition to the removal of the tests. Swift was certainly suspect. As for the failure of the Tories to reward him, we have yet to learn the complete truth. Archbishop Sharp can no longer be considered the villain who hindered Swift's promotion. It is just possible that fuller disclosures will place Swift's supposed champion, Robert Harley, with his penchant for making political trades and building up his family fortunes, in that rôle.

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A history of the German Novelle from Goethe to Thomas Mann. By E. K. BENNETT. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; New York: Macmillan, 1934. Pp. xiii+296.

As recently as 1925 von Grolman lamented the fact that a history of the German *Novelle* and its development still remained to be written, and at the same time he expressed, or at least implied, his despair of any attempt to order the legion of German *Novellen* according to any set of aesthetic principles (Merker-Stammler, *Reallexikon d. deut. Literaturgeschichte*, II, 50). In view of such an attitude on the part of so eminent an authority Mr. Bennett's book is the more remarkable and praiseworthy. He not only succeeds in ordering the *Novellen* according to aesthetic principles, but he also, on the assumption that in German hands the *Novelle* changed, i.e., "developed," both in content and in form, the latter being necessarily dependent on the former, depicts the emergence of the *Novelle* as a distinctly German genre. As one of the few genre studies in the history of German literature, the book ranks with Viëtor's *Geschichte der deutschen Ode*. In its narrower field it definitely supersedes Mielke-Homann's *Der deutsche Roman des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts* in so far as the latter deals with the *Novelle*.

Beginning with a discussion of the *Novelle* as an independent genre, Mr. Bennett treats the pertinent theories of F. Schlegel (*in re* Boccaccio), Goethe, Tieck, Heyse, Spielhagen, and Paul Ernst on the subject and so postulates a working definition of the *Novelle* as an epic form which restricts itself to a single event, situation, or conflict, laying the stress primarily upon the event and showing the effect of this event upon a person or group of persons. On the basis of Goethe's various *Novellen*, particularly his *Novelle par excellence*, he then demonstrates that the German *Novelle* emerging with Goethe was consciously modeled upon Boccaccio but that Goethe added a moralizing element which was a legacy of the "short stories" of the eighteenth century. In the hands of Heinrich von Kleist the form of the *Novelle* remained unchanged but the subject matter was shifted from the contemporary and familiar (the "sublimated gossip" of Boccaccio's stories) into an "exotic" distance of place or time. But even more important, although the central incidents in Kleist's stories possess interest in themselves, their chief purpose is to serve as illustrations of the metaphysical problem of Kleist's relation to the universe. With the introduction of the supernatural (e.g., Tieck, E. T. A. Hoffmann) and of *Stimmung* (e.g., Eichendorff) by the Romanticists, the *Novelle* undergoes such extensive changes in content, and therefore in form, as to become a new genre, namely a German genre. In its Romance form the *Novelle* is severe in structure and its interest lies entirely in the central incident. In Germany, however, some of the severity of form is sacrificed in order to transfer the center of interest from the event itself to an ethical or metaphysical idea or simply to create a mood (*Stimmung*). In this connection Mr. Bennett makes the interesting observation that the *Novelle* underwent the same change in the hands of

the Germans as did the courtly epic before it, namely a shift of interest from the external event to an inner significance (p. 79).

The Young Germany movement, barren as it was in literary production, used the *Novelle* as an instrument for social and political propaganda and added nothing to its form. To be sure, Brentano's *Geschichte vom braven Kasperl und schönen Annerl* had created the so-called *Dorfgeschichte* as a variety of the *Novelle* and contributed to it the materials of the world of German *Bauern* life. It remained for Stifter, Storm, and Keller to complete this development during the period of poetic realism and to create that grand body of *Novellen* which constitutes one of the finest parts of all German literature.

The analyses of the works of these three men, individually and collectively, are among the best in the book. Mr. Bennett has a theory that the *Novelle* reached the end of its development in poetic realism, specifically in Keller, and that the *Novellen* which follow, viz., those of C. F. Meyer, Heyse, Fontane, Raabe, Schnitzler, Thomas Mann, *et al.*, represent decadence. Meyer is merely a virtuoso of form; Heyse likewise, but to a lesser degree; Mann and Schnitzler have even debased a noble form by making it serve as a pretext for psychological or psycho-analytical dissection. In Keller, as in Storm and Stifter, the *Novelle* reached its full German development in form and content because it was and is a *bürgerliches* genre and Keller and his colleagues were essentially *Bürger* while Meyer and Heyse were individualists living outside the world of *Bürgertum* and Thomas Mann and Schnitzler represent the period of its decay. Mr. Bennett merely alludes to subsequent writers, because, in the first place, he wished to treat only those authors whose literary reputations had been established before 1920, and, second, because in the light of his theory writers of *Novellen* after Keller are unimportant in the development of the genre.

The chief value of the book lies not so much in anything new which Mr. Bennett has discovered about the genre itself or the writers who developed it as in the scholarly ordering and interpretation of the facts already available. Regardless of the correctness or incorrectness of his theory regarding the relation of *Bürgertum* to the flowering of the *Novelle*, we were in great need of the kind of analysis which he has given us. By combining literary history and the history of culture with a painstaking analysis of both the authors and their individual *Novellen* (an appendix contains detailed synopses accompanied by graphic representations of the action of six of the major *Novellen*), he has shown us what each literary and cultural movement as well as the individual writers contributed to the development of the genre.

In spite of his learning Mr. Bennett writes in a very facile and imaginative manner and not the least of the many virtues of his book are his thumb-nail sketches and penetrating comparisons and contrasts. So, for example, his delineation by contrast of the art of Stifter:

Stifter would make the *Novelle* describe a long uneventful summer day, the sky cloudless from morning to evening, passing imperceptibly from one shade of

colour to another. But actually it is the business of the *Novelle* to describe the thunderstorm, which arising unexpectedly shatters suddenly the calm and serenity and then passes away leaving crops beaten down and houses destroyed by lightning [p. 140].

Or:

In Hoffmann's finest *Novelle*—*Das Fräulein von Scuderi*—the principal character, the goldsmith Cadillac, is psychologically monstrous, in the sense in which we have used the word to describe Kleist's *Novellen*. It forms an interesting parallel—as a Character *Novelle*—to the *Michael Kohlhaas* of Kleist, and reveals a characteristic which illuminates the different ethical standpoint of Kleist and the pure Romantic Hoffman: Michael Kohlhaas is the self-determining Willensmensch, who proceeds to deeds of outlawry and violence from an inner ethical and volitional principle; Cadillac is a man of instinct, who carries out his crimes in blind obedience to an obscure impulse, which as Hoffmann takes care to explain, is due to prenatal influences [p. 61].

Or again:

It is possible to find in the two types of *Novelle*—the Romance and the Germanic—a difference which is inherent in the spirit of the Mediterranean and of the Northern peoples; and to see precisely in Keller and Meyer, the two writers of the neutral territory of Switzerland, the representatives of the two cultures: the Germanic bürgerliche and the Romance aristocratic culture. Living in the same town as Meyer, Keller is directed toward German ideals in literature. Meyer, in spite of the fact that he writes in German (his correspondence is mostly in French), is directed towards Romance ideals in literature [p. 216].

Finally:

A *Novelle* of Keller in comparison with one of Goethe—not to go back to the classical example of Boccaccio—is like a picture of Titian or Paolo Veronese compared with the more serenely linear compositions of the early Florentine painters [p. 184].

In his main thesis that Keller the *Bürger* represents *eo ipso* the perfect flower of the basically bourgeois genre, the *Novelle*, I believe that Mr. Bennett is somewhat arbitrary and inconsistent. In his opening pages he gives expression to the danger of which he himself has become a victim by stating that "there is always the danger of importing into an a priori definition characteristics which have in fact been obtained from a consideration of actual examples of the genre" (p. 2). We are also reminded somewhat sardonically here of the brusque words of Keller written to Storm and quoted by Mr. Bennett (p. 181) regarding the idle theorizing of the scholiarchs. Mr. Bennett was at great pains to show that while the Romanticists violated and even destroyed the a priori conception of the form of the *Novelle*, they added *Stimmung* to its content. He emphasizes anew the idea that while new elements help to build new forms, they also destroy old ones (p. 161). As regards the Romanticists,

he maintains, and quite correctly, that to deplore the fact that they destroyed classic form is to deplore the existence of the German *Novelle* as such (p. 79). At various points he chides the purists of form (pp. 183, 184, 192, 283) and points out that in its best works the German genius has violated or at least strained the classical form (p. 160), and that this is most notable in the case of Keller (pp. 183, 184, 192). And yet Mr. Bennett insists that the writers subsequent to Keller represent decadence because they violate the form of the *Novelle* in the interest of psychological additions to the content. Consistency would seem to demand that one must at least temporarily withhold judgment, for it is entirely possible that the German *Novelle* may achieve new heights in the twentieth century. Mr. Bennett cannot, however, do this because he has an ax to grind, namely, his theory about *Bürgertum*. In this connection it should be pointed out that when von Grolman speaks of the *Novelle*, let us say of Boccaccio, as a bourgeois genre, he means something quite different from what Bennett means when he calls the German *Novelle* a *bürgerliches* genre. Mr. Bennett is aware of this distinction, as his express choice of the term *bürgerlich* already indicates (see also p. 283 n.). The point is, however, that if a German *bürgerliche* civilization of the nineteenth century could adapt to its needs a genre which was suited to a quite different bourgeois society of the fourteenth century, i.e., that of Boccaccio, who is there to venture the opinion that some form of twentieth-century German society will not likewise take this genre and develop it to even greater perfection? See in this respect L. A. Shears, *The Novellen of Joseph Ponten, GR, XI* (1936), 50 ff.

A minor inconsistency is Mr. Bennett's treatment of Heyse's famous "Falcon-theory." He disposes of Heyse's theoretical contributions as being "neither very profound nor very illuminating" (p. 14), which may or may not be true. Nevertheless, in his discussion of individual *Novellen* the author asks time and again how a certain *Novelle* stands up against the "Falcon"-test or whether it has the sharp silhouette demanded by Heyse. Granted that Heyse's theories are not very profound, it would nevertheless seem that they can be quite illuminating.

Although the author explains in his introduction that he will use certain untranslatable German terms, e.g., *Stimmung*, *bürgerlich*, one feels that he has impaired the general readability of his book by excessive use of German words and expressions which have an acceptable English equivalent. So, for example, *Novellendichtung* (p. 164); *Ideenkreis* (p. 170); *Problemnovellen* (p. 172); *Erziehungsroman* (p. 177); *Lebensform* (pp. 195, 234); *Kulturgeschichte* (p. 218); *Aufklärung* (pp. 197, etc.); *Gründerzeit* (p. 231).

Despite any adverse criticisms, there can be no doubt that Mr. Bennett's book is a major contribution. That it is the work of an English-speaking scholar should be a source of great pride to Englishmen and Americans alike. Its easy style and the facts that it consistently renders quotations from German sources into English and that the critical apparatus has been relegated to the rear make of it a book that can be read and used with profit especially by

the English-speaking layman who is interested in learning something about the appreciation of German literature. In this respect the book should prove a godsend to American teachers of German.

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Matthew Arnold and France: the poet. By IRIS ESTHER SELLS. Cambridge: University Press; New York: Macmillan Co., 1935. Pp. xvi+282.

Mrs. Sells's projected study, in two volumes, of the French influences on Arnold's verse and prose conveys an exceptional promise to anyone interested in seeing the laxity of most scholarship on the later nineteenth century supplanted by some greatly needed corrective investigation. Arnold offers a notable opportunity, not only by reason of the problems which find a focus in his work and the important rôle which France played in them, but because critical interest in his ideas since his death has been hardly more than indifferent. Several essays on his general position in the age have been written; a number of short studies toward the research which Mrs. Sells has now undertaken in its entirety have appeared; but accounts of his thought (since the early studies of Saintsbury and W. H. Dawson) have been prejudiced by the hostility of Lytton Strachey, or simplified by the facile iconoclasm of Hugh Kingsmill, or sentimentalized out of recognition by Mr. Charles H. Harvey's gloved piety.¹

These misfortunes of reputation derive to some extent from the disfavor to which Arnold's temperament and ambitions have been condemned; no serious Victorian author has fallen prey more readily—or, considering his anti-Victorian exertions, more unintentionally—to post-Victorian reaction and ridicule. His hopes and fears for culture, his censure of the Romantics, his immersion in the melancholy tedium of biblical criticism, and the belabored agonies of his spiritual conflict have been successive targets for all the popular

¹ Since Arnold's reputation is undergoing a course of revision, these early works take on a historical interest. Saintsbury's *Matthew Arnold* (1899) is now valuable only for its contemporary characterization; Herbert Paul's (1902), cut to the order of the "English men of letters series," is chiefly and conventionally biographical; Dawson's *Matthew Arnold and his relation to the thought of our time* (1904), the one useful pioneer study, is largely concerned with Arnold's interest in Victorian social and religious controversy. Strachey's "A Victorian critic" appeared in the *New statesman* on August 1, 1914, and was reprinted in *Characters and commentaries* (1933); it not only anticipated his later deflations of Victorian eminence, but perhaps influenced two decades of popular animosity. Kingsmill's *Matthew Arnold* (1928) is not without value as criticism, both corrective and suggestive, but is too obviously journalistic in purpose and style to survive its weaknesses as a popular biography. The inadequacies of Harvey's *Matthew Arnold, a critic of the Victorian period* (1931) have been pointed out in *LTLS*, January 14, 1932, p. 24; the book pays considerable attention to Arnold's writings on education. Mrs. Sells lists nine specialized studies of Arnold's Continental relations, but omits, because they do not bear on his French affiliations, three concerning his other foreign interests; these might have improved the balance of her argument at several points. Of two other works, Sir J. G. Fitch's *Thomas and Matthew Arnold* (1897) is a comparative study in personalities, and Stuart P. Sherman's *Matthew Arnold: how to know him* (1917) is only incidentally concerned with problems of evaluation.

varieties of anti-Victorian satire, until finally his definition of poetry as "a criticism of life" has called on modern disciples of the aesthetic movement to exercise their fiercest weapons of demolition. The "revival of interest" announced in 1930 by Mr. Eliot² has been, where obvious, largely negative, and where sincere or critical, difficult to trace. Little credit to modern taste or judgment is reflected in this cynicism. Arnold's work suffered obviously and equally by defects of personality and by the confusion of ideas around him. His doctrines of culture betray a sentimental traditionalism where he intended a corrective austerity. And in those tests of authority which the majority of modern critics face in vain, his shortcomings, though by comparison honorable, seem particularly marked because of the moral anxiety he betrayed in attempting to overcome them. Yet no Englishman of his time defined more clearly the two threats to critical integrity in the century: the cheapening aggressions of literary commerce, and the easy surrender of critics to new vogues in impressionism. And few employed the tests and contrasts of a foreign culture in invigorating English critical doctrines. Whatever one may say of Arnold's poetic and moral pessimism, it defines a problem rooted in the most serious values of modern poetry. Similarly his critical failings are the result less of an evasion than of a recognition of the critic's responsibilities. He was too English to accept the foreign reforms in poetry—notably Parnassian and Symbolist—which might have enlivened his modern appeal, but he was not too English to miss sharing with several poets like Landor, Browning, and Swinburne an unprovincial sense of European thought that now reveals him as one of the few Englishmen of Continental scope in his age.

These considerations are enforced more by their absence from Mrs. Sells's book than by any use she has made of them in informing and selecting her material. Her study is the result of a great amount of patient research in the backgrounds of Arnold's French contacts and reading. It sets up an ingenious (if sometimes strained or lenient) arrangement of parallels between his early poems and the works of Senancour, Vigny, Leconte de Lisle, and Jules Mohl's translation of Firdousi which he admired, and it supplies the topography of his French and Swiss travels. None of this work has been done so fully before, and no future biographer will avoid using the details Mrs. Sells has accumulated. Moreover, her forthcoming volume on Arnold's criticism should give her a clearer opportunity for justifying her purposes than this unwisely sepa-

² In "Arnold and Pater," *Bookman*, LXXII (April, 1930), reprinted in *Selected essays 1917-1932* (New York, 1932), pp. 346-58. Arnold's value to our time, and his position in his own, are largely illuminated by the work, both critical and poetic, of Eliot. Cf. F. O. Matthiessen, *The achievement of T. S. Eliot* (London, 1935), p. 3: "What Eliot has attacked principally is not the conception of poetry as criticism of life; indeed, no one lately has taken that phrase very seriously except in so far as it throws light on Arnold's own poetry. The main offensive has been against certain jaunty inadequacies in Arnold's thought and, in particular, against his loose identification of poetry with religion. And yet, in his most recent remarks about Arnold, Eliot recognized him as a friend, if not as a master; as one whose work at its best, both in verse and in criticism, has more to say to us than that of any other poet of his time."

rated treatment of his verse. It is unfortunate that the exploratory virtues of the present book are handicapped by three general defects, apart from the handling of documented fact by which specialists will be chiefly concerned.

The project is misconceived as chiefly biographical in nature, in the face both of patently insufficient evidence and of poetic clues either too conventional to be of personal meaning or too generalizing to offer aid in exact interpretation. This has led to much conjecture and mawkish interpolation, in the style of Maurois's *Byron*, particularly in the Marguerite episode. This Mrs. Sells manages to convert into a sizeable idyll³ in spite of a prefatory admission that "of 'Marguerite,' who first and last was the passion of Matthew Arnold's boyhood, we know little," and a concluding remark that "the mystery of Matthew Arnold's love for Marguerite remains unsolved." This passage is symptomatic of a tone of guesswork which, emphasized by inconsistent footnoting, infects the volume. At the same time it does little justice to those biographical ideals of Renan which Mrs. Sells has invoked in her defense.⁴ It rises from a faulty ambition to create a personal importance for poems whose real value is of another sort, and that sort too complicated by possibilities of imaginative and symbolic adaptation to depend wholly on what Arnold actually experienced between leaving Oxford and marrying Miss Wightman.

Again, Arnold's French leanings as here presented are those of youth and early manhood, preceding that "evolution [toward critical writing] naturally determined by the intellectual quality of his genius." They deal, in other words, with influences emotionally and (despite Mrs. Sells's parallels) often atmospherically absorbed, rather than intellectually recognized and grasped. They form in most cases the fragmentary and undecided beginnings of his thought, and even if greater evidence existed, it would be less important to fasten them to his physical experiences and early verse, than to the uses or convictions to which he later applied them. What they offer is one of the foremost cases in English poetry of the influence of typical French romantic style and attitudes, and of course Arnold serves as a guide to that important phase of nineteenth-century literature. But such a study requires both a different approach and a wider definition of the period, with its ideas and motives, than Mrs. Sells has given in her reconstruction of Arnold's visit to Sand at Nohant, his enthusiasm for Senancour, and his derivations from Oriental enthusiasts

³ Pp. 92-139, esp. pp. 99-114. Of the fifteen pages in chap. vii (pp. 92-107), only three paragraphs contain statements based on biographical fact, the remaining being devoted to the history of Thun, the topography of the Blümlialp, an ingenious reconstruction of Arnold's visit in 1848, and conjectures on the origins and appearance of Marguerite. Chap. viii (pp. 108-30) is devoted to deriving the effects of this visit on Arnold from the poems then or shortly afterward written, and to comparing his reactions with those of Obermann under similar difficulties. What style and imagination might do to justify these imaginative excursions as art Mrs. Sells repudiates by such phrases as "In such a mood, we may suppose . . ."; "a girl, occupied like himself with reading and musing among the flowers"; "we may picture Arnold at this age; the dark eyes, and the lashes which drooped over and hid their lively gaze . . ."; "no starched Victorian miss she, but a laughing fairy-like creature, 'a mere sprite of caprice' and winsomeness."

⁴ *LTLS*, March 7, 1935, p. 143.

like Vigny and Leconte de Lisle, who figure here in the most elusive phase of Arnold's philosophical excursions—his "attraction to Buddhism."

Finally, Mrs. Sells has hardly emerged from immersion in her material. Her lengthy quotations, patiently compiled and usually astonishingly derivative, become repetitious and her parallels desultory.⁵ This is largely because she has stopped short of forming a critical attitude both toward her evidence and toward Arnold's poetry itself. Her use of poetic examples becomes a matter of face values which, besides depriving her book of biographical quality that might sustain the reader's confidence, seriously weakens its sense of Arnold's spiritual and intellectual growth. Mrs. Sells does not question the *quality* of Arnold's verse in places where quality alone might have served as a clue to its objective value. Also, in spite of her prefatory and concluding warnings that the classics, his English predecessors, and German writers also counted in Arnold's development, the French influence is isolated and emphasized beyond its admittedly dominant rôle. It would have gained in character by contrasts and counterweights offered by his other educational experiences, and thus have tempered not only Mrs. Sells's strenuous urgings of an already obvious case but also her style. This, in its vague and sentimental lapses, is hardly of the sort to improve the inhuman stolidity of average literary research, which we join her in deploring. But it is likely to damage, by gratuitous underscoring, even the best of her many quoted passages. This is the more regrettable because it is chiefly as a valuable compilation of resemblances and as a redirection of our knowledge of Arnold that this book—at least until the appearance of its sequel or of several other studies now in progress—will stand.

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⁵ They are chiefly with Senancour: pp. 48-57, 60-79, 110-28, 136-65, 166-79, 181-95, 224-51, *passim*. The general effect of the comparisons is to suggest, whether by the fluency of his prose or by greater passion in expressing the *maladie de l'infini* or *maladie du siècle* for which he was admired, Senancour's superiority to Arnold's usually lax and iterative echoes of his thought. Mrs. Sells is not concerned with these possibilities in her comparison; she stops at insisting on her evidence as showing Arnold's "love" and "homage" for his model.

BRIEFER MENTION

Volume XIII of the University of Michigan's "Publications in language and literature" is entitled *Essays and studies in English and comparative literature*. The title is a misnomer, however, as the contents deal entirely with language and, aside from one article of twenty-three pages, specifically with the English language. The first "essay" is the long-awaited report by Samuel Moore, S. B. Meech, and Harold Whitehall on their survey of Middle English dialect characteristics and dialect boundaries. Based on positively localized documents (in most cases of the early fifteenth century), many not as yet printed, the study reports on the treatment of some ten different phonetic and morphological phenomena and presents maps showing the dialect boundaries for each peculiarity. Since the study uses data of a different kind from those on which Ellis based his dialect maps and from those used later by Oakden in his similar study of Middle English, the results are a valuable confirmation and supplement to information which we have possessed hitherto. Other brief articles by Dr. Whitehall and Professor Meech follow, and the volume concludes with an elaborate monograph of nearly two hundred pages: "The origin and extension of the voiceless preterit and the past participle inflections of the English irregular weak verb conjugation," by Dr. Albert H. Marckwardt. Needless to say, this is a complete and scientific treatise on the subject.—J. R. H.

Number 11 of the "Princeton studies in English" is *Sir Degare: a study of the texts and narrative structure*, by George Patterson Faust, a dissertation prepared under the direction of Professor Gerould (Princeton University Press, 1935). With the customary methods of textual criticism, applied as far as possible only to omissions, Part I analyzes the relationships of the extant copies of the romance and offers a stemma, slightly different from that previously proposed. Part II is an ingenious effort to decide from what sources the story was compiled. This is worked out quite exactly, and with remarkable plausibility. But the verdict of the thoughtful probably will be that, although everything may have happened as Dr. Faust supposes, the elaborate series of hypotheses is unproved. The author must be congratulated, however, on the lucidity of his presentation of the material. It is difficult to make clear such intricate details as the evidence of relationship of different manuscript versions and the relationship of narrative motifs, but Dr. Faust succeeds in doing so with ease. Moreover, he reveals throughout unusual intellectual honesty and a desire to see and to state any facts which do not agree with his hypotheses as well as those which do.—J. R. H.

A Chaucer bibliography, 1925-1933, by Willard E. Martin, Jr. (Duke University Press, 1935), supplements Professor D. D. Griffith's continuation of

Miss Hammond's manual. Arranged in essentially the same manner as Griffith's bibliography, this monograph seems to be quite as complete and useful. In appendixes Mr. Martin gives one page of corrections and additions to Griffith's work, and seven pages of additions to Miss Hammond's. He provides also an index of authors.—J. R. H.

The sixth of the Modern Language Association's monographs is Miss Charlotte D'Evelyn's edition of Peter Idley's *Instructions to his son* (1935; pp. vii+240) which, though previously well known by reference and publication of selections, has not been published before. The volume contains all the essential apparatus of a good modern edition—an introduction of seventy-eight pages on the author, his book, its date, language, and manuscripts, the text (printed from one manuscript with significant variant readings from the other six), a brief body of notes, and an index. Miss D'Evelyn has made clear that the author's proper name is not Idle but Idley. Not finding information about a fifteenth-century Peter Idley in Kent (where the author says he was born), she looked elsewhere and found abundant evidence about a Peter Idley of Oxfordshire, who had a son Thomas (it will be recalled that the Latin heading of the work states that it was intended for the instruction of his son Thomas). Suggesting that perhaps Idley's statement that he was born in Kent is intended not literally but as a somewhat humorous reference to a current idea that natives of Kent used particularly bad English, Miss D'Evelyn comes to the conclusion that the author is Peter Idley of Oxfordshire; and she gives a biography of that person derived from official documents. She may well be right, but it must be recognized that, since our chief source of knowledge about a fourteenth- or fifteenth-century person is public documents, if a man (not a great noble or prominent in some special way) was not in the public service, our chances of having information about him are slight. If Chaucer had not been in governmental employment nearly all his life, we should have but little knowledge of his biography. So, although undoubtedly it was right to give the biography of the Oxfordshire Idley here, we cannot be sure that he was the author of the not too lively or original *Instructions*.—J. R. H.

A useful bibliography of the Spanish drama has been prepared by Ada N. Coe, *Catálogo bibliográfico y crítico de las comedias anunciadas en los periódicos de Madrid desde 1661 hasta 1819* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1935). Starting with the beginnings of Spanish journalism, Miss Coe has carefully culled all allusions to plays acted and criticisms of them to be found in all the newspapers of Madrid printed between the dates indicated. To do this she has exhausted the facilities of many European libraries and the magnificent private collection of Mr. M. A. Buchanan, of Toronto. As theatrical allusions in these periodicals become abundant only in the mid-eighteenth century, we have a very complete picture of popular taste in the drama during the latter eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. This was a sterile period of literary degeneracy. It is interesting to note the tendencies. The old classic drama

continued popular, Calderón easily holding supremacy. But the best plays often passed disregarded. Though Ruiz de Alarcón is well represented, his two greatest plays, *La verdad sospechosa* and *Las paredes oyen*, seem to have been neglected during this long period. Next we note the excessive popularity of such meretricious dramatists as Comella, Valladares, and Zavala y Zamora. Next we note the large number of translations of foreign plays. Shakespeare qualifies with four plays: *Hamlet*, *Macbeth*, *Othello*, and *Romeo and Juliet*. Italy is well represented with Alfieri, Goldoni, and Metastasio; Germany with Kotzebue; and France, unworthily, with its most cheaply sensational playwrights. The picture is so sorry that it was high time for the Romantic revolution so soon to come.

It is niggling criticism to note detailed bibliographical slips in a work of wide scope. But in dealing with Kotzebue it would have been well to utilize Mr. Schneider's special study of that author's vogue in Spain, and with reference to *Troya abrasada* the reviewer might better have been cited than such ancient authorities as Mesonero Romanos and Salvá. Antonio Coello might in that case have been given his share of credit in the authorship of this play. Miss Coe has given us a picture of the Spanish drama in its dotage, superior to that given by Cotarello in his *Máiquez*, well and carefully done for the most part.—G. T. N.

Robert Gale Noyes in *Ben Jonson on the English stage, 1660-1776* ("Harvard studies in English," Vol. XVII [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1935]; pp. vii+351) has made a commendable contribution to recent studies of Elizabethan dramatic revivals. As a matter of mere statistics he has added to the chronology of Jonson performances for the period covered some 375 productions unnoted by Genest. No general bibliography is given, but the work is fully documented, and includes a useful list of editions of Jonson's plays, 1660-1776 (pp. 334-36). Noyes has not attempted to trace the influence of Ben Jonson on the later comedy of humors, believing that a detailed account of Jonson's stage record is a necessary preliminary to "an investigation so tenuous and so important" (p. vii).

From the standpoint of textual integrity Jonson fared better at the hands of posterity than did Shakespeare or Beaumont and Fletcher. Apart from two or three late farcical adaptations by Francis Gentleman, no "wretched and garbled renderings" defaced the stage. Up to 1725 the original texts appear not to have been tampered with, and for the next quarter of a century the only changes made were unimportant cuts for acting purposes. In the period 1751-76 four adapted versions appeared—*The alchemist* and *Every man in his humour*, as altered by Garrick; *Epicoene*, by Colman; and *Volpone*. The latter was published anonymously, but appears to have been a revision by Colman (cf. the *Morning chronicle and London advertiser*, September 13, 1783, quoted on p. 98). Perhaps the most important part of Noyes's study is his discriminating analysis of these four adaptations. He not only indicates in a concise and

readable manner the nature of the changes, scene by scene, but also points to the probable reasons for the alterations. In all cases the plays were considerably abridged (obsolete and indecent references were deleted; the underplot in *Volpone* was almost entirely removed; some nine hundred lines were omitted from *The alchemist*). Scenes were sometimes telescoped in order to maintain unity of place, or rearranged to heighten the climax (as in *Epicoene*, where Jonson's III, ii, the revelation of Epicoene's loquacity, became Colman's IV). The most interesting structural changes were made in *Every man in his humour*. Garrick, who played Kiteley, contrived, in Act IV, to maintain a continuous appearance on the stage. Scenes were changed and lines added to emphasize Kiteley's jealousy and give Garrick greater scope for his histrionic genius, at the same time obviating a certain diffuseness in the characterization. In all the plays, as Noyes points out, the alterations, justified on purely technical or dramatic grounds, sacrificed much of the Elizabethan gusto and pointed satire.

One of Noyes's major contentions is that the long continuance of Jonson's plays on the eighteenth-century stage was due, in large measure, to the perfection of the acting under Garrick, after whose retirement in 1776 they "died a natural death" (p. 31; see also pp. 54, 168, 218). On his own showing, however, each of the four major comedies was revived during the last quarter of the century, and *Every man in his humour* was frequently produced up to 1825 (cf. Genest, VII, 512, 514, 550, 568, 576, 611, 658; VIII, 48, 90, 127, 155, 536, 537, 563; IX, 307). In view of this Noyes's statement that "after 1776 it was positively hazardous to revive any of [Jonson's] comedies" (p. 36) requires modification.

The opening chapter, "Main currents in the criticism of Ben Jonson, 1660-1776," might have been more effective if the author had followed a chronological rather than a topical method of organization. One difficulty inherent in the subject itself is the lack of any definite unifying principle. The reader's attention is constantly being diverted from the plays themselves to the fortunes of the rival theaters, to the actors and their reputation, to the critics, and at times to purely literary allusions which have little bearing on the stage history of the plays. The text in general tends to be overloaded with quotations, some of which deserve merely footnote reference. One misstatement should be corrected. On page 191 Noyes states: "Pope wrote a letter to Henry Cromwell on August 29, 1709, containing, apparently, his only specific allusion to a play of Jonson's. His acquaintance with Jonson was not very extensive." Warren, in "Pope and Ben Jonson," *MLN*, XLV (1930), 86-88, shows that Pope was not only thoroughly familiar with Jonson but at one time projected an edition of his plays.—H. P. GUNDY.

William Mountfort was for some ten years one of the most popular and, according to contemporary reports, one of the most capable actors of the Restoration stage. The two parts of Mr. Albert Borgman's *The life and death*

of *William Mountfort* ("Harvard studies in English," Vol. XV [Cambridge, 1935]; pp. 221) consist, first, of an account of his career as a popular actor and as a playwright of slight importance; and, second, of a detailed narrative of his violent death at the hands of Captain Hill, and the ensuing trial of Lord Mohun as accomplice. Mr. Borgman adds practically nothing to our knowledge of Mountfort's life, but he does give a careful account of the plays in which he is known to have acted. This procedure is somewhat unfortunate, however, since too much of the *Life* is made up of summaries of plays either well known or well forgotten. The account of Mountfort's death is effectively handled; but, whatever the merits of the book may be, it raises serious questions. The story, as Mr. Borgman readily admits, has been competently told more than once, and although he has drawn on previously unused manuscript sources, what is new does not change the story substantially. Natural curiosity might attach a certain value to any new fact relative to the life, or even death, of a great genius, although discoveries of this sort as well are usually presented with a degree of dramatizing, ballyhoo, and padding that is out of all proportion to their ultimate importance. Mountfort, however, was, as Mr. Borgman makes clear, a person of negligible importance in the history of literature, and is chiefly to be remembered as an actor of promise whose career was short. Unless we are frankly to admit that students of literature are at their wits' end to find any more problems significant enough for serious study, or that literary scholarship has succumbed to the lure of the detective story (the book contains a map of the scene of the crime), and that hence anyone who died a violent death is to be made the subject of detailed researches in manuscript records until all the mystery of his last moments has been unraveled and the pertinent facts about the perpetrators, accomplices, and witnesses established, we must regret that the obvious labor involved and the skill shown by Mr. Borgman should have been lavished on embroidering a not too important twice-told tale.—M. E. PRIOR.

In his *Letters of Laurence Sterne* ([Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1935]; pp. xxxiv + 495), Lewis Perry Curtis has made an addition to the distinguished Oxford series of letter collections which is, in all respects of format, arrangement, and scrupulous editorial care, a worthy companion to the correspondence of Hume, Gray, Walpole, and Boswell previously issued. It also forms, as Mr. Curtis clearly shows in a charming introduction, a testimony to much more than the industry of Sterne scholars. It demonstrates as closely as the existing documents allow the good reasons for Sterne's continuous popularity in this intimate aspect of his genius. To reveal this with exactitude requires far more than long-standing familiarity with the tone and spirit of his style, or with the "flickering concentration" of his intelligence and what is disclosed to us in the restricted provincial and domestic orbit of his life. These letters, in spite of their intensely personal character, have lent themselves too readily to imitation and forgery to make the identity of Sterne's work a matter of com-

mon acceptance. Mr. Curtis' task has behind it a complicated textual history. He has had the difficult labor not only of investigating the authenticity of the items in eight standard and five popular editions of the letters which have appeared since Sterne's death, but of restoring passages mutilated by Sterne's daughter (in the interests either of discretion or of more creative impulses) and of establishing anew which letters were forged by William Combe or other experts at trading on Sterne's reputation.

Of the 223 letters now included (as against 131 in the edition of 1780, 145 in Brown's of 1873, 176 in Cross's of 1904, and 184 in the uncritical Oxford edition of 1926-27), ten are printed for the first time. To these Mr. Curtis has added, besides Sterne's *Memoirs* and the *Journal to Eliza*, two replies to the Archbishop of York's questionnaires, two memorandums, four letters purporting on fair evidence to be Sterne's, and five from his correspondents, making in all 236 entries. An appendix gives 40 letters relating to Sterne or his family but omits the 47 forgeries which have been the chief source of confusion in previous editions. The copious annotations form a virtual history of Sterne's family life, travels, readings, publications, associations, domestic and clerical interests from 1739 to 1768, the date of his death, which the last letter antedates by less than a week. These notes have grown far beyond those in earlier editions chiefly as a result of Mr. Curtis' explorations among the diocesan and newspaper records of York, as well as among an almost unlimited fund of contemporary references, literary, personal, and topographical. The result—aided by beautifully compact and contrasting printing of text and notes—is a volume which serves both as basis for any future attempt to improve on Cross's biography and as one of the best available pictures of the complex world which Sterne observed around himself, enhanced rather than curtailed by its distance from the center of eighteenth-century literary society in London. If it is true that his letters want "the distinction of adequately recording the rich and varied background against which he lived," it is also true that this is variously recorded in the letters of his contemporaries, few of whom had his opportunity to study the "microcosm of provincial England." These letters extend and explain the record of local conditions given in *Tristram Shandy*. Mr. Curtis has so far succeeded in diminishing Sterne's omissions and ellipses of reference as to make this book a rival, in point of historical and personal information, to that novel. "For this reason" alone, as he justifiably hopes, "abundant commentary can hardly be resented."—MORTON DAUWEN ZABEL.

The "American writers series," published by the American Book Company, has been enriched by the addition of a volume on *Jonathan Edwards: representative selections, with introduction, bibliography, and notes*, by Clarence H. Faust and Thomas H. Johnson (1935). No other American theologian has so profoundly influenced the pattern of our religious life and thought as did Edwards, and in large sections of the country his doctrines are still potent. Editions of his famous sermon, "Sinners in the hands of an angry God," were

printed in Louisville as recently as 1901, and in Fort Worth, Texas, in 1922. Mr. Faust's discussion of Edwards' philosophy and theology, which occupies eighty-five pages of the introduction, is an illuminating exposition, fully documented in footnotes. Since the author is compelled, in considering Edwards' doctrines, to describe the controversies in which he was engaged, the essay becomes a short treatise on eighteenth-century theology. The analysis of Edwards' literary style, and of the personality of the man, which is Mr. Johnson's contribution to the introduction, is equally satisfactory; and the carefully annotated bibliography of the biographical and critical apparatus for the study of Edwards is by far the best that thus far has appeared. The selections included in the volume run to 415 pages and cover the whole range of Edwards' writing. Beginning with the remarkable essays on scientific and philosophical subjects, written in his boyhood, they include the *Resolutions*, portions of the *Diary*, and the *Personal narrative*, excerpts from several of his more important works, and the most representative of his sermons. Generally the arrangement is chronological. The volume concludes with the texts of eleven letters.

—JAMES THAYER GEROULD.

In editing *Nathaniel Hawthorne: representative selections*, for the "American writers series" (New York: American Book Co., 1934; pp. xci+365), Mr. Austin Warren has made a good choice of selections and in his introduction and other editorial matter has presented valuable aids for the student of Hawthorne.

The first selections in the volume are excerpts from *The American notebooks* which are representative of the two most significant types of entries in Hawthorne's journals—his realistic descriptions of scenes written down from observation to be used later in his writings, and suggestions for tales or sketches jotted down at random from his reading, or from other sources. These are followed by selections from Hawthorne's prefaces, which are especially welcome since they bring out the author's strikingly clear and just estimates of his own works. The remaining selections include "Sketches," "Tales of New England," and "Moral tales and allegories." The editor has wisely excluded extracts from the romances, which for Hawthorne represent only tales grown long. With each selection Professor Warren gives the date and place of first publication. He has erroneously assumed (p. 21), however, that the preface to "Rappaccini's daughter" was printed when the story was first published in the *Democratic review* for December, 1844. The preface was not added until the 1854 edition of *Mosses from an old manse*.

The selected bibliography, which includes texts as well as biography and criticism, is helpful especially for the brief comments on the various items. The notes at the end of the volume are concerned largely with the sources of the tales and sketches, in *The American notebooks* and elsewhere; but the editor also includes his own criticism of some of the pieces. The purpose of the "American writers series" forbids, however, the completeness that might be

desired for both the bibliography and the notes. Among other writings, Professor Woodberry's *Nathaniel Hawthorne, how to know him* (Indianapolis, 1918) might well be included.

In his introduction Professor Warren has systematic and well-written sections on "The man," "Theology," "The problem of sin," "Anti-transcendentalism," "Politics," "European influences," and "Hawthorne as artist." Here he broaches several controversial matters. He seems to be treading on uncertain ground when he holds that Hawthorne is almost solely a product of Calvinism and the Puritan past—identifying the destiny in his tales and novels with Calvinistic predestination, assuming that the sin which enters into virtually all his writings is the sin of pride, and interpreting Hawthorne's stoical acceptance of the distasteful work in the custom-houses at Boston and at Salem as his submission to the "curse of Adam." He attempts to show that, even in *The marble faun*, the author conceived of sin as solely a warping force rather than as an educating and broadening influence. He stresses Hawthorne's "lifelong detachment from the intellectual and emotional movements of his day," states that Hawthorne knew but little theology, and makes no mention of the Catholic church among the European influences on Hawthorne. It is surprising that he accepts the "First diary" as authentic, and that he attempts to extenuate, if not indeed to justify, Mrs. Hawthorne's prudishly "cleaning up" her husband's notebooks as she edited them. Most of these topics are open to debate, and Professor Warren's opinions are provocative and most welcome.—ARLIN TURNER.

To my descriptive list of introductions to folk lore printed some years ago in the *Journal of English and Germanic philology*, XXVI (1927), 593-95, many additions might even then have been made; e.g. J. Ribeiro, *O folklóre* (Rio de Janeiro, 1919), a collection of casual essays; A. van Gennep, *Le folklóre* (Paris, 1924); and, perhaps the best of all, Karl Reuschel, *Die deutsche Volkskunde* ("Aus Natur und Geisteswelt," Vols. 644-45 [Leipzig, 1920]). In the last few years many more such works have come out. Students of literature will often turn to A. H. Krappe, *The science of folk-lore* (London, 1930). The turn of affairs in Germany has led to an enormous increase in publications of this sort. Among these recent works, Adolf Spamer, *Die deutsche Volkskunde* (Leipzig, 1934-35), and Wilhelm Pessler, *Handbuch der deutschen Volkskunde* (Potsdam, in progress), easily take the first rank. An effort to compile a series of independent studies covering the whole field took form nearly twenty years ago in the "Grundriss der deutschen Volkskunde," published by Trübner in Strassburg; but it brought forth only two small volumes on the riddle and the proverb. A similar undertaking, "Volk: Grundriss der deutschen Volkskunde in Einzeldarstellungen," may be more successful. It has just begun with a treatise on the history and methods of folk lore: Arthur Haberlandt, *Die deutsche Volkskunde: eine Grundlegung nach Geschichte und Methode im Rahmen der Geisteswissenschaften* (Halle: Niemeyer, 1935; pp. x+160). Further vol-

umes—about a dozen in all—are planned to cover almost every aspect of folk lore. Some hitherto neglected aspects, such as legal and musical folk lore, are to be taken up. Plans are laid for some volumes, e.g., the folk play and the proverb, for which editors have not been found, and treatments of at least two subjects—children's games and the magic charm—appear not to be provided for. Ferdinand Ohrt's admirable essay, *Trylleord* ("Danmarks folkeminder," Vol. XXV [Copenhagen, 1922]), could be easily adapted to provide the volume on the charm. The first volume of the series raises high hopes for the continuation. It falls into two parts: a brief history of German studies in folk lore and a sketch of theories regarding the aims and methods of folk lore. These subjects are competently treated. On legal survivals in folk lore (pp. 3, 144) see Anton Mailly, *Deutsche Rechtsaltertümer in Sage* (Vienna, 1929). On poems eulogizing a city (pp. 11–12) I hope to have something further to say before long. H. L. Fischer's *Buch vom Aberglauben* (p. 37) was reissued in a later edition and was continued in additional volumes. In the remarks on the music of folk songs (p. 94) the works by Müller-Blattau (see below in this issue, pp. 106–7) might have been cited. More significant than the assembling of such incidental addenda is the observation that Haberlandt's careful historical interpretation of the growing interest in folk lore from the fifteenth to the twentieth century suggests the need for a similar study in English.—A. T.

The fable of the Belly and the Members is surprisingly old and widely used. First written down in Egypt during the Twentieth Dynasty (1168–1085 B.C.), it is best known to us as part of the stock of Esopic fables. Notwithstanding its age and wide currency, it has always been preserved and transmitted through literary rather than traditional channels. Livy, Rabelais, and Shakespeare—to mention no lesser figure—told it. In a recent exhaustive treatise, *Die Fabel vom Magen und den Gliedern in der Weltliteratur* ("Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für romanische Philologie," Vol. LXXX [Halle: Niemeyer, 1934]; pp. 207), Heinrich Gombel gives an account of the many versions of the fables and prints by way of illustration a number of texts difficult of access. He touches upon some very difficult and interesting problems. For example, the existence of the Egyptian text brings confusion into the old and unsettled dispute over the priority of the fable as a genre in Greece or India. Gombel treats rather more fully than is usually done in similar descriptions of the versions of a fable both the stories paralleling the theme of his fable and the morals appended to it. He promises a further study dealing with its use as an allegorical representation of the state. So erudite and diligent a piece of work deserves commendation.—A.T.

In the comparative study of the Scandinavian ballad, which has, as everyone knows, important relations to the English ballad, we have been fortunate in possessing a standard collection for Denmark and an excellent anthology for Norway. On the whole, the Swedish collections are less satisfactory:

Arwidsson is practically unobtainable, Geijer and Afzelius, which is useful in supplementing Arwidsson, is after all incomplete, and Lagus is limited to the songs current in Nyland. Otto Andersson's long-promised collection of Swedish ballads in Finland is the first step toward the comprehensive collection of Swedish ballads. The first volume of Andersson's collection, which is entitled *Folkvisor, I: Den äldre folkvisan* ("Skrifter utgivna av svenska litteratursällskapet i Finland," Vol. CCXLVI = "Finlands svenska folkdiktning," Vol. V [Helsingfors, 1934]; pp. xxx+632), restricts itself to the older folk songs, many of which have great interest for the student of English balladry. Since historical ballads and humorous ballads have in general been excluded for the present, one cannot undertake a comparison of the stock of Swedish folk song in Finland with that of other Scandinavian lands. The value of Andersson's collection to the student of English balladry appears from the fact that it brings new texts of such ballads as "Näcken och jungfrun" (Andersson, No. 1; Child, IV, 441; *Danmarks gamle Folkeviser*, IV, 814; L. Heggstad and H. Grüner-Nielsen, *Utsyn pver gammal norsk folkevisediktning* [Kristiania, 1912], No. 22); "Harpans kraft" (A, No. 5; C, II, 137; *DgF*, No. 40; *Utsyn*, No. 23); "Olof och älvorna" (A, No. 10; C, No. 42; *DgF*, Nos. 47, 459; *Utsyn*, No. 14); "Lindormen" (A, No. 14; C, I, 297; *DgF*, No. 65; *Utsyn*, No. 35); "Systrarna" (A, No. 15; C, No. 10; *DgF*, No. 95; *Utsyn*, No. 45); "Magdalena" (A, No. 18; C, No. 21; *DgF*, No. 98; *Utsyn*, No. 51); "Staffan och Herodes" (A, No. 23; C, No. 22; *DgF*, No. 96; *Utsyn*, No. 50); "Riddaren Sankt Göran" (A, No. 30; C, III, 294; *DgF*, No. 103; *Utsyn*, No. 54); "Sven Svanevit" (A, No. 32; C, II, 437; *DgF*, No. 18; *Utsyn*, No. 68); "Sven i Rosengård" (A, No. 35; C, No. 13; *DgF*, No. 340; *Utsyn*, No. 154); "Den bortsålda" (A, No. 53; C, No. 95; *DgF*, No. 486; *Utsyn*, No. 93). See now the monograph by E. Pohl, *Die deutsche Volksballade von der "Losgekauften": ein Versuch zur Erforschung des Ursprungs und Werdegangs einer Volksballade von europäischer Verbreitung* ("FF communications," Vol. CV [Helsinki, 1934]). In brief, many of the most interesting and important ballads in Child's collection are here represented. Unfortunately, the editorial principles of the series in which this collection appears have excluded comparative notes of any sort. Such notes as I have given by way of illustrating the importance of this collection to students of the English ballad would have been very helpful and could have been given in a very compact form. References to four or five standard collections in various languages would have sufficed. After all, one must not look a gift horse in the mouth, and Andersson's collection is admirable. Melodies, often in many variant forms, are included, when available to the editor.—A. T.

Study of the musical aspects of German folk song has advanced notably in the last few years. The essay before me at the moment is Joseph Müller-Blattau's "Zur Erforschung des ostpreussischen Volksliedes," *Schriften der Königsberger Gelehrten Gesellschaft, Geisteswissenschaftliche Klasse*, XI (Halle: Niemeyer, 1934), 25-68. It contains a series of forty examples of East Prus-

sian popular music, with very simple and instructive musicological comment. Its great merit consists in the clear exemplification of the differences between old and new folk music and between German and Slavic musical types. Since a critical examination of these matters would lead us beyond the scope of this journal, I stop only to express my doubt of the interpretation (p. 28) of the "Carol of the twelve numbers" as a survival of Celtic heathendom (see my discussion of this theme in "Formelmärchen," *Handwörterbuch des deutschen Märchens*, II [1935], 171-74). The Breton text which is the basis of this interpretation is in Hersart de Villemarqué's *Barzaz Breiz*, a work containing texts of very doubtful authenticity. A companion piece to the essay here noticed is Müller-Blattau's *Das deutsche Volkslied* (Berlin-Schöneberg, 1932). This small volume reviews succinctly and clearly the history of the study of German folk music. As an illustration of the progress made in the historical analysis of German folk music, I cite the recently published *Deutsche Volkslieder* (Berlin, 1935), edited by John Meier. This is hard reading, and can scarcely be anything else. In simpler manner Müller-Blattau's essay and book illustrate the same problems. They may serve as an introduction to the subject. These three works enlarge our knowledge of folk music.—A. T.

Soon after his collection of figurative French proverbs noticed above (MP, XXXI, 334-35), Walter Gottschalk has issued a similar work on a larger scale: *Die bildhaften Sprichwörter der Romanen*, I: *Die Natur im romanischen Sprichwort* (Heidelberg: Winter, 1935; pp. xvi+279). The later work differs from the earlier in the omission of many references to sources. It provides us with a good index to the metaphorical proverb in the Romance languages, and particularly to those derived from biblical and classical sources. In the lack of a good discussion of Romance proverbs derived from the Bible, Gottschalk enables us to survey the field. Possibly classical and medieval Latin proverbs should have been distinguished more sharply than is the case. I should have considered "A quien cuenta las estrulas, le salen verrugas en la cara" (p. 7) a superstition rather than a proverb. "Por un clou se perd un fer ..." (p. 107) is the old saying "For the want of a nail the shoe was lost . . ." found in a fuller form in the *Household tales* of the Brothers Grimm (see Bolte and Polivka, *Anmerkungen zu den Kinder- und Hausmärchen*, III [Leipzig, 1918], 335-37; Taylor, *An index to "the proverb"* [Helsinki, 1934], p. 50). Gottschalk's choice of French and Spanish collections is good; the Roumanian collection is standard and comprehensive; the minor Romance languages are adequately represented. Since no large Italian collection exists and no good historical dictionary of the Italian proverb has been compiled, the representation of this prolific field is not altogether satisfactory. I look forward to the second part and the indispensable index.—A.T.

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